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SUM!vMY 
ihere exists in the modern VJorld a form of non-Christianised religious thought which develops the 
basic ideas of indigenous African religion beyond their beginnings, and is represented in authors 
such as Kamalu, Osabutey-Aguedze, etc. The spheres of interest in such authors fiJay be 
analysed in terms of the following areas: 
Intervening ideological conditions bearing on African life (particularr; theological and 
cosmological ideas): 
The historical background of African life; 
The roots of African life, as manifested in its traditions, and tts ethical and cultural heritage; 
Means for the innovative development of African Hfe, found in African concepts of knowledge, 
mysticism and magic; 
The perceived destiny of Afi"ican nfe. 
The thesis concludes with an indication of areas of agreement and debate in post-traditional 
African thought, of problems faced by such thought; and of other possible priorities for future 
study. 
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1 THE EXPLORATION OF POST-TRADITIONAL AFRICAN 
RELIGIOSITY 
1.1 THE PROBLEM 
Many contemporary accounts of African and African-derived religion seem to take for granted 
several unquestioned truisms about African religion. To begin with, it is assumed that ~rican 
reHgion', in so far as it is not a version of Christianity or Islam, must inevitably take the form of 
'traditionar reUgion, an ancient pre-Enlightenment set of perspectives that pretty much 
encapsulates the entire indigenous contribution of Africa to world religion. Moreover, it is 
assumed that ~rican religion' not only originates in Africa but also is confined there, and does 
not grow or develop in distinctively African perspectives beyond the continent. 
Those ~-mo are familar ~4'ith the distinction drawn by E~.iood ( 1991 : 128) beti.~en 'estabtished' 
and 'emergent' refigion v.JOuld probably be tempted to place most of what is called African reBgion 
in the 'estabfished' category, and admit 'emergent refigion' only In Christianised or Islamic 
movements on the African continent. Relgion with roots in non-Westernised Africa, in other 
words, would be simply assumed to be invariably the manifestation of some pre-modern or 
analphabetic perspective, or else to be merely a subdivision of some tradition of Semitic re&gion. 
It is the contention of the present study that this assumption is biased. Casual obseivation of 
certain sources relating to African philosophy, such as the work of Mascio (1994) and Wright 
(1984), reveals trends in African thought that, by provoking reflection on such things as the 
Egyptian roots of African culture, are suggesting new ways of understanding the religion of Africa. 
Further exploration of these movements, and related sources, shows that these new ways of 
understanding African refigion have developed virtuaUy into a new sort of refigion, apparently 
related to traditional African religion as Theosophy is related to orthodox Hinduism or Buddhism. 
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The boundaries of this reUgion are at the present time fluid and inexact, and it is difficult to draw a 
hard-and-fast distinction between 'beHever' and 'unbeHever', since the trend under discussion is, 
as wiH be shown, related to many attempts to merely describe existing African refigion, such as 
the philosophies of Tempels and Kagame, which almost by mistake and unintentionally created, 
so to speak, a whole new form of refigion. Alhough many of the important Hterary sources relating 
to this new 'emergent' retigion are over-elaborate systematisations of this sort, there are many 
sources 11'.Jhere the attempt to improve on traditional African reHgion is exp6cit and deHberate: 
such are, for example, the work of Kamalu (1990) and Osabutey-Aguedze (1990). 
In other words, we can speak in our day of an emergent post-traditional form of African reHgion: 
and it is the aim of this present study to summarise an exploration of various literary sources that 
either directly expound post-traditional African refigion or put forward related viewpoints that may 
be deemed its precursors. On the basis of the findings it is hoped that the main spheres of 
re6gious interest in post-traditional African thought wiD be more clearly understood, and that the 
Idea of a purely 'establshed' and uncreative African refigious tradition ~-.in be questioned in the 
Hght of the presently available data on recent trends in African refigious thought. 
The study of a religious movement whose boundaries are not clearly defined, and which indeed is 
more a relgion-in-becoming than a fixed body of be6ef or practice, is bound to encounter 
problems when previous fixed ideas are brought to bear on a phenomenon that does not flt into 
comfortable preconceived structures. For such a research problem, a method formulated for 
approaching processual phenomena in a relatively bias-free fashion seems particularly suited. 
1.2 PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON METHODOLOGY 
The present literary study was conducted within the quaitative research paradigm and employed 
a strategy modeled on the initial stages of the constant comparative method of analysis in the 
grounded theory approach of Glaser and Strauss (1967), employing principally certain forms of 
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open coding, together with the use, in the classification of basic categories of post-traditional 
African reHgious Interest, of a variation of the paradigm model originally proposed by Strauss and 
Corbin (1990) as an aid to axial coding. The result of this approach was the perception of 
previously unseen relationships and similarities between data sources and aspects of the ideas in 
data sources, and the provocation of various insights about the distinctive motivation and 
structure of post-traditional African thought, and the possible direction in which it was moving. 
The exploration of post-traditional African thought was to pose some problems in the Bght of: 
firstly, the possible influence of initial presuppositions on the findings; secondly, the alterations 
to the paradigm model of Strauss and Corbin, which were performed in order to adapt the 
classification of the emergent categories of the present study to the scope and content of the 
actual literary data sources; and thirdly, the limitations of the study in so far as it concentrated on 
expressions of ideas in Hterature, and left necessarily unexplored several other aspects of post-
traditional African relgion, which could possibly be suggested as priorities for more detailed future 
research. These three points wil be touched on in the discussion of theoretical framework and 
methodology, which folows below (1.3, 1.4). 
1.3 PRESUPPOSITIONS 
The study presupposed that there existed such a thing as 'post-traditional African reBgion', 
understanding by 'religion' any orientation towards that which was outside ordinary experience 
with the aim of introducing meaning and order into one's lfe. 'Religion' was therefore 
distinguished from non-relgious viewpoints whose horizons were lmited by 'ordinary experience'. 
This understanding of religion did not presuppose reducibility of refigion to befiefs or ritual or any 
definite system, but did presuppose some sort of structure in the He and worldview of the 
'religious' person. It especially did not understand by 'refigion' a be6ef necessarily held by more 
than one person as part of a recognised extra-academic tradition, for many of the reigious views 
held in the literature were personaly devised by academic authors themseh.les, and even within a 
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particular movement such opinions might be widely discussed but did not appear to have the 
status of 'orthodoxy' or of a fixed creed or dogma. 
1.3.1 THE CONCEPT OF 'AFRICAN' THOUGHT 
By ~rican thought' was meant in this study any thought inspired by the indigenous culure of 
sub-Saharan Africa, or by any perceived culural unity relating to black-skinned peoples of African 
extraction. As such, the '.Africanity' assumed by this study was a broad concept, inch.Jding not only 
perspectives articulated on the African continent, but also certain Afro-Caribbean forms of relglon 
related to Yoruba tradition, and some relgious perspectives of American provenance which 
professed an interest in the African roots of Afro-Americans. African thought within this broad 
spectrum was studied not only from within, but also from without, and thus this study included 
some writings by Western authors who reflected creatively on African and African-derived beUefs. 
The study sought to avoid nationalstic bias. It focussed on common interest in the reBgion of 
Africanlsed races rather than shared geographical area or racial affitiation in individual authors. 
Documents by black or intra-continental African authors were not given preferential status as 
'primary sources' for verification (1.4.2); the exploration aimed more at insight-provoking 'far-out' 
comparisons (Strauss and Corbin 1990:90) using varying contexts. More geographically 
concentrated description involving 'close-in' comparisons remains a priority for future research. 
THE PROBLEM OF WESTERNISATION OF AFRICAN THOUGHT 
It was not a straightforward matter in any case to find any example of purely un-Westernised 
'Africanity' in viewpoints strugglng to interact with African culture through the written word: some 
form of assimilation with non-African culure tended to creep in naturally with the very fact of 
alphabetisation, and the taking into account of global culture. There seemed no point in excluding 
viewpoints from the definition of '.African' simply because they were broadening the horizons of 
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'Africa' and opening themselves up to useful exotic viewpoints, whether Western or Eastern: for, 
apart from an a priori biased concept of black inferiority, there seemed no good reason to say that 
only the undeveloping or parochialy restricted viewpoints of Africa, that totaly excluded aU 
sources of external contribution to African continental cuiture, should be held to constitute the 
'rear Africa of the present era. 
THE STATUS OF WEST AFRICA IN THE "AFRICAN DIASPORA' 
This broad field of ~fricanity' was not nevertheless plumbed exhaustively, and there tNere several 
reasons for this. To begin with, the basic inspiration of this research was an interest In an 
emergent re6giosity that was neither Islamic nor Christian, and this tended to exclude such things 
as black theology and related movements. Moreover, the fact of including Afro-Caribbean and 
extra-continental movements in the study meant that much attention was necessarily 
concentrated on 'missing finks' related to the perspectives of Western Africa, for it was basicaDy 
here that one found the more important points of contact bettNeen Indigenous Africanised thought 
and the Africanised thought of the Western Hemisphere. Kamalu (1990) for example was an 
important example of an integration of Afro-American trends of reUgious thought with the 
philosophy of Kwame Nkrumah, evidence that these trends were not unrelated. The Yoruba-
originated reHgion preceding and fob.Jing the ~ican Diaspora' (cf. Beard & Cerf 1992: 12) 
tended to dominate the investigation both because of the abundance of material available, and 
because of the importance of this area as a 'convergence zone' where both continental and 
extracontinental perspectives most visibly interacted, for historical and other reasons. It was here 
that Africa really seemed to begin confronting the world at large. 
WEST AFRICA'S HISTORICAL ROLE IN DIALOGUE WITH WESTERN THOUGHT 
In the process of selecting sources for the present research, special interest was shown in 
perspectives, which developed mystical ideas and evolved philosophical systems of some 
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complexity. These, again, tended to be In West Africa or in American perspectives related to the 
West African religion, although there was no absolute monopoly: Kamalu (1990) and Gyekye 
(1987) were prime examples of fully worked-out philosophies in the context of Africa. The role of 
West Africa as a place where African and non-African cuitures had, according to the claims of 
some, historically interacted as equals (since the time of Timbuktu, and so forth), it was 
suspected, possibly accounted for a certain pecufiar taste for philosophy stiU present in the 
Western Africans of our day, 1tJho ~·.iere trying to return to an ancient and civiUsed aspect of their 
heritage: certainly Keita (1984: 68) acknowledged this as an element in his cultural past. 
CONCENTRATION ON NON-CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES 
On account of the study's particular interest in an emergent reiigion which was neither Islamic nor 
Christian nor purely traditional, the Uterary sources consulted, as has been mentioned, did not 
include to a great degree Christian responses to traditional African reUgion, or detailed 
descriptions of traditional re6gion from an anthropological point of view. Exceptions ~"Jere only 
made in the case of some people, Uke Griaule (1965}, whose scholarly descriptions were 
influential in the viewpoints of more modem trends in African philosophy or refigion and/or 
involved some creative insight or philosophication about African thought that went beyond the 
fimitations of an indigenous perspective. Tangential material of this sort was not studied 
exhaustively, however, given the greater interest in more explicitly post-traditional viewpoints. The 
work of Mbiti (1989 etc.) was treated sparingly in this study owing to controversy concerning 
possible Westernising distortions in his work, especially as indicated by P'Bitek (Hood 1990: 127-
128). Some of Mbiti's contributions to Africanised thought, however, were mentioned (cf. 2.6.3). 
RASTAFARIAN/SM 
An apparent exception to the non-consultation of Christian sources in this study was the inclusion 
in the research of some sources relating to Rastafarianism. Comparison of Rastafarian teachings 
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with the philosophy of Kamalu and Osabutey-A.guedze, and other Egyptological authors, revealed 
that under the superficial appearance of Christianity the Rastafarian worldview appeared to have 
more in common l/IJith the New Age and with emergent African-Egyptological religion than with 
mainline Christianity; and the same appied to the heavily Egyptoiogised theology of Barashango 
(1991 ). As a resull these sources were treated as post-traditional African or Africanised reUgious 
material despite the fact that they disagreed with each other on some points: for each had in 
common the appeal to indigenous African roots, the attempt to improve on the analphabetic 
perspective generally associated with traditional cultures, and the incompatibility of basic 
teachings (esp. pantheism and reincarnation) with traditional Christianity. By these criteria, 
practically any New Age appropriation of African thought, even by an outside New Age 
sympathiser making use of African sources, was deemed worthy of inclusion as a post-traditional 
African source. A more orderly description of the eventual make-up of Hterary sources dealt with 
in the studywift be found in 1.6. 
BLACK VS. WHITE AUTHORS 
No purpose seemed to be served by presupposing that only blacks could develop and insightfully 
reflect on the ideas of African reHgion. After au, it was not only white Christians that had 
something worthwhile to teH us about Christianity, and not only Asian Buddhist monks that had 
something to teU us about Buddhism, and the same lack of insider-oriented bias seemed to be a 
suitable frame of mind to approach a movement where the division between insider and outsider 
was not absolutely rigid anyhow. Thus the study included perspectives Dke that of Gonzalez-
Wippler (1973), who was influenced inter afia by the Celtic-inspired occultism of Dion Fortune, 
and offered an outsider-interpretation of the mystical dimensions of Yoruba-derived 'Santeria' and 
the significance of the 'orisha' (Yoruba deities) from a Western occultist perspective, in such a 
way as to confirm several insights about post-traditional African relgion found elsewhere in the 
data. 
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1.3.2 'POST-TRAOmONAL' RELIGION 
QUALITIES OF POST-TRADITIONAL AFRICAN THOUGHT 
The term 'post-traditional African thought' was understood to refer to viewpoints that either 
intentionally, or in the opinion of others, developed the traditional pre-colonial retigion of Africa 
beyond its initial indigenous form. Thus 'post-tradltionar retigion included not only expHcit reHgious 
viewpoints based on a New Age interpretation of Africa and so forth, but also comprised what 
O dera-0 ruka ( 1990: 7) called 'philosophication' or the creation of an African philosophy where, at 
least in the view of certain people, none had previously existed. Such philosophications were 
frequently influential in more recognisably developed perspectives; for example, the views of Mbiti 
(1989: 15ff) on the African idea of time resurfaced in the esoteric philosophy of Frye (1988: 91, 
121). Post-traditional documentary sources consulled in the study tended to concentrate on 
perspecti'ves Unking African reUgion i,.'IJith occultism, and sources which, though not directly related 
to Egyptology or occulllsm, were influential in the later articulation of such perspectives. This 
included some material on witchcraft as a form of innovative reHgion in Africa, such as the work of 
Geschiere (1997). 
THE HISTORICAL LOCATION OF POST-TRADITIONAL AFRICAN THOUGHT 
The sources of the study concentrated mainly on post-colonial perspectives articulated in the 
second half of the twentieth century. An exception to the rule was made for the work of 
Vusamazulu Credo Mutwa (1960, 1966 etc.) which, though written prior to the independence of 
South Africa from white rule, bore significant resemblances to later forms of 'black occullism' . 
.A.lso in a class of its own was the work of Jahn (1961) which was however related the post-
tradltional reHgious viewpoint of Senghor (1964). The work of James (19~), written when most 
of Africa was stil under white rule, was nevertheless influential in several post-traditional 
viewpoints found in the data. 
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BROADER .ANO NARROWER UNDERST.ANDINGS OF POST-TRADITIONAL THOUGHT 
In a broad sense, it could be argued that .ANY viewpoint that drew out Africanised reUgious 
thought beyond its beginnings was in some sense a post-traditional African re&gious viewpoint. 
But as was indicated ear6er, this study tended to concentrate on non-Christianised and non-
Islamic thought, and to devote attention to Western African and Afro-Caribbean perspectives 
which had a special historical role to play in the dialogue of Africa and the West. In other words, 
attention was focussed on viewpoints that did not conform readily to conventional Western or 
conventional indigenous African moulds. The viewpoints that tended to predominate in this study 
tended to tread along a sort of edge or horizon, between Africa and the West but not readily 
subsumable by either. 
Of course such viewpoints were not necessarily confined to Western Africa, as witnessed by the 
example of Mutwa (s.a., etc.) in South Africa, nor did the study altogether exclude viewpoints fike 
those of Mbiti and Uka, that seemed to Be comfortably on the Christian or African side of the 
'edge' yet offered insights relevant to less conventional and more Egyptological or mystical trends 
of Africanised thought. Nevertheless non-Christianised viewpoints, and viewpoints that integrated 
Western and African material without adhering rigidly to either Western or traditional African 
moulds of thought tended to predominate In this study. Thus the post-traditional African thought 
conceived in this study consisted of thought that developed, or was significantly relevant to the 
development of, refigious ideas that drew out the indigenous refigion of Africa beyond its 
beginnings and beyond both conventional Western .AND conventional or famifiar indigenous 
African moulds of reHglon. 
'Development' here is a value-neutral term signifying passage from the 1mpficit systematisation' of 
commonly held beUefs and practices (cf. 2) towards more expUcit systematisation thereof 
(especialy through philosophy, science, technological reflection or esotericism). The term also 
refers to innovative or sociaUy chalenging articulation of thought. Among the authors studied, the 
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expHcit systematisation of reHglous thought had a pluriform character, there being no uniform er 
'one true' expHcit reigious systematisation similar to the 'creed' and 'dogma' of Western refigion. 
1.4 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
The present study was an exploratory analysis of Hterary sources relating to post-traditional 
African refigion by means of an approach modelled on the initial stages of the constant 
comparative method of analysis in the grounded theory approach of Glaser and Strauss (1967). 
The approach made use of a modified form of the paradigm model of Strauss and Corbin (1990: 
99) as a means fer arranging the principal categories of the study, and so arranging into some 
sort of order the various central spheres of interest to be found among post-traditional African 
thinkers. 
The approach of literary analysis, as a way of obtaining material for this study, while leaving 
untouched many areas of post-traditional African religiosity, was at the same time the most direct 
and obvious 1Nay of making first contact vilith the thought of these thinkers. They came from au 
comers of the globe, and existed in both hemispheres. For the direct investigation of a movement 
spanning at least three continents (Africa, North America and South .America) the written word 
was the most Inexpensive, accessible and straightforward choice for the object of an exploratory 
study, a key goal of which was to make the movement more widely known, and point the 
audience of this report in a direction where they could most easily lay their hands on confirmatory 
evidence, namely their very own academic Hbraries - a source of material for comparative 
analysis that Glaser and Strauss (1967: 179 cf. 176ff) had already suggested could be made 
more of by theorists than had traditionally been the case. Thus, this study was undertaken as an 
analysis of the information afforded by various Hterary sources consulted: an approach whose 
disadvantages of leaving certain avenues of reHgious Hfe unexplored (cf. 1.4.2), especially where 
relevant extant sources were not readily obtainable, seemed possibly remediable by future study 
aimed at fling in the relevant gaps. Literary research seemed perhaps an inadvisable point at 
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which to finish or discontinue totafty the investigation of post-traditional Africanised reRgiosity; but 
this did not contraindicate its advantages in the preBminary stages of research on this subject, to 
which context the present exploratory study of this report appeared to belong. 
'Post-traditional thought' was a researcher-originated concept (cf. Strauss and Corbin 1990: 68) 
formulated as a way of capturing the idea of emergent Africanised refigion. In contrast to 
'radltionar reRgious thought preserving pre-colonial African orientations minimally influenced by 
favourable or adverse reactions to the West, 'post-traditionar African thinkers were those in lt'Jhom 
Innovative articulation of African reBgion predominated in some way over presuppositions derived 
from ordinary pre-colonial reHgion. This did not prevent 'post-tradltionar interlocution of traditional 
refigion - the usual form wherein post-traditional and traditional thought interacted - and 
occasional modern dialogue with more traditional views (cf. Griaule 1965; Odera-Oruka 1991 ). 
The work of Wanjohi (1997: 54, 90) indicates the difficulty of uncovering 'pure' traditional thought. 
1.4.1 RESEARCH GOALS 
EXPLORATION 
The study was an exploratory study, made for the purpose of examining a relgious movement 
which seemed to display too much idiosyncrasy and variation to be generafised by means of a 
descriptive study, and which moreover had not yet crystallised into a definite tradition llllith a 
definite creed or party Une. The goal of the research involved not so much the description of a 
common relglous system as the tracking of a sort of ongoing dialogue or debate on reUgious 
issues between people on and off the continent of Africa, which focussed on several common 
areas of interest (e.g. the concept of God in Africa, the significance of Egypt in African history, 
African forms of mysticism etc.) llllithout having any fixed area of consensus, other than a strong 
interest in Africa and an enthusiasm for developing the African heritage and culural resources, 
whatever these were conceived to be. 
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THE CONSTRUCTION OF PRELIMINARY CATEGORIES 
The eventual end resul of this study was a series of common causes or shared trends of thought, 
which suggested possible ranges of opinion and interest which could be found in post-traditional 
African thought about refigion, but which were not exhaustive or comprehensive. Rather than 
describing universally instantiated attributes of post-traditional African refigion, which might have 
given a misleading impression of unanimity in the sources, the study explored the discussions 
and controversies which gave rise to principal variations of opinion, and ended up with a series of 
prelminary categories, which could be used as a guide to the main areas of interest for the 
benefit of future studies of post-traditional African ideas about religion. 
1.4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The analysis of the data was based on concepts, ideas and controversies which recurred in the 
lterary sources on post-traditional African religion that were studied. The data analysis procedure 
consisted mainly of open coding with some use of axial coding. 
OPEN CODING 
Any idea that occurred as a common sphere of interest in a significant number of data sources 
{e.g. the defects of Western culure, in comparison with the African way of fife) was noted, and 
any item accumulating many multiple references in this way was subjected to questioning in order 
to isolate Its areas of variation and its relationship with other ideas uncovered by the study (e.g. 
criticism of Western science, re6gion, racism, lack of emotional peace etc.). This joint 
employment of comparison and questioning constituted what Strauss and Corbin (1990: 62) 
caled 'open coding' of data. By means of such methods a series of categories and sub-
categories was created, for the purpose of sorting the data of the study into some kind of orderly 
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arrangement, whose order was dictated more by the structure of the data themse.,es than the 
prejudices of the researcher. 
AXIAL CODING 
The process of axial coding, as described by Strauss and Corbin (1990: 96, 99) involved the 
putting of data back together in ne~·' ways after open coding. It made use of a paradigm model 
which sorted the data bearing on any human action in accordance with the following categories: 
The phenomenon itself 
The qualities of the immediate context of the phenomenon (including qualities of the 
phenomenon itself which affect strategies for human reaction to it) 
Causal conditions bearing on the phenomenon 
Intervening conditions, or qualities of the broader context influencing the phenomenon, and 
thus intervening' between the beginning and end of the process 
Strategies used for the purpose of reaction to or management of the phenomenon 
Consequences of strategies 
By placing data in such categories it became possible to gain an understanding of the process 
studied by expficitly adverting to the factors which influenced and were influenced by the process, 
and by variations of the same. The question arose however of whether this paradigm model was 
in any way an imposition on the data of preconceived categories. In the context of the present 
study, se\o'eral considerations seemed to argue for a change in or adaptation of the model. 
THE PARADIGM MODEL OF THE INSIDER 
The emergence of broader central categories of data under the influence of open coding revealed 
that the central categories of interest among the authors of the study corresponded in some way 
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to the divisions of the paradigm model alhough not in al respects. Thus in relation to the general 
'phenomenon' of the reUgious Ufe of the African, post-traditional sources tended to debate and 
comment on the following areas: 
The traditional roots of the African, and the resources for moral goodness, harmony and so 
on present in the African background regardless of urban or rural habitation. This furnished, 
in ideological terms, the immediate context for a good reUgious Ufe as conceived by the 
African. 
The historical conditions, both in colonial times and in more ancient 'Egyptian' times, which 
were regarded as shaping the modern consciousness of the African, and were beUeved to be 
causes of his/her present state of mind. 
The general 'African' pattern of cosmology, handed down in myths and elsewhere, which 
indicated the presence of various abiding influences and spirits, and formed in ideological 
terms a broader context or set of intervening conditions in the midst of which reUgious Hfe 
~'\las held to take place. 
Various strategies, whether educational or scientific or (very often) esoteric or mystical, by 
means of which the fuB potential of African Ufe and refigion could be in post-traditional terms 
enhanced and developed. 
Expected consequences or goals of the African Ufe, such as an ideal African humanity, or a 
vision of happiness in this world or the next, which were part of the raison d'etre of post-
traditional developments in African relgion. 
These categories corresponded to the divisions of Strauss and Corbin's paradigm model, and 
indicated that the basic spheres of interest in the data in effect constituted a paradigm model of 
sorts that was emergent from the data rather than superimposed on it. In view of a concern not to 
impose on the data a systematic framework foreign to it, it was decided that this emergent 
insider' paradigm model, rather than the unadorned paradigm model of Strauss and Corbin as it 
stood, would be the main influence in arranging for analysis the ideas and controversies present 
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in the data, as being more representative of the true interests of the Uterary sources and the true 
issues of the movement provoking discussion by insider and outsider aHke. 
THE PROBLEM OF OUTSIDER PERSPECTIVES 
A key chaUenge was to study the post-traditional movement in terms of the spheres of interest 
represented by the insider paradigm, but without an insider-oriented bias. The present study tried 
to achieve this end by including not only post-traditional African reHgious viewpoints articulated in 
terms of this insider paradigm, but also some sceptical or detached responses to viewpoints so 
generated. In effect, the post-traditional relgious African raised the basic issues for this study, but 
both he/she and his/her opponent were allowed to have their voice heard on these issues, and to 
be included in the data. Thus, the study accepted African occultism as a sphere of interest to the 
insiders', but included among the data an article of Bodunrin ( 1995) criticising African belief in 
witchcraft, and two articles by De MonteBano (1991, 1992) criticising the esotericism of the 
African-American Baseline Essays. 
UNDERSTANDING VS. VERIFICATION 
A comparison of the insider' paradigm model with the version of Strauss and Corbin revealed an 
important difference between the two: that whereas the outsider model was interested in real 
historical conditions acting on the phenomenon, in tangible causes, conditions, goals and so on, 
the insider paradigm had a more intangible and ideological import: it related to perceived goals, 
perceived causes and perceived history, and positive or negative reactions to such perceptions 
by various authors. There were in effect two different spheres of study possible concerning post-
traditional African refigion: firstly, the understanding of the basic issues which were of interest to 
its thinkers, and how people within and outside this or that relgious orientation of the movement 
reacted to them; and secondly, the verification of the claims made In so far as this was 
historicaly possible. 
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The first possible form of study, for example, would note that many post-traditional Africans 
befieved Egypt to be the origin of civifisation. The second form would Investigate whether or not 
Egypt was in fact the origin of civifisation. The first form would note that some post-traditional 
Africans claimed to have gained occult powers through initiation in traditional ceremonies; while 
the second form might investigate whether or not these occult claims actually worked in the real 
world, or whether it could be proved that the initiation ceremony was actually held at aD. 
The present study dealt principally with the first form of investigation (namely the understanding 
of the reHgious orientation of the post-traditional African, and the reactions it provoked from 
outsiders in the ideological sphere), both because of the impossibility of carrying out the research 
necessary for even an overview of the second approach in the course of a single literary study, 
and because it appeared premature to subject a be&ef or orientation to historical-critical study 
without having first tried to at least understand it and famiDarise oneself to some degree with the 
present state of the question. Thus, the present study concentrated on understanding post-
traditlonal thought and dialogue at an ideological level, by means of the insider paradigm outHned 
above, and the ways in which people reacted, positively or adversely, to thought articulated in its 
terms. 
1.5 THE IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
The resul of this study's literary anai';sis was a series of categories of reffgious interest, arranged 
in accordance with the modified paradigm model proposed above and explored for variations of 
opinion. The broad structure of these categories corresponded to the basic features one would 
expect in a Western theological system. There was the theology and cosmology of Africa, the 
sacred history of the black race, the moral teachings of Africa, the African way to 'salvation' or, 
more exactly, development of oneself and society, and the destiny of the African in this fife and 
hereafter. A danger definitely existed that such an arrangement would give the impression that 
more uniformity existed in post-traditional Africa than was actually the case. It should therefore be 
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stated clearilj at this stage that the study did not in fact uncover a single 'one true' form of post-
traditlonal African reRgion (cf. 1.3.2), and the unification of post-traditional Africa into a single core 
tradition was something to be looked for, not in the present, but at most in the future. The unity 
inking and relating the disparate trends of the movement was of a sightly different nature. 
INCLUSIVENESS 
Although the post-traditional authors were not united by means of a shared system, they !!'-Jere 
united in the sense of adopting a generally inclusive worldview which encouraged the tolerance of 
variant viewpoints and the use of the insights of other Africans whether or not one accepted their 
individual systems. The outlook of Barashango (1991: xii), who sought to convert people to 
Afrocentrism rather than to any definite refigion, corresponded to the picture of 'modernised' 
African reRgion manifested in the data. This attitude of tolerance was not at/.;ays consistently 
manifested, especially when Western culture and religion were subjected to criticism; but the 
interdiscipUnary attitude to science, religion and so forth demonstrated by many authors meant 
that ideas were freely borrwred from aft available sources, and that mutually incompatible trends 
in the movement could nevertheless be related by reason of certain shared ideas (e.g. in the 
realm of pantheism, reincarnation, vitaism and so forth). 
THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION 
The adoption of an interdiscipinary viewpoint introduced an additional complication into the use 
of the paradigm model as described in 1.4 .2, since it meant that, although most of the data fitted 
straightforwardly into one of the categories of the model, there were a few central themes that 
belonged to more than one category, and the discussion of which had to be split up for the 
purpose of the study. The most prominent example was the theme of l'v1yth, which could be 
viewed as an instrument of cosmology (an intervening condition), or an aspect of the African 
culural heritage (an aspect of the immediate context) or in some cases a symbol embodying 
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occult power secrets (a strategy for personal transformation). Also problematic were the themes 
of Man and the Ancestors: were these beings aspects of the African universe (intervening 
conditions), or guiding principles of everyday Ufe in Africa (the immediate context) or 
embodiments of the African ideal of true humanity in this Ufe and the next (goals or expected 
consequences of action)? The subdivisions of the paradigm could not be rigidly separated: since 
many of the authors adopted a view of African Hfe as a sort of seamless web including au aspects 
of reHgion and human activity, it could not be expected that the subject-matter of the categories 
could be hermetically separated. It appeared that the arrangement of material adopted in this 
study could not be regarded as the sole vatid way to put together the material provided by the 
Bterary sources studied. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRADITIONAL AND POST-TRADITIONAL AFRICAN RELIGION 
A further issue requiring comment was the fact that the priorities of post-traditional refigion as 
uncovered by this study, despite the insistent claims of some authors (cf. Kamalu 1990: 2, 3) that 
the 'ancient' African or Egyptian sources they drett1 on were compatible with traditional reUgion, 
diverged markedly from the traditional refigion of Africa as known to Western scholarship. Since 
the criterion for inclusion in the present study was the innovative development of African tradition 
beyond its beginnings, it was to be expected that the more fit an author was for inclusion in this 
study, the less refiable his views would be as a representation of traditional African refigion. 
The most significant differences were to be found in the area of strategies and consequences of 
action: to the extent that the authors of the study interacted with an alphabeticised culture, they 
seemed to develop a concern with human destiny and personal and inteUectual development 
whose overal tendency was to tum traditional refigion into something more compficated. The 
degree of remoteness in the viewpoints of the authors from African traditional reUgion as 
commonly understood tended to vary from author to author, and the description of the &terature in 
· 1.6 may give some idea of the grades of this variation. 
19 
1.8 THE LITERARY SOURCES OF THE STUDY 
The sources consulted for the purpose of this study could be classified broadly as sympathetic or 
hostile to the emergent refigion of post-traditional Africa. Whether positive or negative, most 
literary sources could be arranged in a series of classes based on the degree of innovativeness 
present in the form of African thought under discussion. Three basic classes (caled for the sake 
of convenience classes A, B and C) could be isolated. 
Class A comprised what might be caled the emancipatory restatement of traditional refigion. 
Such a class included the attempt by Chavunduka (1994) to raise the themes of traditional 
medicine and ll1Jitchcraft as issues worthy of serious consideration by the people of the twentieth 
century. It also included inadvertent 'philosophications' of African thought resulting in the creatio_n 
of new systems, as described earfier (see 1.1 ). Such sources often purported to be 
representations of traditional African refigion, but added features, such as the model of African 
theology of revelation proposed by Uka (1991b: 153-165), which betrayed them as improvements 
on the original tradition. 
Class B comprised creative thought about African and Afro-Caribbean refigion, and as such was 
not the exclusive monopoly of the black or white race. The work of Jahn (1961) and Gonzalez-
Wippler (1973) feU in this category, and some sceptical Bterature relating to African viewpoints 
was also included. 
Class C comprised expticit post-traditional African retigious viewpoints. Many of the sources in 
this category subscribed to an Egyptological perspective which treated the refigion and occulism 
of ancient Egypt as part of the African culural heritage. In addition to this perspective, and the 
Rastafarian worldview already alluded to in 1.3.1, three other important strands of thought were 
worthy of mention: 
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The American trends inspired by Yoruba refigion offered some interesting material. One of 
the literary sources in this category (Neimark 1993) came from a white American who 
practised the Yoruba refigion: and some material relating to the Yoruba-inspired spirituafism 
of the Umbandistas of Brazil was included in the study {McGregor 1966; Ortiz 1989). 
Two of the sources, namely Mutwa (1960 etc.) and Some (1994) contained what purported to 
be accounts of traditional initiation and introduction to a sort of African secret teaching or 
occultism. These two sources were included for purpose of comparing their views !Nith others 
in the study: but no attempt to verify their claims l!'Jas made. 
The reUgion of the Negritude Movement was represented in this study in the work of Senghor 
( 1964). This refigion formed a sort of 'special case' in the data in so far as it was integrable 
with orthodox Christianity (Senghor himself tNas a CathoUc [Taylor 1967: 371]) yet was 
influential in other less explicitly Christian viewpoints, such as that of Jahn (1961), and 
contained an undercurrent of interest in the 'magicar aspects of life that related Senghor's 
thought to other trends in African mysticism (Senghor 1964: 267-268, 280). 
The literary study tended to concentrate on Class C as the more central area of interest, including 
material from Classes A and B which were related to debates, opinions and discussions referred 
to in the C sources. This led to an underemphasis or exclusion of several authors from the data 
whose work was more in the fine of scholarly exposition of African traditional refigion than actual 
development of post-traditional Africanised refigion - perhaps another priority for future 
comparative studies. 
1.7 TREATMENT OF THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS TRUTH-CLAIMS 
A note is in order to prevent, at this point, a possible but inaccurate conclusion from the content of 
the present report. From the discussion of research findings in subsequent chapters the reader 
might be tempted to infer that I personaly agree with, or even that I am sympathetic to, non-
traditional Christology, mystical ideas or theology in post-traditional African thought. This would 
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be a mistaken impression. My personal reUgious belefs are, in many areas, in direct and 
irreconcilable opposttion to the perspectives explored in the present study, and their exposition 
and defence would be a totaHy different task from the scientific exploration attempted in these 
chapters. For example, the subject matter of the section on post-traditional African responses to 
Christianity (3.5.2) is concerned with what post-traditional African authors have written about 
Jesus, not with my personal Christology . .Although my discussion of the ideas of Barashango and 
others about Christianity is not uninfluenced by my beUefs, I have tried to limit the intrusion of my 
personal views to a bare minimum, making no faith-oriented theological truth-claims, but only 
such statements about the logical impHcations, significant . omissions and comparative 
characteristics of reHgious positions as could be conceivably verified by the scientific examination 
of texts pertaining both to the sources explored in the present study and to my own refigious 
tradition (conservative CathoHcism). A fuB theological treatment of the fiterary sources explored in 
this chapter is beyond the scope of the present research. 
1.8 THE BASIC INTENTION OF THE STUDY 
The aim of this study involves exploration of the potential of post-traditional African religion, as 
instanced by some of those thinkers and re6gious believers whose writings are related to it. It is 
not a descriptive task; it does not go so far as to prescribe a single universal form of post-
traditional African refigiosity. The study aims at furnishing some provisionally constructed 
categories that may give some indication of what one can expect to find when studying post-
traditional African refigious authors; it seeks to provide a sort of prefiminary orientation which wiH 
of course be open to correction and modification when general knowledge about post-traditional 
African thought becomes more exact in future. 
The research discussed in Chapters 2-7 of the present report hopes to offer and to some extent 
explore ideas on the following areas: what can the post-traditional community of thinkers agree 
on? What themes of refigious beief are likely to become popular causes? On the other hand, 
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what differences of opinion may arise? What are thinkers going to argue about? What are the 
sensitive areas? Where is the potential to say or propose something new in the reDgious sphere? 
The present study is exploratory, not descriptive, and any generafisation in this study about the 
actual state of things is necessarily &mited to the scope of the data: whenever the reader finds a 
reference in this work saying "Post-traditional reUgion tends to ... • do this or that, the meaning is, 
of course, post-traditional retigion as manifested in the sources chosen for this study, which are 
deemed indicative of possibitities present in post-traditional and/or African Renaissance-related 
reUgious thought as a whole. Of course, such exploration as that of the present report cannot be a 
substitute for further descriptive study. But it can draw attention to features that may wen deserve 
attention in future investigations of this sort. 
1.9 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
The research findings relating to the above Uterary sources, and summarised below, wiH be 
arranged according to the subdivisions of the insider' paradigm model mentioned in 1.4.2, ~·Jhich 
correspond to the core categories of post-traditional African religious interest. The findings will be 
discussed in relation to post-traditional refigious fife as the central phenomenon of the study, 
affected by various ideological contextual elements and developed by means of various 
strategies. (References to '.African' Ufe, time destiny' etc. signify Dfe, time etc. as interpreted by 
Africanised refigion, and lack racially discriminatory meaning here). 
Chapter 2 wiR deal with the Origin of African life. This wiD contain an exploration of the theology 
and cosmology of post-traditional African reDgion, and the betief in spirits and powers of various 
sorts that forms part of post-traditional African mysticism. 
Chapter 3 wiB deal with the Historical Background of African Life. This wil contain an account of 
attempts by Africans to pklmb the riches of their culural past (in Egypt or elsewhere) and to react 
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to Western and colonial culure in the present. The issue of black-white racial conflict in relation to 
refigion wiU be touched on here. 
Chapter 4 wiD deal with the Roots of African Life. This wiD deal with the attitude of post-traditional 
Africans to their traditional heritage, and with the abiding features such as morality and artistic 
expression forming part of the cuttural values and heritage of Africa which must be upheld and 
preserved from age to age. 
Chapter 5 wiR deal with the Development of African Life. Beginning with a consideration of the 
potential sources of innovation and understanding present in traditional African refigion (such as 
witchcraft and traditional medicine) the chapter wiU go on to deal with the development of Africa in 
the inteDectual, educational and mystical sphere, and wiU discuss the epistemology of post-
traditional African religion in this context. There win also be a discussion of post-traditional African 
ideas concerning magical power. 
Chapter 6 tAJiD deal with the Destiny of African Life, in the form of material happiness in this Hfe or 
in the next incarnation, and in the form of the gnostic or mystical pattern of God-reafisation or 
ideal humanity present in certain forms of post-traditional African mysticism. 
The study wiD finish off with a series of conclusions about the direction in which post-traditional 
African religion appears to be moving, and about the aspects of contemporary post-traditional 
debates on African refigious cosmology, history, roots, destiny and so forth lNhich are prevalent 
enough to require further study. The goal of demonstrating that there is an emergent retigiosity 
developing African tradition beyond the pre-colonial level should hopefully be substantiated by the 
indications of debate on African refigious issues that wiR be documented by appropriate 
references to the analysed literature in the discussions of Chapters 2-6. AD the fiterary data 
sources employed in the studywiH be found in the Bib&ography at the end of this report. 
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2 THE ORIGIN OF AFRICAN LIFE 
The rettgious life of post-traditional Africa uncovered by this study, in spite of the extensive 
innovation it introduced into the framework of more traditional retigion, showed certain features 
common to aH the religions of the world. One of these was the tendency indicated by Kruger 
(1995: 151) to conceive or experience the human world as a meaningful Gestalt, that is, to 
construct some sort of unity into which al features of fife could be fitted. Two closely related 
themes in the Bterature studied 1ri1ere relevant to this tendency, namely the theme of God, or 
theology, and the theme of the Universe, or cosmology. 
2.1 THEOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY 
The themes of divinity and the universe were difficult to separate, and were frequently discussed 
in the same breath. In fact the theme of world-creation or world-upholding was in some sources 
treated as the virtuaDy the sole office of God (cf. Kamalu 1990: 73) to the exclusion of more 
mundane tasks such as worrying about human affairs. Yet at the same time most authors 
discussed the universe in sacred and spiritual terms rather than profane or materiaftstic terms. If 
God could not escape from the sphere of cosmology, with equal reaUty the universe could not 
escape the sphere of theology. In fact, God and the universe tended to be integrated as two 
levels of a single scheme, if not two facets of an identical reaUty. My consideration of the 
universe thus was usually underpinned by the presupposition of God as its fundamental reaHty. 
2.2 BASIC IDEAS OF GOD 
2.2.1 MONOTHEISM 
Belief in the existence of one God was taken for granted by most of the authors: in fact, some of 
the authors claimed to be monotheists. Exponents of traditional religion in the data could be found 
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to proclaim to the world that African reHgion was indeed famiHar with the idea of monotheism (cf. 
Senghor 1964: 25). The attribution of monotheism to Africa by Mbiti (1970: 2ff) is worthy of 
mention; and Uka (1991a: 39ff) vigorously defended against Western scholars the existence of a 
proper monotheistic deity in traditional religion. In fact, Africa was even upheld as the source of 
monotheism by Neimark (1993: 2), who identified the Yoruba system of lfa as the world's oldest 
monotheistic reHgion. Cheikh Anta Diop (Moore 1986: 233-234) claimed the Pharaoh Akhen-Aten 
as the world's first prophet, thereby making Africa a pioneer of monotheism, in so far as belief in a 
universal deity of some sort qualified as 'monotheistic' (cf. Diop 1990: 159). 
All of the forms of monotheism mentioned above could be treated as reHgious or philosophical 
forms of monotheism. But there was some indication of what one might can 'civic monotheism', 
namely a God whose principal function was guarantor of a sacred and privileged social order. 
The presence of such a God could function as a sign that, in accordance with the stance of Uka 
already mentioned, African culture had indeed 'arrived' in this respect, it possessed a 
monotheism of its own tike any respectable cubure. On the other hand, a civic 'God' also 
sacrafised, and to some degree immunised from questioning, the social order which it guaranteed 
Such a God was the God of Kenneth Kaunda's Zambian Humanism (cf. Wright 1971: 23): 
"Taken seriously •humanism• contained the seeds of ultimate tyranny. It represents, 
according to the President, the only viable social response of Christianity, or indeed of 
any reHgion. It is God's declaration of the social form. In this way the doctrine of 
humanism becomes the supreme philosophy and the head of the Executive its supreme 
(and only) interpreter." 
The idea of God as guarantor of the white colonial social order was criticised by Kamalu (1990: 
142), who mentioned how God could be used as a de-emancipatory tool to prevent al 
revolutionising of the existing social order: if God upheld the law, what right had humanity to 
criticise it? Neither he, however, nor any other author in the study, seemed to recognise that even 
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black African leaders could exploit, and had in fact exploited, the stabilising import of monotheism 
in this way. 
That, then, was one extreme among the problems that the postulation of monotheism in Africa 
could face. The other extreme l·'llaS that the ~lternative solution of a purely non-axiomatic God-
symbol was open to manipulation as well. Barashango (1991: 22, 24. 83), for example, viewed all 
God-symbols as essentially malleable, but this by no means implied !hat he tl\fas l"Ji!ling to 
tolerate, for example, a \"Jhite Jesus' (or even a non-African Buddha>. Rather, if symbols tl\!ere 
malleable, then they could be, and thus had to be. pressed in1o the se1Vice of the African 
struggle, no matter what. This was an issue hinted at also by Kamah..l's description of faith 
(Kama!u 1990: 72): the predominance of a faith-symbol depended on how human effort 
pragmaticaliy validated it. In such a context, it seemed to be implied, the party that fought the 
hardest could acquire the right to proclaim their transformative God authoritatively, on quasi-
pragmatic grounds. If Kaunda ruled the country and successfully overthrew colonialism, his 
socialised 'God' l/\Jas therefore valid, regardless of its effects on democracy or anything else: for it 
was representative of a real and predominant social power or activity. It was uncertain to tA..!hat 
extent Kamalu realised this impHcation, although his unconditional admiration of Nk}umah 
afforded no grounds to assume that he would wholly object to such an implication. 
Th problem of a non-objective God, in Africa or elsewhere, therefore, was that it was, by virtue of 
its flexibility and malleability, subject to the control of the most pOll'Jerful influences in the society, 
whether or not such forces made any contribution to human happiness, intelligence or freedom. 
In an objectivised theism, the fundamental values embodied in the God are non-negotiable, and 
the God, so long as the theology remains unchanged, cannot be subsumed in a struggle to 
overthro~'>I these objectivised values. Thus, an agreed-on objective theism not generated by the 
ruling power renders a dictatorship in theoiy accountable to some external and non-manipulable 
standard of human betterment: a sort of sacralised rule-of-law. There were some indications of a 
-------.~--~ ----- ~- -
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concept of this sort, related to African traditional reUgion, in the theistic democracy of Senghor 
(1964: 271) and the philosophication of African traditional relgion by Uka (1991d: 184). 
2.2.2 THE INCLUSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF MONOTHEISM 
The philosophy and reBgion of monotheism in the West is generaUy articulated in opposition to 
polytheism and pantheism, and this in the present research raised the question of whether the 
monotheism of post-traditional Africa excluded or moved beyond polytheistic or pantheistic befiefs 
in indigenous African reUgion. It seemed from the actual exploration of sources in the present 
study that post-traditional Africanised 'monotheism' was, unHke conventional Western 
monotheism, not necessarily to be understood as implying, in all instances, belief in a single 
transcendent and unitary God distinct from the world. This was plain in the case of Neimark 
( 1993: 7) whose worldview admitted both pantheistic and polytheistic articulations of the one true 
divinity. Neimark's viev-1point was echoed else11'11here in the data by authors who, professing 
monotheism, appended nevertheless a discussion of how this monotheism could be reconciled 
with the traditional African belief in many divinities. Thus, views were put forward as 'monotheism' 
which were more exactly describable as henotheistic or monistic. 
The theisms put forward by the study tended not to be exclusive of any form of divine concept in 
any refigious tradition, with the exception of the Christian concept of a transcendent God which 
was frequently attacked both in its pre-incarnate theological and incarnate Christological forms 
(cf. Some 1994: 2, 103, 107; Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 75, 77), although not aft authors shared 
this hostiHty to the same degree. Senghor (1964: 27, 38) deplored the Helenic God of Reason 
but gave a positive assessment of Christian devotion to Jesus, this difference being expficable in 
terms of his emotion-centered understanding of worship and devotion in reBgious fife. It was 
notable that the desire for a Christ-motif or Messianic motif, as wil be clarified later (6.3.2), was 
not wholly absent from post-traditional Africanised thought. It was mainly the generaUy accepted 
Western or whitenised idea of the Messiah that was objected to. 
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2.2.3 THE TRANSCENDENCE OF GOO 
Despite the hostility to traditional transcendental theism manifested in the data, certain authors 
were found to admit a transcendent dimension to life, in the sense of a sacred and mysterious 
level of reality in which we could participate. It could indeed be argued that nothing in which 
humans could not participate constituted a really interesting or meaningful issue in the thought of 
traditional or post-traditional Africa, hence the predominance of immanentist ideas even of 
transcendence itself. 
THE NON-RATIONALITY OF UL TIMl\TE REALITY 
Neimark (1993: 13) defined transcendence as 'that simple but exquisite act of feeling 
unencumbered by any finear thought' and contrasted the teaching of transcendence in formafised 
refigion Vllith the actual achievement of transcendence in his own Yoruba ritual. His definition of 
transcendence tied in with Senghor's non-rational picture of reHgious reaHty referred to earlier, 
and highfighted a recurring attitude in the data, name"-/ an orientation which sought to leave in the 
universe some room for the non-rational or mystical side of Ufe. 
THE NEGATIVE THEOLOGY OF KJ\MALU 
In the God-concept of Kamalu (1990: 35, 36, 52) there was admitted, outside the empirical world, 
or world of Becoming, a Noumenal Reafity, or world of Being. This Being Kamalu viewed as a 
paradoxical reaHty which could not be comprehended ~xactly in positive terminology, but had to 
be described negatively via the negation of finitude, discontinuity and individual entity. By 
describing the Noumenal Being as a non-entity, Kamalu did not deprive it wholly of al existence 
or of power to act on the phenomenal world, since he insisted that the timeless interaction of 
Noumenal and phenomenal on each other was the source of the world as we knew it. But he 
denied that the Noumenal was an individual, or that it acted as an individual or literal person. It 
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was simply a ground of Being that upheld the world - a God, but not a personal divinity. Although 
Kamalu was the only black African author in the data to expBcitly propound a negative theology, 
his denial of God's reducibility to our mindset was found reflected in the contemptuous description 
of human symbols of God by Mutwa (s.a.: 132-133) and was a further contribution to the picture 
of God as beyond the fun comprehension of human reason. 
GOD: INTELLIGIBLE OR COMPREHENSIBLE? 
None of the authors, in denying our fuD comprehension of God, made it expUcitly clear whether 
they were denying that God could be explored by the reason at au (in Western scholastic 
terminology, denying that God was 'intelligible') or denying that he could be fully and exhaustively 
explored by the reason (in scholastic terminology, denying that God was 'comprehensible'). 
Several authors who denied that our reason could adequately understand God nevertheless by 
no means gave up an avenues of thought and speech about him: for example, Mutwa (s.a.: 1ff, 
133) described God's creation of the world mythically, and inferred various beUefs about God 
from his transcendent attributes (e.g. that, given his greatness and transcendence of good and 
evil etc., he would not be interested in passing judgement on human souls in the afterlife and so 
forth), and Kamalu indulged in extensive philosophical discourse about the Noumenal, reaching 
similar conclusions to Mutwa. 
It appeared therefore that while God could be viewed as beyond our fuU comprehension in certain 
trends of post-traditional African thought, this did not nevertheless make him absolutely 
unintelligible, and in this regard, as in other areas (Kamalu 1990: 6, 45) Kamalu was foUwJing 
AristoteHan and Thomistic ideas about God, though not obviously drawing the same conclusions 
as Thomas Aquinas did as far as divine personality was concerned. 
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THE RATIONAL DISPUTABILITY OF GOD 
lndeed, otNing to the fact that other AITican authors did not vietN God's transcendence of symbols 
as making him unintelligible, one occasionally found perspectives that dre•n different conclusions 
from the impersonalism of Kamalu. For example, Barashango ( 1991: 167), instead of denying 
divine punishment in all respects, quoted with approval the Bible's phraseology 'As a man sows, 
so shall he reap' (Galatians 6: 7) and applied it to the laMJ of Karma as manifested in the attributes 
of the Egyptian god Ptah, who was himself non-different from the One God of Egyptian-African 
religion (Barashango 1991: xi). Although Barashango and Kamalu here both manifested the trait 
cf ascribing personality to the God in the context of divine immanence rather than transcendence. 
8arashango did not, like Kamalu (1990: 142), reduce the immanent at1ribute of 'God judging' to a 
mere symbolic metaphor of the divine, but vie114ed the lal/J of Karma as exacUf expressing the 
divine justice. Thus side-by-side ~·Jith post-lraditional African opinions of God as mysterious and 
beyond conception, there existed post-traditional conceptions of God as investigable by human 
thought; and it was this that al101:1,1ed for the emergence of perspectives that dissented-from the 
'divine impersonality and indifference' school of thought. Once God became namable and 
-~ 
thinkable and speakable, he seemed to become arguable and discussable as well: and thus 
reasoning about God was to pave the way naturally in the data to a plurality of ideas about God. 
This created opportunities, and also complications: for while the embodiment of definite values in 
God could thwart the co-optation of the God-concept as an indescribable value-neutral idea 
offering no challenge to present social structures (as in Brahminica/ India), it also meant that 
complications, and perhaps superfluities, were introduced, that detracted from the unitive 
potential of the idea. Which values exactty were to be embodied in God? 
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2.2.4 THE IMMANENCE OF GOO 
In the post-traditional Africanised thought of this study, the theme of closeness to humanity, or the 
&nkage of humanity and nature, recurred in various ways, notably in the form of an immanent 
God-idea. An important and recurrent character of the theism of post-traditional Africa was the 
inc&nation to conceive God and the world in a pantheistic or vitaDst fashion, in such a way as to 
make God Immanent in the visible universe rather than transcendent; or rather, to make God 
transcendent in such a way that the divine immanence or identity with the universe was not 
thereby denied. Often the very same people who insisted that. God transcended our Dmited 
concepts of divinity could nevertheless be found to hold views that identified the divinity with the 
nature closest to us. 
This created the problem of how God could be near and far at the same time, a problem which 
did not, in a viewpoint opposed to Western transcendental theology (2.2.2), admit of the Western 
solutions of a Godhead distinguished in being from the creation, yet 'present' nevertheless, by 
reflection in non-rejectible ideas, or obseivable hierophanous or kratophanous power/action (cf. 
EDade 1959: 11 ff), rather than spatially or by direct continuity of being. lmmanentist theologies 
could not reduce God's presence in this world simply to reflections, mirrorings, and the effects of 
divine action; it was rather the realty of the Godhead, not just the acts thereof, that was in 
immanentist theologies identified, at least partially, with the empirical relativity of our world and 
universe. 
VARIOUS FACTORS OF BELIEF IN DIVINE IMMANENCE 
Osabutey-Aguedze (1990: 8, 77), while insisting that God was so ungraspable as to be beyond 
the reach of any one reUgion, nevertheless argued that God was identical with earthly reaftty: as 
he put it "the Mother is visible". Similarly, Mutwa (s.a.: 132, 248) argued that the rural Bantu, 
being closer to nature, was closer to God than the white person: and this was related presumably 
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to his pantheist views tNhich 1111ere articulated in dire.ct opposition to Christian transcendentalism. 
Thus. belief in divine mystery and belief in the identity of God with the visible and comprehensible 
universe did not necessari~; exclude one another in a post-traditional Airican \,'Jorldview. 
PANENTHEISM 
.A possibility arose that perhaps these views indicated the presence not of rigid pantheism in the 
style of !he \Nest so much as par.en!heism, a viei1·lpoint !Nhich could be described, in lhe words of 
Kruger (1995: 185) as imp~1ing that "God is the given. total universe, plus the 
openness ... permeating and surrounding (transcending) it. . .' Among panentheistic perspectives 
\Nou!d be included the theory of the \Norld-SouL according to \,'lhich God was not reducibie to the 
worid in which he dweit, but at the same time was not separate in identity from that world (ci. 
S!eyn 1994: 174 .. 176). Evidence for panenlheism among post-traditional African thinkers could 
be appealed to in the form of adoption by African authors of the Hermetic cosmology based on 
Being and Becoming, in such a way as to identify the cosmos in a special tNay ttJith 8eet:1ming as 
distinct from Being. 
THE HERtviETIC THEOLOGICAL COSMOGONY 
ln the mysticism of the Egyptian worldview, which in post-traditional A.frk:a 11.ias widely regarded 
as part of the Ali'ican heritage, there could be discerned a distinction of the t."JOrld of 'being' and 
'becoming' the immutable and the mutable aspects of reality as manifested to human intelligence 
(Bernal 1987: 117-113). This was taken over into Kamalu's philosophical scheme of Being and 
becoming, both of tNhich were identified as constituents of the Ultimate Reality called Life or God 
(cf. Kamalu 1990: 24-25, 36, 41 ). Thus in an Africanised form of Hermetic Philosophy there could 
be room both for a transcendent element of 'Being' in God and an immanent element of 
'Becoming.' Osabutey-Aguedze (1990: 132-133), like Kamalu, accepted 'monotheism' and 
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'pantheism' as being compatible, tNhile rejecting both acosmism (denial of the physical universe) 
and pancosmisrh (the reducibility of everything to the physical universe). 
PANPSYCHISM ANO \f!TALISM 
Certain Hermetic interpretations of pantheism in the data seemed, contrary to Osabutey-
Aguedze's indication, to be acosmist, on account of accepting Mind or Thought as the basic 
category of reality (cf. Barashango 1991: 205). But on further exploration it was discovered that 
mind and matter could be interpreted consubstan1ially in certain viev~s. so that mentattst 
cosmologies did not appear to necessitate the denial of matter: for example, Barashango (1991: 
187 .. 206) appeared to vie1/IJ human evolution in terms of the 'production' of mind from an animal 
nature that converted itself progressively. so to speak, into spirtt, and identified atomic rnawty 1,04ith 
spiritual reality: nor t<-Jere vievJpoints vietding spirit and matter as mutually converlible lacking 
elsewhere in the data, such as the view of Onye~·4uenyi that one's flesh becomes 'less fleshy' as 
one approaches old age and the divine realm, hence the authoritative status of Elders in African 
belief (cf. B'Nasseem 1992:21). 
A further factor to be considered was the presence of vitalism or belief in the consciousness of 
ma1ter, and in a 'living universe' (Kamalu 1990: 86-87: De Montellano 1991: 47). If ail matter 1.•Jas 
somehow endowed with a life-force or consciousness of its oJNn, this made the identification of 
visible reality with 'mind' or 'spirtt', in theory, not necessarily exclusive of the belief in the 
identification of the same reality with 'matter.' Kamalu (1990: 44-45) indeed seemed to confirm 
this idea in his discussion of Nkrumah's philosophy of Consciencism. 
THE IDENTITY OF SELF AND GOD 
Did the 'immanent God' have to be a purely ecological and naturalistic non-human entity? On the 
contrary, many adherents of an immanent concept of divinity in post-traditional African thought 
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stressed not only the unity of God and the t11Jorld, but also the unity of God and the human being. 
Among the Rastafarians. (legesse 1994: 332. 338) knowledge of oneself as identical to the 
divinity was an integral part of religious experience. Legesse ( 1994: 331, 332) referred to the 
belief of Rastafarians that "Every Rastaman is a!so Ras Tafari', and quoted a Rastafarian as 
saying: 
·\Ne get our spiritual communication dai~J from our imperial Majesty, the Emperor Haiie 
Selassie. V·/e don1 have to read the Bible to kncwJ !hat he is God ... \Ne knoin he is God 
through inborn conception.' 
This theme of identification with God tNas also found in forms of thought based on Egyptian 
mysticism. Barashango (1991: 166if) made much of the 'Ptah principle' INithin oneseif 1Nhereby 
one couid get in touch directly t?Jith divine power through the medium of thought or mind. James 
( 1954: 37, 88) conceived perfection and salvation in terms of, inter alia, a se!f-a~·4areness which 
tNould increase the god-like qualities tNithin oneself, and vietNed the interconnectednes-s of the 
Hermetic universe as part of the key that would unlock those powers (...lames 1954: 103). 
Some authors, less egocentricaily, simply hinted at the unity of God and humanity: Senghor 
( 1964: 24-25) talked of all of nature in African thought being animated by a human presence. 
Here again vita!ism seemed to play a role in facilitating the identification of mind and spirit with 
matter. lt should be noted that the realisation of God in oneself tcJas noL. as in certain Ne1CJ Age 
forms of thought, conceived as a withdra~·Jal from the world and from social issues: James (19!14: 
162) in fact urged missionaries to replace their otherworld~J preaching t·•Jith a 'Gospel of 
Happiness' taking account of earthly affairs and economic welfare, and Osabutey-A.guedze 
(1990: 216) argued for a salvation from within that expressed itself in natural human effort rather 
than removal from this world. 
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THE ISSUE OF THE 'DEUS OTIOSUS' 
From the above indications of belief in the nearness of God it could be suspected that the idea of 
the 'Deus Otiosus' attributed to \//estem scholarship by African religion, inhereby the traditional 
African God t.·Jas deemed lo be uninvolved with the world .. t.oJould not be accepted uncriticalty by 
all authors in the study: indeed, ho~·J could God be uninvolved with the world if ln some sense he 
tNas the t.11or!d? Even someone not explicitly pantheistic .. such as Uka (1991 a: 44) could say: 
"The African believes in God's providence ... Africans also believe that God not on!y 
provides. he also protects. guards. controls and saves his people. In short. A.fricans see 
God as King, Ruler, Lord and Master of the \i\/orld. They see him also as their judge, their 
conqueror, who delivers his people from their enemies .. .' 
Yet at the same time Uka admitted that despite such beliefs, "usually more attention is paid to the 
lesser divinities and spirits•. This highlighted a feature t/\Jhich could be found also in Mut1Na (s.a.: 
132-133) and Kamalu (1990: 142), namety the coexistence of ideas of divine nearness with a 
..;;;;. 
simultaneous admission of a certain impersonality in God. God 1.'\!as indeed involved \1\li1h the 
world, but in a more universalised than a particularised sense. 
Nevertheless, certain authors found the universalised idea of divine nearness, impersonal as it 
was, more appealing than the V\/estern idea of a far-away transcendent God. MuWJa (s.a.: 247) 
viewed the African as closer to God owing to hisiher closeness to Nature (which was God). 
Osabutey..,l\guedze ( 1990: 8,. 77), l·\lhi!e regarding God as beyond human categories of 
comprehension, spoke tNarm~ of God's immanent aspect as a visible Mother in nature. 
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THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATIVISED ULTIMATE_, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
KRUGER'S GOD-CONCEPT 
The values inherent in an immanentist God, that of closeness to nature and humanity, seemed to 
override, in most of the authors of the study, considerations such as whether or not it was a 
contradictory 'absolutisation of the relative' to make God continuous with the universe. The claim 
could be made that the 'God', at least the 'personal God' of conventional reUgion, ~·.ias not an 
absolute or objective entity at aU, but was rather inside the mind (cf. Kamalu 1990: 73). This did 
not wholly address the question - since after au the non-uftimate subjective realm was, as such, 
not per se immune from undue absolutisation and the associated incoherence. Thus further 
treatment of the problem was necessary, and the most detailed further investigation of this 
problem among the sources studied was found in Kruger (1995). 
THE TREATMENT OF ABSOLUTISM 
Kruger ( 1995: 118) claimed to deny absolutism, not on absolute grounds, but on provisional 
grounds. He appealed to the fact that, empirically, he had not found a good reason to befieve 
absolutism. This, to his mind, denied absolutism without doing so in an absolutist fashion. His 
argument nevertheless suffered somewhat from the fact that the expficit criteria of its falsification 
were not laid out. Kruger did not specifically say that •1n such-and-such a situation, X, I would no 
longer deny the vafidity of absolutism, but unfortunately X is not the case.• It was thus not clear 
how his view was corrigible, and how it could therefore be viewed as 'provisional' rather than 
absolute. 
Further exploration of his value-system revealed that, more specifically, it was not 'absoluteness' 
in the sense of conclusiveness as such, but conclusive affirmations that were rejected: a refigious 
befief could not be conclusively proven, but it could be conclusively dlsproven or unmasked 
(Kruger 1995: 116). This meant that religious disproof in effect had in his system the status of an 
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absolute negation, othen.'llise it t.\lould be as ultimately inconclusive as was religious proof, and 
would not be rightly describable in straightfontJard terms as an 'unmasking of untruth'. since there 
can arguab~; be no real and coherent 'unmasking', or full exposition as false, of any idea whose 
falsehood is not absolutely certain. 
Given Kroger's Buddhist interests it could be suspected that this stance, which admitted a real 
unmasking of false ideas but not a rigid proof of true ones, 1.\las not unrelated to !he Buddhist 
concept of the unconditional non-affirming negation of !he self, pudgalana:rc:tmya, a negation 
applicable in principle to all fixed entities (cf. Le Roux 1994: 73) tNhich had the status of a 
consistent negation of the fn<ed. a point of standing or falling. in a system that did not allow for 
absolute fixed affirmations. Such consis1ent negation did not allow for any excep1ions 
it~hatsoever: trJhich made it arguaMf impossible to distinguish a 'consistent negation' from an 
'absolute negation' since any principle not admitting of exceptions is by definition an absolute 
principle. 
The blanket statement !hat ',41! our t,·mrds and concepts cannot describe Reality', used by Krager 
.SI!. 
( 1935: 37) in describing the ideas of Nagarjuna, admi1ted of no exceptions, and in that sense !Nas 
an absolute statement: nor could an exception be made by. for example, saying that Nagarjuna's 
philosophy was an acceptable description of Reality, and therefore absolute or privileged. To 
exclude all viewpoints except one's own implied an absolute affirmation, and to exclude all 
vie1.•Jpoints inciuding one's w.m implied a negation lNhich, being trJithout exceptions, ~·Jas therefore 
indistinguishable from an absolute negation. Either ~·Jay, something absolute appeared 
unavoidable: perhaps it was not real~J a formulated dogmatic proposition (given Buddhist 
insistence on silence or wordlessness) but it appeared nevertheless to amount at least to an 
unbreakable orientation or attitude against dogmatism in those situations where negation of 
absolute affirmations was held to consistently. 
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.Absolute negation, ho1111ever. in word or 1111ord!ess atti1ude, introduced the possibility of absolute 
affirmation into Kruger's beliefs. for it was a simple matter to conclusivery deny all but one of a 
series of possibilities. thereby in effect absolute~/ affirming \llJhat \,•Jas left . 
. A SELF-DECONSTRUCTING GOD-CONCEPT 
.An example of effectual absolute affirmation through exhaustive negation t111as not lacking in 
Kruger's theism; for having dt?nied polytheism, pantheism, and lradilional transcendental theism. 
he came up l·'lith an idiosyncratic deconstructive God-concept r·;hich he described as. and l quote 
him direct~f. 'the only tolerable concept of God' {Kruger 1995: 130 cf. 39). The words 'onr1 
tolerable' implied a consistent and definitive exclusion of all alternative God-concepts outside a 
given set cf parameters of tolerabiiity. and therefore amounted io an abs:Jluiist proposal of these 
parameters. The parameters t.0Jere themselves described in terms of radical relativisabllity of the 
concept - 'one that has implanted in itself the germ of its own explosion, its 0~·4n radical 
relativising' - but this merely meant that we b0Jere here dealing tNilh an affirmation of-absolute 
relativity, rather than absolute nonrelativrty. The concept affirmed was of a relativistic set of 
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parameters, but the exclusion of alternatives to ft admitted of no exceptions, and therefore was 
something absolute. And betv"ieen a concept alternatives to which were total~f excluded, and an 
'absolute idea', no meaningful distinction seemed evident. In Kruger's system, an individual God 
couid become obsoiescent, but on~f one sort of God - namely an obsolescent divinity of this sort -
l·'Ja s tolerable at all. 
The apparent absolutist affinnation of relativistic criteria for a tolerable God was not made any 
less problematic, in the context of Kruger's non-absolutist position, by the fact that the God (or 
anti-God?) possessed 1.•Jhat appeared to be a buitt-in incoherence, whereby articulation of the 
divine reality simultaneously affirmed comprehensive integration and absoiutely denied the same 
(cf. Kruger 1995: 22-23, 56-57. 129-130). A way out of this existed in terms of Kruger's o~·~n 
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system: he coutd claim that the contradiction tl\las in fact a 'paradox' rather than a proper 
incoherence (_Kruger 1995: 110-1 Hi. 
But it was not certain at ail that this escape route 1rJas workable, since the idea oi 'paradox' as 
Implied in, For example. the paradox of light as wave and particle, involved the presence of firm 
evidence for both sides of the apparent contradiction, and ~·4hife the integrative side of Kruger's 
God, intertwined 111.1ith !he interrelatedness of all things ad infinitum. seemed to have roots in an 
involuntar; conceptual habit of the human mind (Kruger 1995: 23, 151ff), the transcendent side 
INas based on tr·Jhat ,,,1as, for him, a non-absolute, and thus potentially fallible, denial of 
absolutism. Since one side of 1he dilemma was. prima facie, not infallibty or practicai~/ 
necessitated (unless one elevated lhe denial of absolutism into an absolute or non-provisional 
denial). it appeared that the contradiction postulated was gratuitous or non-necessitated in terms 
of his system,. and therefore l·'Jas an incoherence rather than a paradox_ 
THE TPANSCENDING DYNAMIC OF RELIGION 
Kruger's views provided a response of sorts to the argument in the last paragraph, since h~ made 
the claim that denial of absolutism ~·~as in· fact finatly required by the transcending dynamic of 
religion (Kruger 1B95: 118} and on lhat ground was a oostMort defensible. Nevertheless, the 
problems did not stop here, since Kruger had not in fact conclusively established that the 
unsaying of ultimate religious integration as such (as opposed to individual systems of religious 
integration) was finally feasible_ !n fact, the total absence of systematisation in the human 
worldview ttJas by his 0111.1n admission impossible in practice (Kruger 1995: 129) tl\lhich meant that 
however many systems one exploded, the basic idea of 'Gestalt' or unity of one's world was not 
finally rejectible, corrigible or replaceable in practice. This was one human need which could not 
be in practice successfully and conclusively transcended during the course of ordinary life_ 
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The ultimate impression created by Kruger's thought was that, given Kruger's insistence on the 
rigorous exclusion of alternatives to his own relativistic concept of a tolerable God, without any 
exceptions [and his reference to 'he death of God as absolute basis and support' (Kroger 1995: 
130) seemed to imply a fairly definitive exclusion of the kind of God-concepts he rejected], the 
problem of absolutising the relative in immanentist concepts of divinity was not in fact resolved in 
his work, which nevertheless represented the most detailed and thought-out treatment of the 
problem in the data of the present study. 
2.3. DIVINE PLURALITY 
Some philosophical problems of immanentist theism may have been largely untouched by the 
post-traditional Africanised authors of this study, but this did not mean that various practical or 
conduct-related reftgious issues were not dean with - more specifically, the relationship of the 
invisible with the visible in the process of religious orientation to ultimate reaftty or the cosmos, 
and the problem of whether to approach the sacred as One or Many. Since immanence was far 
more prevalent than transcendence in the God-concepts found in the data, it could be expected 
that created reaftty would be included in rather than excluded from the sphere of the divine: and 
indeed polytheism and ritual images were on the whole more fikely to be defended than attacked 
by the authors studied. This was an important and significant difference from Western thought, 
influenced as it was by Semitic religion. 
2.3.1 THE REPRESENTATION OF GOO IN CREATION 
THE TENSION OF DIVINE MYSTERY AND CREATIVE EXPRESSION 
In the Hermetic philosophy to which many of the authors of the study pledged alegiance, the use 
of idols was accepted as lawful and indeed a central religious expression of human creative 
pcwrer: the idol was a physical expression, fashioned by the human, of an invisible animating 
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potNer, identifiable ~"Jith the dMne (Tasker 1945: 245ff). It !0"11as perhaps a measure of the 
inclusiveness possible for post-traditional African thought that an author like Kamalu. in forming a 
general concept of God, could draw on the ideas of Hermes Trismegistus, l·"lho accepted this 
doctrine. and Thomas Aquinas. who denied Hermetic teaching on this point (Summa Contra 
Gentiles, Book Ill. Chapter CIV). til. any rate there was a conflicting or paradoxical tendency, both 
in Kamalu's vie~·Js and in the rest of the data, between the !a~Jfulness of physical representations 
as expressions of divine power, and the total remoteness of God from anything that humanity 
could represent or conceive (cf. Kamalu 1990: 71ff, 90, 92). 
THE USE AND NON-USE OF SY!v1BOLS 
The interest here was not in an attempt to address the philosophical issue of abso!utising the 
relative, but was more of a pragmatic issue of whether images of God could serve any purpose or 
not. lh•Jas possible that ~.-lutwa (s.a.: 133) portrayed God as indescribable or undepictable, not so 
much because of philosophical problems in God talk as such, as because describing such- a great 
mystery 1111as so often purposeless, as well as being generative of cruel judgmental God-ideas. 
It was often found in the data that there was no universal ban or permission of divine symbols, but 
rather symbols could be used on some occasions but not on others. Uka (1991 a: 48-49) said that 
symbols could not represent God directly, but could be used to express his power. Other authors 
gave a similar magical explanation for the permission of images, such as MuttNa himself (1960: 
498; s.a.: 133). who, as has been said, viewed representations of God as infantile, but 
nonetheless permitted the use of images during magical activity, to release power. This was also 
the explanation of images given by Jahn (1981: 151, 157-158). Griaule (1965: 113) indicated that 
in Oogon thought some beings were not expressed in depicted likenesses, for fear of drawing on 
their power prematurely, and a related idea seemed to be found in Some {1994: 7, 258, 287) 
who, though making use of physical power-objects as essential means for the release of power. 
discouraged the representation or even verbal expression of hidden powers lest the power be 
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lost: which suggested that physical representations both released and at the same time 
exhausted or depleted magical power in some way. Some also impfied that verbal expression 
somehow profaned and Dmited the meaningfulness of the power. Perhaps analogous to this idea, 
but at a more abstract level, were the comments of Barashango ( 1991 : 23, 24, 25) on the 
psychological utifity of divine symbols, and at the same time the danger of being Hmited or 
restricted by refigious symbofism. 
ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION OF IDOLATRY 
There were some authors who spoke of idolatry or associated practices in terms implying general 
rejection; but these tended to absolve African culture from the charge of idolatry. Osabutey-
Aguedze (1990: 138) regarded idolatry as a term more appucabie to what he viewed as the 
rationalty indefensible transcendental deity of the Christians, than to the immanentist deity of the 
Africans. Cheikh Anta Diop (1990: 150) spoke of the 1NOrship of ashes and the ancestral cult as a 
European invention, but does not seem to have been inspired by a hostifity to images in general, 
but rather the contrary, since he apparently regarded it as a mark of nomadic Western retigion 
that external expressions should be reduced to a minimum (Diop 1990: 156, 158, 159), instead of 
being richly abundant as in African agricultural religion. Among the Umbandistas (McGregor 
1966: 211), who were a spiritua&st group inspired by both Yoruba ritual and the spirituatist 
philosophy of Allan Kardec, the prohibition of idolatry in Kardecism was not carried over into the 
Umbanda refigion. This appeared to confirm a lack of absolute prohibition of images as a 
prevalent feature of African-derived re6gion. This impression is confirmed by the characterising of 
Yoruba refigion byThompson (1984: 5) as dominated and pervaded by aesthetic symbolism. 
2.3.2 THE TRINITY 
The form taken by divine symbols in the post-traditional African thought of this study seemed to 
be determined by the African and Christian or mystical traditions that authors drew on, and most 
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of the authors actually selected for this study - adhering as they did to the less Christianised 
forms of Africanised relglous thought - seemed to defend rather than criticise or dissect the divine 
concepts of African tradition: they were in effect the apologists of African symbolsm in the West. 
As far as the Western or Christian tradition was concerned, the authors were more critical and 
less incfined to follow tradition. The Western idea of the Trinity, as a fundamental pattern 
underlying creation, theology and history, seemed to be largely absent from their non-
Christianised African thought. Barashango ( 1991 : 160, 172) showed some familiarity L·Jith the 
Western idea of the Trinity, but criticised it as patriarchal, and viewed it as neglecting the dynamic 
or creative element of the Logos as the power of thought. 
NON-WESTERNISED FORMS OF THE TRINITY 
There were some non-Westernised concepts of the Trinity in the data, for example a reproductive 
triad representing the coming-together of male and female gametes to form the zygote, and 
iUustrating the divine fecundity of Nature (cf. Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 50) and the Yoruba Triad 
of Nzame, Olofi and Baba Nkwa (Gonzalez-Wippler 1973: 24). But on the whole a Trinity in some 
Christian sense of the term was not found except perhaps in Rastafarianism (Hood 1990: 89), 
although even here the concept of the Word bore more in common with the creative immanent 
principle of Barashango than the Logos of traditional Christianity (Hood 1990: 97). 
THE COSMIC TRINITY 
Comparison with the Theosophical concept of the Trinity (cf. Preston & Humphreys 1966: 11-12), 
whereby invisible reality (the One) expressed itself materially as the Logos or created ll'JOrld, and 
was Bnked by the mediation of a Third Reality, was a trinitarian concept far easier to find echoed 
in the data than the Christian scheme. Although the adherents of pantheism or panentheism in 
this study did not consciously admit to being cosmic trinitarians, such an attitude was impficit in 
their distinction of three levels in the universe, nameli{ God, the gods and other mediators, and 
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the earth, which corresponded to the One, the Bridge Unking mind and matter, and the materiaRy 
manifest God or Logos in Theosophy. These, as in Theosophy, were fundamentaRy identified 
with each other. 
HERMETIC/EGYPTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE TRINITY 
The adoption of Hermetic philosophy by some African authors Ukewise entailed what seemed to 
amount to Cosmic Trinity of the One, the world of the gods, and the world of matter and animals 
(cf. Keita 1984: 63): in relation to this Trinity humanity was in an uncertain position, participating 
both in the sphere of the gods on account of the human intellect and its potential, and in the 
sphere of matter on account of corporeal fimitation. Humanity was, so to speak, without a single 
place of its own but existing between worlds (2.2.4 cf. Barashango 1991: 206). On the 
relationship between this dual participation, and the multiple selves of Egyptian and traditional 
African belief (cf. Gyekye 1987: 10, 85ff, 99ff), more shall be said later in Chapter 6. 
2.3.3 THE DIVINITIES 
Of greater interest than the Trinity were the pantheons of indigenous and diasporan Africa; and 
most of the authors of the study it.Jho spoke of polytheism in African refigion tended to endorse it 
or defend it. It was a frequently repeated argument that monotheism and polytheism did not 
contradict each other, since the many were simply aspects or expressions of the One. Uka 
(1991a: 45) described the divinities of traditional reHgion as emanations from the Deity with no 
absolute existence at an, and Barashango (1991: 158) argued a similar perspective from the 
viewpoint of Egyptian-derived refigion. Mutwa (s.a.: 132) professed that the Zulu befieved in many 
gods under the One, most of them evil, but viewed polytheism and monotheism in the same 
wortdview as no more of a problem than the Virgin Mary and the Saints in CathoUcism. 
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THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE ANO THE MANY 
The religious issue of the One and the Many, though recognised and commented on by authors 
in this study, was not subjected to profound reflection, and the impression was given by many 
authors that there was scarcely anything more than a concern to answer Western charges of 
'polytheism' and 'paganism', going so far into the problem as was necessary to silence the 
Westerner, and no further, rather than really coming to grips with the problem as a problem in its 
ov-.m right. Uka (1991a: 44) admitted that the multiplication of divinities or the equivalent tended to 
crowd out attention to the Deity, but responded by simply deploring the situation and saying that 
the indigenous Africans should have known better. There was no attempt to ask whether the 
muliplication of divine aspects in a monotheistic deity tended to encourage a true polytheism 
among the uneducated, however much the educated avoided this trap themselves: nor was there 
an attempt, in the appeal to the Cathofic practice of saint-veneration, to ask whether or not the 
Catholic practice itself was questionable, and if so, how one would distinguish levels of veneration 
precisely, 11.ihat exactly was /atria or dulia etc. The attitude of Muttr.ia seemed to be simpl'f: if ~·Je 
and the whites coincidentally agree, tnhy make a problem? 
THE DEIFICATION OF HUfv1ANS 
The above comments of course take into account the fact that some Africans did deal partially 
with the problem of the One and the fv1any, by adopting ideas such as emanationism (used by 
Uka, and an obvious concept also for those who adopted a Hermetic or quasi-gnostic form of 
mysticism.) Some authors however compficated the emanatlonlst argument somewhat by alluding 
to the deification of humans: Barashango (1991: vii) proposed a euhemerist theory according to 
which the gods of the West were deifications of ancient African heroes, and the compficated 
theme of the ancestral cult, which was not lacking in its influence even in post-traditional thought, 
introduced the theme of the deification of the human into many forms of Africanised belef. In the 
traditional re&gion of Africa such examples as the deification of Shango in Yoruba religion showed 
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that the difference between ancestor and deity was sometimes more one of degree than of kind 
(Thorpe 1991: 93-94). In the more expDcitly post-traditional forms of African reDgion found in this 
study there was no widespread desire to aboDsh ancestral veneration: but there were some 
Egyptian-influenced viewpoints in the data which tried to reinterpret their role, as inteBectual 
forebears rather than spirits to be placated (Barashango 1991: 206; cf. De Montellano 1991: 47). 
There were also signs of attempts to integrate herolatry and Messianic veneration of Uving 
persons into post-traditional Afrlcanised reUglous thought. Thus, the problem of the One and the 
Many, in a general post-traditional African context, was not purely a matter of belief in God versus 
the gods on some remote spiritual level, but was part of the general issue of divine immanence, 
the distinction of creature and creator. 
MODES OF POL YTHEJSM 
Certain authors, discussing the problem of the One and the Many, did not go into too much detail 
into the idiosyncratic nature of individual gods: but this did not mean that the personalty or 
individuality of the separate gods was wholly neglected by the authors in general. Indeed, the 
distinctions between the gods of Yoruba reftgion (Nelmark 1993) and Egyptian reDgion 
(Barashango 1991 : 155, 183 etc.) were occasionally the object of detailed systematic interest. 
There were two major pantheons accepted by the authors of the data. The first was the Egyptian 
pantheon of gods, which was viewed as being of great cosmological significance. The second 
was the Yoruba cull of the orisha, in its traditional and Americanised forms. There was also some 
interest in the various beings of Dogon reUgion and mythology, but more on account of their 
cosmological symboUsm than anything else (cf. Kamalu 1990: 110ff). 
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EGYPTIAN THEOLOGY 
Those authors who showed interest in the gods of Egypt tended to concentrate on their 
cosmological and symbofic significance: experiences of personal 'encounter' with Egyptian gods 
as spiritual reafities were not readily available in Dterary form in the same way as experiences of 
contact with sub-Saharan spirits (Some 1994: 221 etc.) or the powers behind Yoruba ritual (cf. 
4.3.3). 
References could be found in the data to the three major Egyptian theological systems, termed 
the Heftopolitan, the Memphite and the Theban/Hermopolitan theologies. Olela (1984: 84, 87) 
appealed to the Heliopolitan theology - which viewed the god Atum-Ra or Fire as the source of 
other deities representing different elements - as proof that the ancient elemental cosmology of 
the West, and various related ideas among the Pre-Socratic philosophers, were uftimately of 
Egyptian or African origin. The Memphite theology, which made Ptah the first cause of the 
universe and Atum-Ra a secondary influence, was accepted by Barashango (1991: 165ff, 183ff) 
as a living option for Africans today: according to him, the Ptah-principle could be contacted by 
the individual and drawn on as a power source during meditation. Of aH the authors, Barashango 
paid the most attention to the impact of Egyptian gods on daily reftglous Ufe. The 
Theban/Hermopolitan theology, which accepted the existence of four opposing pairs of male 
and female deities (the Ogdoad), was regarded by Kamalu (1990: 34) as illustrating the 
oppositional structure of the universe; for in Kamalu's philosophy the unity of Life expressed itself 
in various dual conflicts, from the fundamental contrast of Being and Becoming that constituted 
Life itself, to many other oppositions found in this world (reason/emotion, magic/science, 
perception/conception, etc) which were nevertheless resolllable into a paradoxical unity and 
coexistence. None of the authors played any one of these systems against any other system or 
against the monotheism of Akhen-Aten: in fact, the three systems as expounded by Olela (1984: 
84) were conceivably integrable into a single worldview, with Ra as the common factor in each. 
One and the same divinity, under the name of Atum-Ra, functioned as the servant of Ptah and 
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!he source of the other elemental deities, and, under the name of Amon-Ra, generated the 
Ogdcad. 
THE OR!SHA. 
More of a living option for religious Africans than Egyptian porj'theism ~·Jas the cult of the olisha or 
ihe many deities of Yoruba religion. They tNere of course routine~/ expiained atl\lay as mere 
emanations of the One God by many authors (2.3.3), although in practice they could be treated 
as many, especially' in the Umbandista religion (cf. McGregor1966: 187-188). 
THE OR!SH4 AS PO'v'\/E.R-SOURCES 
A more innovative !rea!:nent found in some authors v\las the idea of treating the orisha as beings 
somehotN within ourselves, like Jungian .Archetypes (cf. Nelmark 1993: 7), which could also 
function as sources of pot.\ler. Taiking of Santeria, a form of Yoruba-derived religion where the 
crisha were identified ~vith Cathoiic saints, Gonzalez \Nippler (1973: 65) expiained: 
·1 believe saints are just so many points of contact with the subconscious mind, each one 
controlling an aspect of human endeavour. An unshakable faith and strong~; 
concentrated 11Ji!I could tap the 'Jast reservoir of power which is the subconscious mind. at 
exact~} the point desired,. by using a simple key ~·JOrd: the name of the orisha that controls 
that particular area. I believe this is exactly what the santero does when he controls an 
orisha. The spells and magical rituals he uses are simp~/ additional fuel for his already 
unwavering faith and determination.• 
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THE OR/SHA AS PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE 
One of the authors (Barnes 1989: 3) identified the orisha as a possible source of understanding 
and knowledge, and a useful metaphor for the integration of one's 11.,ridview and philosophy of 
lfe. This was a similar and parallel idea to the opinion of Kamai.I (1990: 37, 39-40) that 
philosophical ideas, such as Infinite Number, Unfailng W'il etc. were concepts of God, although 
Kamalu did not expticitly identify these concepts as orisha. A paralel was seen in the 
Egyptologlcal views of Barashango already mentioned, where the deities were both cosmological 
principles and sources of power. This was an ins1ance of a theme prevalent In the forms of 
African mysticism explored in this study, namety the ldentilcation of knowledge ll'Jith power. 
S'i'N'CRET!SM 
In the description of Yoruba-derived pantheons, it was invariably mentioned that the Yoruba 
deities were routinely identified with Roman Cathoic saints {cf. Hood 1990: 55 etc.):- Nor was 
religious syncretism confined to the Yoruba side of pos1-tradltional African reHglon: Barashango 
(1991: vii, 71ff, 125, 127) attempted to integrate mos1 of Wes1em and Eas1em religion with 
African and Egyptian thought, and at the same time prove that Africa 11.as the origin of al that ll'faS 
good in these viewpoints. The presence of polytheism in the post-tradkional African thought of 
this study tended to manifest an inci.lsive tendency in the sphere of the God-concept, 1t.ihich 
attempted to incorporate Into modernised African reUgious thought as much interes1ing material 
as possible. 
POLYTHEISM AND CRITICAL REASON 
A question 1t1as suggested by the concept of the deity as an archetypal source of kncti',Mldge: 
what sort of knotl'Aedge exactfl} was meant here? It was plausible that knowledge of African 
tradition, of aspects of culure presided over by culure-heroes, or of ft1'iStlcal experience, could 
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have some connection with the rtual experience of divinities. But what about critical or sceptical 
reason, which would encourage in the name of parsimony a narr°"'Jing down, if not a complete 
aboition, of the number of African deities that formed part of African thought? What about 
demythologisation of Egyptian myth? For certainly, there was a tendency in Kamalu and 
Barashango to treat the gods more as symbols than beings, and to reduce them to the One, but 
at the same time one was conscious of an unwilDngness to let the myths absolutely go. This 
seemed part of a more general tendency in the post-traditional Africanised thought of this study, 
to reject the 'colder' aspects of Western scienttsm in favour of more humanised forms of 
knowledge (cf. 5.2.2): and it is this probably this sort of humanistic kn0t.\lledge, rather than 
objectivised Western science w1ept clean of symboHsm and myth, that constituted the 
'knowledge' and 'wisdom' idealised in Barnes' African god-archetypes. The issues of O'l)Ah and 
humanisation in certain post-traditional authors will be discussed in 3.2.2 and 5.2. 
POLYTHEISM AND NATURAL WISDOM 
The phenomenon of a symboDc ideal of non-critical or symbolc knowledge was to later arise In 
the form of natural wisdom or nature-symbofism, which could appear as simple religiouS'" regard 
for nature, or in a more complex and esoteric form as mystical astrology, depending on whether 
an Egyptian-Hermetic or Sub-Saharan model of religion tNas follows. The polarisation between 
Egyptian-Hermetic and Sub-Saharan African religion in post-traditional Africanised thought ran 
Ike a thread throughout many of the issues deal with in the present report, alhough 'missing 
&nks' betvJeen the two such as Kamalu and Frye were not lacking. This polarity included the two 
variant forms of polytheism (Egyptian and Yoruban) that have just been discussed. It wiD also be 
visible in the discussion of the sacredness of nature dealt with In the next section. 
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2.4 THE DIVINE IN RELATION TO NATURE 
As the result of an immanentist God-concept which identified God with the created lr'IJOrld, it was 
predictable that some form of sacredness in nature should be recognised by certain post-
traditional Africanised religious thinkers. The influence of Egypt and occultism on African thought 
seemed to be related to some trends in thought about Africa favouring an interest in astrology; 
while in the sphere of the sacred recognition of animal fife there was expficit recognition by 
authors of precedents in Egyptian and traditional religion. 
2.4.1 THE SPHERES AND ASTROLOGY 
Those authors who accepted the concept of a series of 'spheres' through 11\Jhich one travelled to 
approach the Divinity seemed to be influenced by Hermetism (Osabutey-Aguedze 1090: 64; Keita 
1984: 60) and by Western spirituaHsm (Ortiz 1989: 96). The concept of spheres was based on a 
Gnostic astrological concept, according to which the Godhead emanated a series of heavenly 
spheres, each one corresponding to a planet or associated god and forming a series of 
intermediary planes between our world and the divine. 
~TIONISM IN MORE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN THOUGHT 
Authors who retied more on traditional refigious inspiration than on Egyptian refigion tended not to 
expficitly acknOV'41edge a fuH series of 'planes' beyond the elementary distinction of the seen world 
and the unseen world (cf. Some 1994: 230, 253). Nevertheless the theme of gradual emanation 
of levels of being from or toward the divinity surfaced in two ways in more traditionafised religion, 
on the assumption that certain descriptions of African refigion in the data were reliable: firstly in 
the form of a cycle of being or a reincarnation concept, which could take the form of expticit 
stages of animal transmigration (Mutwa s.a.: 137-138); and secondly in the form of a series of 
stages in the constitution of the universe, whereby - at least in Dogon cosmology - creation 
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proceeded, by means of the First Word, the Second Word and the Thi'd Word, through 
progressively less perfect ~.iortd-states until the present state of ordinary mortaity was reached 
(Griaule 1965: 167). tn view of the point argued by Kamai! (1990: 3.7, 101ff), that the Dogon 
creation myth and similar accounts were descriptions of the synchronic basis of creation and 
consciousness rather than a diachronic series of events in the past, it could be argued that 
emanationist cosmology was not altogether foreign to traditional African thought. 
ASTROLOGY 
INTEGRATION OF Affl./CAN THOUGHT WITH WESTERN ASTROLOGY 
At the end of his recorded conversations with the Dogon sage Ogotemmei, Griaule (1965: 209-
216) argued that the twelve signs of the Zodiac in Western astrology corresponded to motifs in 
the Dogon metaphysical system, and argued that the African contribution to our civilsation was 
therefore not as negigibfe as had been hitherto supposed. In post-traditional thou"~ about 
Africa, the Integration of ·astrology l>ilh African thought was carried on more thoroughly by 
'· 
exponents of occulic perspectives. Gonzatez-Wippler (1973: 122) drew up a table of occul 
correspondences matching the planets with the orisha or Yoruba divinities, and fo\kwMrs of 
Egyptological Africanism were found to comment favourably on the astrological (or 
'astropsychologicaf) knowledge of the ancient Egyptians (cf. De Montellano 1991: 47). 
ASTROLOGY AND TRADITIONAL AFRICAN BEUEFS 
In a less specific way, tvlutwa (s.a.: 68, 177-178) commented on the superior astrological 
knowledge of his Zukl people and retold a story indicating belef in the influence of earthly history 
by signs in heaven: and indeed, he beieved that humans themselves coukt be reincarnated as 
stars (Mitwa s.a.: 138). The occulic and ~hological trends of astrological belef converged in 
an interpretation of Dogon mythology v«tich assigned special significance to Siius B, as a source 
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of occult information on which black people could dra'll by means of the mystical powers 
conferred by their melanin pigmentation (De Monteftano 1992: 163). This latter view seemed 
however to be confined to Afro-American and extra-continental trends of thought, although the 
Dogon mythology was not without interest to indigenous African authors for other reasons. On the 
whole it appeared that while aspects of traditional sub-Saharan African refigion offered some 
features favourable to a befief in astrology, most of the development in post-traditional African 
thought concerning astrology, as far as could be gathered from the present research, was 
pursued according to Western and Egyptian precedents, mostly by people off the African 
continent. 
2.4.2 THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF ANIMALS 
TRADITIONAL INDIGENOUS VENERATION FOR ANIMALS 
The problem of the significance of animals in reUgion was commented on in the data. Although 
Uka (1991a: 47ff) insisted that the traditional African practice of totemism 11\aas not a form of 
idolatry, certain authors in the data treated animals with a certain respect that made them 
superior to humans. Ogotemmefi (Griaule 1965: 126) regarded animals as superior to humans 
because they did not have to work and because they were silent, or did not speak. Some (1994: 
24 7) regarded animals as having great power in the spirit world, and mentioned that it was 
dangerous to strike an animal while travelfing on a shamanistic journey in the spirit world, since 
their power to retafiate was greater than in the physical world. Mutwa (s.a.: 137-138) placed 
humanity in the middle of the hierarchy of being, above plants and mammals but belot.•J sacred 
reptiles, birds and stars. 
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EGYPTIAN ZOOLATRY 
Trends deriving from Egyptian thought had to cope with a religious problem that had existed since 
ancient times, namely the problem of reconciling the cutt of animals with rational philosophy 
(Bernal 1987: 117). The aDegorical interpretation of animals as symbols for philosophical truth 
was the solution adopted by the ancients, and also by Frye (1988: 35-36), who related both the 
hierarchy of being in Mutwa and the animals of Egypt to a symboUsm indicating stages of spiritual 
progress or initiation. Barashango (1991: 35ff) attempted to solve the problem along the general 
fines used by other authors to address the problem of African polytheism as a whole (2.3.3): he 
regarded the One as manifesting in various 'zootypes' in addition to the other polytheistic 
manifestations, and thus appfied to animal veneration the concept of the god as a psychological 
archetype. 
2.4.3 VITALISM 
Far more common in the data than references to the sacredness of individual animals were 
references to the sacredness of Hfe and vitafity in general. It has already been mentioned (2.2.4) 
that many authors supported the concept of a 'living universe' where every aspect of realty was 
somehow endowed with consciousness. This often went hand-in-hand v.iith pantheism or 
panentheism. There were two principal varieties of vitalism in the data: the vitalism of Tempels 
and related authors, and the vita6sm of the Hermetic tradition. 
Y.JEST AFRICAN VITAi.iSM 
According to the pre-colonial philosophy ofTempels (1995: 63ff), the basic category of traditional 
Bantu re6gion was the theme of vitafity or force. The universe was subordinate to a network of 
interacting forces (the power of the ancestors and so forth) and vital power could be transferred 
from one person to another. The category of 'Being' was in effect replaced by force by virtue of a 
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dynamic metaphysics (cf. Tempels 1995: 67). This theme of a vitalist basis for African thought 
was taken up by subsequent scholars of African reigion (Grlaule 1965: 2) and echoed by 
Senghor (1964: 71) who went further and referred to a vital principal of extremely subtle material 
composition that accounted for human ife - thus demonstrating both the tendency mentioned 
eartier to view spirit and matter as convertible, and the idea of a quasi-material principle which, 
according to Wiredu (1996: 45, 50), was the standard way of conceiving the after-life of the 
human in African religion. In Senghor (1964: 24-25) could also be discerned the idea of 
something of a vital nature which pervaded the v.ihole universe, an idea stilt more clearly found in 
the Hermetic tradition and in certain forms of occuttic thought rela1ing to Africa ~\lhich were found 
In the data. 
HERMETIC AND EGYPTIAN VITAL.ISM 
According to Diop (1990: 160), the Egyptian cul of animals was based on a \Jitalist concept. The 
Hermetic teaching on vitatism, which in its broad outftnes seemed to be accepted by m~st of the 
Egyptologically lnftuenced African authors in the data, could be described as beBef In a 'Nous' or 
'· 
world-soul, by reason of which al of nature was interconnected (James 1954: 1ooy.a Some 
authors went so far as to defend animism on the basis of Hermetic vitalist Ideas: alhough Bailey 
(1964: 107) viewed animism as the most undeveloped form of thought available to Africa, as 
opposed to the sort of mysticism they might be expected to develop in the future, some 
Egyptologically influenced authors seemed to view it as not a primitive but an advanced form of 
thought - for Kamalu (1990: 86-87), it represented something better than the problematic 
Newtonian 'dead matter' theory. It was noteworthy that some conventional scholars of African 
reHglon denied that African traditional relglon was animistic (cf. V~redu 1996: 46), so that explc!t 
animist mysticism in relation to traditional thought seemed to be more of an innovation than a 
revival of tradition. Indeed, Tempels' very theory of vitaism itself as a basic prlncip'9 of Bantu 
reigion had not passed without controversy from is beginnings until the present day. 
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THE SACREDNESS OF NATURE AND THE \NORLD 
An important resutt and frequent implication of the aforementioned post-traditional African beliefs 
concerning vitaiism and the sacredness of nature was the absence of any distinction bef{llJeen the 
sacred and the profane, or the worldly and the unworldly. Although ce11ain precolonial authors 
i/liere found ~'liho deplored the mixing of re6gion INith non-religious activities, such as politics 
(Bailey 1964: 132; Mutwa 1966: 324), the vast majority of authors appeared not to have any room 
in their worldviet/\J for a total~J non-religious vietl'J of secular phenomena such as politics and so 
forth, although of course the misuse of religion in the sph~re of poRtics was knot.•.m and 
commented on (cf. Kamalu 1990: 142). 
On the whoie post-traditional thought in the context of Africa, as far as the present study 
indicated, tended to be favourable to a 1Norldviet111 !Nhere, contrary to the prevailing attitude in the 
West, the sacred was recognised as universally present in the world (cf. Kaboha 1992: 89, 70, 
71 ). What Gayraud S. Wilmore (1989: 26}, alluding to the viet/'.JS of W.E.B. Du Bois, said about 
Afro-American spirituality - that it was a theology developed not just in the churches but also 1n 
the streets, in taverns and in pool haUs' - seemed to correspond to the widespread post-traditional 
African view that ordinary life was not a separate sphere of being from the sphere of religion. 
Elsewhere \IVilmore ( 1972: 303) attributes similar concern for sacredness of Hfe to traditional 
African religion. 
LIFE AND AFRICANISED RELIGION IN GENERAL 
A further important feature of vitalism was evident, on the re-examination of an the findings of this 
study as a whole (3-6), when one bore in mind the modified version of the paradigm model 
proposed in 1.4.2. The new paradigm model made post-traditional Afrlcanised retigious life the 
center, so to speak, of the findings of this study. All the ideas and potential areas of thought 
explored were about conditions which authors could treat as acting on this 'life', the goals which 
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could be assigned to this 'life' and the strategies which could be adopted to attain the goals. 
Although this paradigm model did not have strict descriptive force, it seemed to embody a 
tendency, in the sources explored so far by the present research. for religious thought about 
Africa to converge in many respects around the theme of 'fife'. 
In fact. in certain forms of immanentist Africanised theology the 'life' of the human subject or 
community forming the centre of aff these considerations ~·Jas on occasion itself identical trJ1th the 
ultimate, or God. Thus vitalism and religious life itself could be, in certain sufficient!y immanentist 
religious opinions, fundamentally identified. This meant that any feature of one's God-concept, !f 
one followed such an immanentism (or even a transcendentalism strongly emphasising, for 
mysticai or other reasons. the theme of the immanence of God in all areas of life), was arguably 
non-separate from one's ideas of general history, moral life, life-goals and sirategies to attain the 
same. Thus in an interdisciplinary framework of religiosity the problems and internal 
paradoxes/contradictions of one's God-concept could be expected to have repercussions on the 
rest of one's philosophy, and the same applied to any less problematic and (by humanistic or 
democratic standards) advantageous and useful features of one's God-concept. 
2.5 OPPOSITIONAL CONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE UNIVERSE 
Despite the V'Jidespread tendencies to1f'Jards quasi-monist, inclusive and unitive philosophy 
present in the data, especially among the more mystical of the authors, there !!'Jere widespread 
references to various forms of opposition which were deemed crucial by various authors to the 
structure of the African universe. Examples were such things as good and evil, or male, female, 
beneficial spirits, and hostiie spirits etc. Belief that aft things were One, far from discouraging 
thought about oppositions, seemed to intensify these authors' preoccupation with them. 
Oppositions were present not only in certain Egyptian ideas about the elements or principle of the 
universe but also in the symbolism and mythology of more traditional African religion. 
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2.5.1 THE OPPOSmONAL THOUGHT OF KAMALU 
The most prevalent case of preoccupation with oppositions in the data was found in the work of 
Kamalu (Kamalu 1990: 24-26, 31, 35ff, 52, 54, 104-105, 141). Taking his stand on the Hermetic 
opposition of Being and Becoming, he propounded the view that Life, or the Ultimate, was 
generated by a mutually constitutive duo of the Noumenal and the Phenomenal, the unseen and 
unindividuaHsed, and the seen and the individuafised. 
THE RA.NGE OF OPPOSITION 
The basic paradoxical unity of the noumenal and the phenomenal in Kamalu's philosophy could 
be conceptuafised in a variety of philosophically significant God-concepts or Ideas. Each Idea 
embodied a 'not necessarily logicar but stiD paradoxical contradiction; and the oppositions at the 
root of his philosophy were metaphysical (deafing with the tension bettt'lleen the absolute and the 
relative in theology and cosmology), psychological (deafing with the unified 'I' verses the 
individuafised material self), epistemological (deafing with the contrast of noumenal intuition and 
phenomenal experience) and ethical (dealng with the contrast between ideafism and 
casuistry/pragmatism in moral decision-making). 
THE INTEGRATION OF OPPOSITES 
Kamalu tried to articulate a philosophy that recognised and contained aH of these opposites in a 
unity instead of introducing a Western hierarchical opposition. Although his viewpoint tended to 
render this unity impossible, in so far as it assigned causafity to the phenomenal alone and 
therefore rendered it impossible to explain (and therefore, presumably, understand) the physical 
in terms of the metaphysical (cf. Kamalu 1990: 120) in practice he did not apply this principle 
consistently: for by conceiving the noumenal and phenomenal as mutually constitutive in thought, 
and mutually interactive/conditioning in reality (cf. Kamalu 1990: 36, 45, 73) he in effect appeared 
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to assign a causal role of sorts to the Noumenal as ground of being and Unmoved lv1over, albeit 
in a general rather than an indlviduafised or personal sense, and in such a way as to make the 
Noumenal and Phenomenal co-eternal. In this respect Kamalu's views were similar to the eternal-
creation theory of Aristotle, on which he acknowledged expftcit dependence (cf. Aquinas' Summa 
Contra Gentiles, Book II, Chapter XXXll-XXXVlll). By a synchronic integration of the noumenal 
and phenomenal as unmoved and moved reality, each of which gave meaning to the other, and 
the first of which could be deemed in some sense the sustaining ground of the second, a unified 
picture of Life as the whole constituted by the paradoxical union of Being and Becoming in their 
totaUty was achieved by Kamalu's philosophy. 
THE PROBLEMS OF PARADOX IN PHILOSOPHY 
The problem of fundamental contradiction, in an immanentistic view of God as both absolute and 
relative, already alluded to in the case of Knlger (2.2.4), introduced some problems into Kamalu's 
thought. There was a tendency not to firmly distinguish the paradox from the gratuitous 
contradiction: Kamalu's contention that the various paradoxes of his philosophy were 'not 
necessarily logicar contradictions was a statement that, understood in its most obvious sense, 
seemed to leave open the possibiUty that there were in fact logical contradictions in his 
philosophy. The Western ideal of non-contradiction and the conflict-ridden Marxist-oriented 
thought of Nkrumah, which Kamalu (1990: 15) adopted, were syncretised with difficulty. 
THE POLITICAL EXPLOITATION OF PARADOXICAL BELIEFS 
A noteworthy imp6cation of paradox-ridden thought that neither Kamalu nor any other author of 
the study enlarged on, was that, In a universe where contradiction and 'paradox' run wild, the 
polcies enacted by a poltical leader cannot and should not be required by citizens to make 
sense, or to taBy perfectly with moral ideals. This perhaps raises a question when, under a post-
colonial African regime, it becomes the fashion to decry 'objectivity' or 'either/or logic' or Western 
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'reason'. Is there maybe an attempt to deprive all criticism of the ruing post-colonial regime, by 
Western democratic standards, of its epistemological basis? 
An example of such a use of relatMsm was present in the thought of Nkrumah ~simeng 1989: 
229). Charged by the Rev. G.T. Eddy with injustice in the detention of persons without trial by his 
government, Nkrumah defended his practice in a relativist fashion, saying of his Preventive 
Detention .Act that 1he rightness or wrongness of the act, in my opinion, depends entirely on the 
angle from which it was viewed·. 
He went on to s~: 
You and your colleagues, having the duty of working peacefully for the salvation of the 
souls of men, neither involved in the intrigues of politics nor surrounded by the practical 
dangers of state government, m~ be justified in looking at the Act the VJaY you do. On 
the contrary, my coDeagues and I, deeply involved in the practical issues of 
government.. .cannot afford to be Influenced by conventional niceties or deceived by the 
'· 
knavish tricks of imperialsts, coloniaHsts and their agents, and naturally v.,ie see the act 
from quite a different angle. 
In this way Nkrumah effectively immunised his position from al criticism: because there was no 
'objective point of view' on the issue he could simply do as he pleased, regardless of the 
democratic sensibiDties of others, without having to give valld adverse criticism serious 
consideration. People might argue about the truth was, absolutely, but who could argue about 
what was 'true for Nkrumah', relatlvlstlcaly? If something was wrong from the white democratic 
point of view, It could be simultaneously right tom the post-colonial African governmental point of 
view, and that seemed to be the end of that. 
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Criticism of Western science and logic in the sources studied was, however, not solely a tool for 
immunisation from criticism. Many of the post-traditional objections to Western science found in 
the data were based on its de-humanising character (5.2.2) - something which might be Unked 
with its 'cold objectivity'. lmpUcit in such an argument seems to be the idea that the more critical 
and rational you are, the less human you are. But here it should perhaps not be forgotten that 
reason and intellect belong to the human as weD as feeling and emotion, and that one can be 
'dehumanised' by being prevented from thinking rationally and critically, from acting as a 'rational 
animal'. In order to bring more of the qualitative dimension into science, it is not necessarily to 
attack either/or logic or ordinary reason. In fact exclusion of critical.reason, and of the intolerance 
for uncertainly justified or self-contradictory theories in the scientific arena, could de-humanise 
science as much as the exclusion of the quaUtative research paradigm, by preventing an 
important part of human consciousness from making its contribution to the sphere of science. 
2.5.2 OPPOSITION OF GENDER 
Not an of the authors in this study, however, elevated conflict or opposition into a principle of 
thought. Rather, it was various type.s of opposition, of a moral or sexual nature, that held their 
interest, probably as representative of real conflicts or issues in their lives. A common 
oppositional motif found in the data was the opposition of male and female. Sometimes this male-
female opposition was Unked with a law of Opposites, according to which the whole universe was 
polarised between positive/negative or male-female extremes (Frye 1988: 69-70), a duafity 
reminiscent of the Yin-Yang polarisation in the cosmology of Kruger (1995: 62-63). The male-
female duaUsm varied from expUcitly sexual metaphors in African mythology to the mere 
mascuUnity/femininity of the Egyptian theological systems. In most cases the opposites were 
postulated with a background of unity underlying them, and the harmonious integration of female 
with male was a central motif in the refigious orientation in question. Barashango (1991: 172) 
indeed went so far as to say that the power of the male would be ineffective unless Unked with the 
energy of femaleness. 
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.ANDROGYNY 
Patriarchal patterns in Western religious symboism were questioned or chalenged to some 
degree. Certain vie~oints, integrating male with female imagery, had an androgynous or 
bisexual concept of the divinity (Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 40-41; MuMa s.a.: 133). Nevertheless 
none of the authors in the data deaUng with the phenomenon of homosexuality accepted the 
homosexual lfestyfe as vafid: Barashango {1991: 188) articulated his feeings on this question 
fairty forcefutj by describing ancient African sexual mores as follows: "In these societies, faggots 
[sic] were not tolerated." And his description could be confirmed by casual and scholarly 
observation of a general hostilty to homosexual beha..nour in African culure (cf. Some 1994: 
212). 
ANDROGYNY AS A PROCREATIVE I DEAL 
It did not appear that this Afiicanised anti-homosexual stance was a contradiction of the 
mythological androgynous symbolism, once one realsed that the union of male and female was 
" . -~ 
valued in terms of fertility and procreation: so that any non-procreative androgynous union was in 
these terms conceived as a violation of the right relationship bettt4een the sexes. Androgyny in the 
God-concept was tolerated by Barashango in so far as i1 pertained to the divine creatNe act: bu1 
he did not accept the Christian 'androgyny' of the Father begetting the Son prior to creating the 
world, which for him was an unacceptably non-procreative metaphor (Barashango 1991: 172). It 
was possibly a confirmation of this fecundity-interpretation of Barashango's Africanlsed 
androgyny that he also condemned the practice of ceibacy {cf. Barashango 1991: 68), thus 
manifesting a ferttlty-oriented concept of male-female union. 
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AN AFRICANISED HERMETIC IDEAL NO PROCREATION, NO SE>< 
Despite the stance of Barashango and of traditional African Ideas on the desirability of marriage, 
it was noticed that some other authors, inspired by Hermetic precedents, seemed to view celibacy 
and a procreative-unitive concept of male-female union as compatible: for Egyptian ('.African') 
religion contained both the procreative pairs of the Ogdoad and the ascetical anthropology of 
Hermetic redemption (cf. James 1954: 75; Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 65). An analogy existed 
bet!Neen some trends in Hermeticised African religion and Roman Ca1holclsm, in tha1 a 
~'\!Orldview accepting both ce6bacy and the procreative ideal could be formulated which a1 the 
same time gave no positive or exp Heit support to the homosexual lifestyte (cf. Mambo Press 1994: 
539-552L The choice was either sex and offspring, or no sex and no offspring. For any 
intermediate option no precedent could be found in the Africanised-Hermetic or sub-Saharan 
African traditions or cosmologies presented by the authors studied. One followed either the 
precedent of the Egyptian or Atican ITl)'thological hierogamies, or that of the redemptive ideal of 
Hermetic asceticism. Ordinary famii;' lfe, or the harder way of sexual abstinence for_mystical 
reasons. Admittedly, though, the ideal of fertility and expressive sexuality was, of the two Ideals, 
the more prominent one in the sources s1udied. 
FEM\LE SYMBOLISM 
The sacred significance or feminine sexuaUty viias a particular sphere or interest for many 
Africanised authors. Th~ motif of a feminine principle in nature and divinity surfaced In se11eral 
forms. An important area was in mythical symbolsm: Mutt.'lla (s.a.: 1fJ) attributed importance to 
the Earth Goddess as a creative principle In association with the Tree of Life, and the Dogon 
mythology attributed wisdom and redemption to a female ancestor (Griaule 1965: 26, 27, 56ff). 
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SYMBOLS OF AFRICAN AND OTHER TRADITIONS 
The post-traditional African thinkers of this study who deal with the theme of femininity tended to 
conceive the feminine principle incllsivety, and even to relate it to similar S)'tnbols in other 
traditions: Kamalu (1990: 16) spoke favourably of the Egyptian goddess Isis, and Osabutey-
Aguedze (1990: 39-40) Rnked Mary with African nature symbolism. Extreme examples of 
inclusiveness of the feminine were found in the work of Barashango (1991: 74.ff, 105, 121ff) ~Wlo 
professed to find African lnkages in the female symbolsm of the Babylonian Tiamat and the 
Hindu goddess Kafi - and also in the work of Frye (1988: 6-7, 19) who admitted a comprehensive 
interest in aB aspects of the Great Mother Archetype and even stated that the whole aim of black 
philosophy was none other than pursuit of the feminine principle. Frye's views did not attempt to 
claim a rigid African monopoly of ideas so much as stress the inkage of black thought with 
feminist ideas worldwide. Barashango, however, seemed to impose on history the story of a 
struggle betv1een African respect for the feminine element in relgion, and Western or white 
patriarchy, in a manner that fostered rigid Afrocentrism and a virtual hatred-on-sight of the white 
race. AD the phenomena of world relglon seemed to t.e twisted Into this mould in a sort of 
Procrustean fashion, wilhout much dispassionate discussion of the case against such apparent 
distortions, prompting one possibly to ask v~hether the unaided achievement by the vA'lite race of 
any good thing whatsoever in the ield of women's rights was realty as impossible or absurd as 
Barashango seemed to be presupposing. 
FEMINIST ETHICS 
Possible Afrocentric distortions of relglous history by Barashango apart, however, was there In 
fact a fink between African thought and feminine respect, comparable to the lnkage often 
asserted between Western thought and patriarchy? Signs of an lncllsive or feminist ethic VJere In 
fact not lacking in the authors of this study. Indications ranged from Kamalu's reference to the 
genderless languages of Africa (Kamall 1990: xi-xii) to the alllsion of Senghor (1964: 269) to the 
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concern for women in traditional African thought. A partlcularilj Interesting connection 1-Aft!S the one 
drart.-i by Maybee (1999: 168) between the caring-oriented (and therefore feminised) ethical 
tendencies to be found in Egyptian and traditional sub-Saharan African ethics. as opposed to the 
patriarchal rationality of other perspectives. 
THE FEMALE CON'NECTiON W/TH POWER AND WiSDOM 
The connection of the feminine principle with occu~ power was of course one of the aspects of 
the Great Mother archetype in the work of Frye: and in the initiation of Some (1994: 221) the 
appearance of a female figure V'3S a key mystical experience. The Hnkage of feminine symboism 
!Nith African witchcraft seemed to be impicily disavowed in the work of Geschiere (1997: 61) who 
denied that 11.ritchcrat in Africa was, as in the West, Inked with the deVil or sexuality. Yet tv1utwa 
(s.a.: 20) told the story of an ancient matriarchal government of witches in Africa, which appeared 
to positively Ink the two. 
A more detailed connection of feminine symbolsm with power was found in the work of 
Barashango (1991: 171ff) who attributed the warmth and positive attributes of the black1ace to 
the 'Mother Force', and spoke highty of the female attribute of Ptah as Preserver which provided a 
necessary complement to al male expressions of power. The feminine principle was speclfica~ 
mentioned as a source of wisdom, as concretised in the land of the black people itself. Thus 
Mother Alkebulan' or Africa was for Barashango (1991: xii, 167, 171, 172ff) not merely, by 
coincidence, the place where civiisation arose: It was also a mystical power source or contact 
point for the continuance of that civiisation's roots and wisdom. The connection of knowledge 
with power was an Important and recurring motif in the systems of mysticism found in the data: 
the source of feminine power was usuatj connected in some way with the symbolsm of 
knowledge or v•sdom. 
66 
tv\Al.E SYMBOLISM 
The emphasis on female symbolism in the data was not one-sided. There ~~as some indication of 
the qualities of the male or patriarchal symboUsm in African mythology. lvtany of these 
indications revolved around the Yoruba deity Ogun, the god of war and weapons, ll'.tlo according 
to Barnes (1989: 3) "Rke all deities advances understanding, unifies knowledge and creates a 
'first philosophy of nature': Here the aforementioned connection of knm'Vfedge and power was 
present as in feminine symbolsm. Yet, the 'patriarchal rationality' of Ogun's power was evident. 
THE ETHIC OF VIOLENCE 
The male ethic of self-reliance and martial or military activity, which could be contrasted with the 
more communitarian and female ethical outlook above, was, despite the criticism of Barashango 
(1991: 159) not wholly absent from Atlcan thought. Indeed, Neimark (1993: 85) viewed the deity 
Ogun as inspiring the spirit of violence which was wiling to fight and kil in the name o.f justice. 
Even in Barashango (1991: vii, 167) the themes of heroism and flght,ng for freedom were not 
'· 
wholty absent. This meant that a certain scepticism perhaps had to be shown about ctarms that 
the African tradition vJas a purety peaceful product of 'sun people'. Egyptian Africa produced, 
according to a biblical tradition too wel known to need any comment. the Pharaonic oppressors 
of the Jews (a fact glossed over or ignored in many Egyptological perspectives, alhough the 
Rastafarian interpretation of the identiy of the ancient Jews, and its relevance to this question, 
will be touched on briefly in a later chapter), while Sub-Saharan Africa had its share of warlke 
and martial perspectives which both in nobility and depravity were comparable to those of the 
West (cf. Mutwa s.a.: 185). 
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THE ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF OGUN 
The 'patriarchal ethic' of post-traditional African thought, in so far as such a thing was apparent in 
the data of the present study, did not necessarily conform to any phaDocentric stereotype, but 
was presented by Ajuwon (1989: 195-196) as a philosophy of Ufe based on the principle of 
individuafity and the contribution to be expected from individual effort and leadership. Ajuwon 
deduced from African tradition about Ogun an ethic based on three principles. Firstly, humans 
were alone, and like Ogun, the hunter needed to be self-sufficient. Secondly, the ideal individual 
took a leadership role. Thirdly, as a human one was judged by o.ne's own achievements. These 
were principles based on heroic individua6sm and efficiency, and the Dnkage of this heroic motif 
with other significant tendencies observed in the data, notably moral ideals of liberation, 
accomplishment and overaB excellence (and even godfikeness in power and knowledge) meant 
that the male element would not necessarily be found less essential to post-traditional African 
religious thought as the feminine element. The very inclusiveness of symbols found in the post-
tradltional African thinkers of this study seemingly prevented feminism from reigning supreme to 
the detriment of symbofism relating to certain male or Messianic figures. 
2.5.3 THE POLARITY OF GOOO AND EVIL IN NATURE 
The theme of evil and evil spirits arose occasionally in the data, and could not be tt.Jholly avoided 
when speaking of African witchcraft. Many authors referred to individual evil spirits or witches as 
phenomena in African befief, but there was a reluctance to recognise any sort of general evil 
principle comparable to the Christian devil. This in turn seemed to be Hnked with a view of human 
nature that did not accept the concept of original sin. 
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THE GOODNESS OF HUMAN NATURE 
Certain of the more modem post-tradiional African authors tended to deny the Christian concept 
of original sin and the fal (cf. Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 92). Original sin was in this context 
interpreted in a Protestant sense as the total depravity of human nature and its incapacity for 
good. Such a concept, as It stood, was contrary to Ideas such as that of Neimar!I: (1993: 7) that It 
was one's birthright to be happy successful and fulfilled; and it was opposed by the Ghanaian 
leader Nkrumah (who in turn was a significant Influence on Kamalu} on the grounds that i1 
fostered the denial of political dignity to the African (cf. Axelsen t984: 233). Perhaps an ulterior 
motive for the political rejection of the concept v.ias that the idea of original sin was incompatible 
with the immunity of .Atican leaders from criticism. A leader born in original sin cannot be perfect 
and totally immune from evil, and thus the possibility arose of the leader's giving orders that might 
openly contradict the law of God, and therefore had to be disobeyed. As Wright ( 1971: 20) put it: 
"The President would lay great stress on equaDty of aD men as made in the image of 
God, though he would net observe that the Christian tradition sees that image as a 
fla~~d one and asserts that man's first duty is to God." 
THE MYTH OF THE FALL 
Certain less modem authors, such as Mbiti (1989: 94.ff), alluded to references in African 
mythology to some sort of primordial fal in the early ages of humanity, as a result of which human 
mortally entered the world. In the mythology of the Dogan (Griaule 1965: 17, 21ff, 47, 57, 123), 
the stages of the fan were compBcated, lnvo lvlng a transition from Immortality to pseudo-death to 
real death. In the lght of what was mentioned before (2.4.1), that the Dogon mythology amounted 
to a synchronic account of the constitution of the universe and of human consciousness, It could 
perhaps be argued that fai-myths were to do with humanity's remoteness from the divinity rather 
than a real historical fal from grace: and the normaity of this remoteness would perhaps explain 
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the absence of redemptive concern in more tradltlonalAfrlcan thought, as note.d by fl,.t)iti (1989: 
96). This would tie In ~h the view of MJtwa (s.a.: 134) that the evil inclination coexisted 11'Ath the 
good as part of human nature rather than being contracted by a historical accident. 
THE FALL IN H/STOR'/ 
In more modem post-traditional authors there ~'\Jere some signs of beffef in a historical 'far in the 
sense of a recognition of the pw.ier of humanity to cut itself off tom its roots in nature - for 
example by Westem-styte ,,ubris' or spiritual blindness (Kaboha 1992: 76 etc.). Fafts of this sort 
were usualy found to be redeemable in various ways. Some authors, 11'.tlo beieved in Africa as 
the source of cMHsation, attributed importance to the fal of ancient 'African' civilisation as a resul 
of neglect of human values, and an expected redemption in the future as the cultural riches of 
that civilisation were rediscovered (cf. Kamalu 1990: Sff; James 1954: 153ff) - Including, for some, 
lost African secrets, such as the secret of primordial longevity (Osabutey-AQuedze 1990: 31). 
EVIL SPIRITS 
The theme of evil in Africanised reigious authors, gi'J8n the background of traditional African 
ideas, was not in al cases a matter solei'j of ordinary human evil. Many of the sources studied 
made some reference to the powers of evil in traditional African religion. Indeed, investigating 
ideas about the powers of evil was difficul to avoid in a study of post-traditional African thought, 
in the sense that many post-traditional Africanised Innovative tendencies were inked with 
occutism and unsociaised forms of reigion, or, in other words, witchcraft (Geschiere 1997:1, 7ff). 
References to witchcraft, which wil be dealt with more fuly In Chapter 5, tended to be more 
prominent than references to more non-human evil powers; nevertheless, these too were not 
lacking. 
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THE AMBIVALENCE OF NATURE 
Several authors tended to treat evil as a part of nature, and in certain respects on a par with 
good. Gonzalez-Wippler (1973:6-S) applied to Santeria the idea of Dion Fortune, that evil or the 
Negative Force has a role to play in the world plan, serving to "clear up behind the advancing tide 
of evolution, removing that which has become effete, so that It may not choke or clog evolving 
5fe." Thus, although the orlsha were undoubted1'j on the side of ffght, nevertheless the powers of 
darkness were useful as well and were identified with the shadow side of natural processes. 
This echoed a sentiment found in the Yoruba-deriwJd beliefs of Nelmark (1993: 80) vtio, mile 
not accepting the trickster-deny Eshu as evil or demonic, nevertheless identified Eshu with the 
harsher and more merciless side of nature. Geschiere (1997: 1, 12-13) did not accept that the 
power of evil or witchcraft was moralfy" biased, but rather the power of witchcraft was neutral and 
could have a good or an evil side. In many different 11'.JaYS the Idea 1t<1as articulated that Good and 
Evil, for whatever reason, could not be rigid1'/ separated: and this seemed moreover-to be a 
natural consequence of a monistic or panentheistlc worldview which united aB reaHty into one 
-"" 
interrelated whole. Mutwa (s.a.: 132) argued that most of the gods of traditional Zulu relgion were 
evil - and ne~rtheless he called them gods, not devils. This tied in v4ith his view of the good and 
evil inclination as existing side by side in the heart of humanity, and with his identification of the 
entire universe with God. 
ESHU, OR THE TRICKSTER 
Signs of belef In a supreme evtl spirit 1Nere dlfficu• to find In the data. Nelmark (1993: 7, 33, 7411) 
natty denied that any such thing as a devil existed In African thought: he approved of the cu• of 
vitches under the command of the Yoruba deity Eshu, but Insisted that Eshu was not a devil but 
a master. controler and Hmiter of evil or destructive powers. He had a destructive aspect, but also 
a benevotent aspect. Other trends of thought hcw.ver were more ready to identify Eshu as an 
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evil god (McGregor 1966: 45) aRhough even In this case he apparentl'j had to be wor!hipped and 
placated rather than shunned. Certain Yoruba-derived forms of spirituaism employed the term 
'exu' as a general syno~ for evil spirit (cf. Ortiz 1989: 95, 98), alhough even here the 
absoluteness of the evil was modified by a subdivision into 'pagan' exus and baptised' exus, the 
latter being the source of more benign forms of spirit-possession. The tendency to Hnk good and 
evil into some sort of unity was found in the view of Abimbola (1994:106) which made Eshu into a 
sort of intermediary ftnking the 'Deus de Bern' with the 'Deus de Mar. 
EVIL IN A BINARY" UNIVERSE 
It was significant that Eshu was regarded, according to lvlcGregor (1966: l9ff), as the teacher of 
lfa, a god personif)4ng a famous Yoruba divination system. This divination system had a dualistic 
basis: according to the description of Thorpe (1991: 98) it could involve the use of sixteen palm 
nuts, which, being tossed rapidly from hand to hand according to a prescribed scheme, would 
end up with either one or two nuts remaining in the hand of the diviner. In a procedure analogous 
to the construction of I Ching hexagrams, the results of many repetitions of the above procedure 
' 
resulted in a double eightfold sign corresponding to an lfa myth which could be adaptetf to the 
situation of the cfient. There were 16 principal llfy'ths and 256 subordinate llfy'ths. 
The basis of the lfa system, as of the I Ching, was binary opposition in the structure of the 
universe. In ine with this oppositional tendency was the aforementioned role of Eshu as mediator 
of the opposite tendencies of the universe, and of his role, mentioned by Drewal (1992:16), as the 
principle of change. For change impled ambivalence, innovation and transition from one state to 
a second. Evil was once again found to be intertwined with good as part of a basic ambiguity -
perhaps even a conflict or contradiction - in the structure of the evotving divine universe Itself. 
This theme v-•H be touched on again in Chapter 4, v.t\ere it will be discussed v-.t\ether Africanised 
religion is based as a matter of course on peace and love (as is generall'j supposed by today's 
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conventional wisdom), or whether an awareness of violence and conflict in the universe may 
occasionally play a more pivotal role. 
THE PROBLEM POSED BY EVIL' PHILOSOPHICAL OR EMOTIONAL? 
A notable impression given by some post-traditional Africanised aHusions to evil and evil forces, 
~'IJas that evil tended to be net so much philosophically explained as coped ~'llith: there were 
attempts to 'include' evil as part of a unity, rather than construct an explicit theodicy justifying evil 
in God's universe and/or sollling any philosophical problems relate.d to evil. Evil \Alas not there to 
be discussed or explained in a detached fashion, but to be dealt with and managed by some 
means. This approach went to the heart of indigenous African traditional refigion, and of the 
traditional ideas behind sacrifice and ritual (4.3.1, 4.3.3). 
2.6 THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE 
The post-traditional African cosmologies explored in the present research - among which West 
African ideas tended to predominate ( 1.3 .1) tended to be heavily influenced by traditional African 
mythology, of which the mythology of the Dogon of Mali (Griaule 1965) was a prominent example. 
Ideas on the significance of creation my1hs varied: while rv1utwa (s.a.: 1ff, 111) seemed to treat 
them as titeral history, integrating them with Zulu oral traditions bearing on the past of his people, 
many other authors seemed to grant them a synchronic explanatory role. Barashango (1991: 18-
19, 183ff) distinguished between aesthetic myths (animal stories), explanatory myths and heroic 
myths, and like Diop (Moore 1986: 238) seemed to agree with the standpoint that the Egyptians 
provided Africa not with a mere mythology, but actually with a philosophy, albeit one expressed 
more by means of symbofism than rrteral prose ( 0 sabutey-Aguedze 1990: 8, 11). 
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2.6.1 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLO-OROER 
It has already been mentioned that many of the authors conceived the myths of traditional Africa 
as offering a synchronic scheme corresponding to the present and continuing constitution of the 
world and the self, rather than describing events in the remote past (2.4.1 ). The nature of the 
'structure' so understood could frequently be conceived as an emanation of the world from the 
divine. According to Kamalu (1990: 6, 24-25, 101, 113-114) there was only one original African 
cosmology, alluded to by both the Hermetic cosmology of Being and Becoming, and by 
analogous concepts in traditional mythology such as the 'zo' and. 'yo' of the Bambara. Kama~J's 
idea that the creation of the self was also described in the original cosmology seemed to be 
related to the attempt of some authors to identify the divine creative principle with one's deepest 
self (cf. Barashango 1991 : 166; Legesse 1994: 332}. 
REALITY: SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE? 
The identity of the self and the universe had an important epistemological implication: it 
undermined objectivism and scepticism about ungrounded and unrationaHsed personal 
convictions about the universe. It was not unusual in the course of this research to see authors 
holding a cosmological or quasi-theological concept of the self and also espousing a humanistic 
or non-rational approach to the problem of knowledge and valid experience. Kamaiu (1990: 28) 
was a case in point: he pointed out that science as a cultural product had to necessarily be 
culturally relative. He portrayed 'common sense' as a cultural product rather than a set of 
panhuman ideas, thus apparently implying that science was built on a relative foundation t•Jhose 
tests were more intersubjective than objective. Kamalu did not wholly reject Western science: he 
accorded it a Hmited vaHdity, but he did try to question its necessary supremacy to an other 
perspectives. 
74 
THE DECOLONISATION OF THE MIND 
It ~s not difficul to see a possible reason or motive for a post-traditional African to refrain from 
molly embracing Western science. Apart tom Western science being a proof frequently 
appealed to as evidence of Western superiority, Western science dominated cosmology, and 
therefore its acceptance conferred on scientists the power to shape an ideology. In order for 
traditional African ideas to be safeguarded from Western domination, therefore, ~ could be 
argued that some way had to be found of articulating traditional African cosmology, and i1s 
authoritative tradi1ional means of transmission, in such a way as to deny the pm\ler of Western 
science to criticise or pick holes in such an arrangement, to the degree of totally invaHdating 
African cosmology. 
It appeared to follow from this that cosmology, in the context of post-traditional African thought, 
was not necessarily a purely theoretical position on the nature of the universe, but could function 
as a tool of empowennent, whereby the Africanised person could have an overarching ground for 
his/her world\lfew that was not subject to Western control. From such a standpoint lberation or 
decolonisation of the mind, rather than a disinterested search for truth, could appear a! more 
central an issue. 
It is not being maintained here that the present infllence of Western science on our society is 
necessarity a 'dictatoriar or 'undemocratic' thing, since ideology in a social miieu cannot be 
wholly unshaped by anything, and there are, in the sphere of the struggle for human rights, some 
possible means of thwarting dictatorship that are offered by an objective sphere of Intellectual and 
moral ideals which are immune tom co-optation by poltlcal leaders, as has been alklded to in 
2.2.1. 
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2.6.2 THE PATIERN OF THE UNIVERSE 
Post-traditional African thought, as has been said, involved, inter alia, various attempts to resist 
the hegemony of Western objectivist or critical science. Nevertheless, if Western science was not 
to dominate cosmological thinking, then what sorts of influences would motivate its systematic 
development? In order to ansvJer this question, authors had to investigate how exactly traditional 
and 'ancient African' systems held themselves together before \Nestern civifisation came along. 
The ~frican' mythological traditions aHuded to, both Egyptian and traditional African, contained 
patterns and systems serving to generally classify everything in their universe: an equivalent to 
this in Western culture would be the arrangement of aft words in the respective categories of 
'.Abstract Relations, Space, Physics, Matter, Sensation, lnteHect, Vofition, Affections' and their 
subcategories in the synopsis of Roget's Thesaurus (Roget 1962: xv-xxii), or the arrangement of 
creatures found in Daniel 3 :51-90 in the Oeuterocanonical (or ~ocryphal') version. 
EXOTERIC CLASSIFICATION 
Some authors alluded to the inherent classificatory tendencies of Bantu language, in the form of 
noun classes. In place of grammatical mascufine, feminine or neuter gender, Bantu nouns were 
placed in various classes corresponding to the notions of 'person', ,hing', 'place', 'action', 'abstract 
state' and so forth (cf. Jahn 1961: 96, 99ff). Over and above this one couid point to the eightfold 
Dogon correspondence scheme finking mythological ancestors, the structure of the human, the 
layout of villages, the design of granaries, the construction of musical instruments, the classes of 
animal and so forth (Griaule 1965: 222-223 etc.). In Egyptian thought one could indicate the four 
elements (cf. Kamalu 1990: 31), and it was perhaps arguable that the difference in the spheres of 
patronage of the gods of any polytheistic religion, whether Egyptian, Yoruba or Greek, afforded a 
clue to the way worshippers of these gods divided up and prioritised the various aspects of their 
world (e.g. if sex and love, war and wine were not important to the Greeks, Aphrodite, Eros, Ares 
and Bacchus obviously would not have been worshipped or venerated! See also 2.5.2 above). 
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The categories of mythological thought could not be treated, particularly in post-traditional African 
thought of West African origin, as necessarily unconnected with the categories of cosmology and 
ordinary thought in general. 
ESOTERIC CLASSIFICATION 
The predominance of mythical motifs in \Nest African systems of classification (particular~1 those 
related to Dogon belief} meant that a widespread tendency arose, in the sources studied, to 
articulate .Africanised belief, especially cosmological belief, in terms of authoritative myth or 
culture-story rather than critical objective study. Nevertheless not every author in the study was 
content to just accept the myths at face value, as given: there were some authors who attempted 
to see a deeper meaning to the patterns of Egyptian and traditional African mythology. In addition 
to V\/estern science and the ordinary classification of the universe according to tradithmal 
m-y1hological precedents there were attempts at 'esoteric classification' or the construction of 
tables of correspondence between African concepts (such as orisha) and other concepts of 
mythical significance - in !ine tl'Jith the search for nonlinear patterns that v~as regarded by Faivre 
(1992a: xv-xvi) as one of the marks of esoteric philosophy. \Northy of mention tll!ere the attempts 
of Gonzalez-Wippler (1973: 122} to match up the African orishas with the planets and the 
Sephiroth of the Cabbala, and 1he table of opposites drawn up by Fiye (HU~S: 40) which seemed 
to be connected with the Being/Becoming Scheme of Kamalu (1990: 35) and the all-pervasive 
integrativeitranscendent interaction of Krager (1995: 55ff. 62-63). Many of these correspondence 
schemes seemed lo have in common the theme of a fundamental duality or opposition in the 
structure of the universe, a hidden structure underlying the major symbols of religion (cf. 
Gonzalez-\/\/ippler 1973: 97-100). Thompson (1984:109, 112) refers to patterns in ordinary 
A.fricanised religion reminiscent of such hidden structure in the form of the Kongo cosmogram, 
and of mandala-like Trinidadian ground-drawings which function as "spiritual aids to mediation·. 
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2.6.3 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIVERSE 
Despite the efforts of certain authors to rehabilitate African traditional mythology, myth, even 
esotericised myth, had to somehow come to terms with the impact of history. How were 
mythology and history related? In Rne with the synchronic interpretation of mythology, some 
authors argued for a cycfic or non-linear approach to time. Influential even in the post-traditional 
thought of Frye (1988: 121) 1tJas the much-discussed theory of Mbiti concerning the nature of 
African time. Mbiti (1989: 22) explained African time in terms of the two concepts of 'sasa' and 
'zamani', as follows: 
"Sasa is in itself a complete or fuH time dimension, with its own short future, a dynamic 
present and an experienced past. We might call it the Micro-Time (Little-Time) ... Zamani 
is not limited to what in English is catted the past. It also has its own 'past', 'present' and 
'future' but on a wider scale. We might caU it the Macro-Tims (Big Time). Zamani overlaps 
with Sasa and the two are not separable. Sasa feeds or disappears into Zamani. But 
before events become incorporated into the Zamani they must become realised or 
actuafised within the Sasa dimension. When this has taken place, then the events 'move' 
bacbwrds from the Sasa into the Zamani. So Zamani becomes the period beyond which 
nothing can go." 
As described by Mbiti, 'zamani' was a sort of 'macro-time' which could be viewed in a sort of 
synchronic relation to 'sasa', thus making the two degrees of time analogous in some respects to 
the 'Being' and 'Becoming' of Kamalu. 
NONLINEAR TIME AND HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
Among post-traditionalAfricanised thinkers, there could be found indications of an interest in such 
things as the history of Western and African thought, which resulted in a tinear historiographical 
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concept of time being integrated ""'1h the more ~deal concept. tvhm""' (s.a.: 32) seemed to 
accept a cyeical concept of time based on traditional S)lmbolism, but the detailed quasi-
mythological history of his people that formed the substance of his work created a sort of Hnear 
arrangement that divided African history into various ages or epochs (Mutwa s.a.: 6ff, 10ff, 15ff 
etc.). The combination of c~lic time with historical study had the general effect of apparently 
increasing or stretching out 'sasa• so as to encompass the ~nhole of known history: cyt:lc time 
became a timeless reaity signifying the natural background of the beginning, sustenance and end 
of aft things, and this was continuous with an extensive linear history as the West conceived it. 
The cycle had not wholly vanished, but the reabsorption of time into timelessness was 
1'9interpreted in terms of a synchronic interaction rather than, as in Mbiti, a part of the diachronic 
passage oftime (cf. Kamalu.1990: 36, 117), or, allematively, the reabsorption could be related to 
some nonfragmented quality inherent in the 'stream' oftime itself (Frye 1988: 91). 
PROCESS AND EVOLUTION 
None of the authors of the study denied the concept of evolution as conceived in the West. On 
,, 
the contrary, the tendency found in Kruger (1995: 173ff) to Integrate the theme of evo!U1ion or 
process with cosmology and theology was widespread among Egyptological or Hermetic authors: 
there were even attempts to find evolutionary motifs in Egyptian ~hs (cf. De Montellano 1991: 
48). In the anthropology of Barashango (1991: 206) there was the attempt, typical of much New 
Age thought, to link physical evolution ll'Mth spiritual evolution: the human was viewed as 
progressing from the state of animal being to that of a purer spiritual being. An infaJentlal factor in 
the acceptance of evolution for many authors was the theory of modem Western paleontology 
that humankind had first evolved in Africa. 
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
The intervening ideological conditions acting on various aspects and varieties of post-traditional 
African thought, and expressed in the various theologies and cosmologies of the data, were 
difficult to describe by means of pat categories or neat schemes. But certain recurrent features of 
debate on cosmology could be indicated. 
Firstly, there was a tendency to look for an inclusive worldview which had a place for 
everything. God-concepts formulated by Africans, whether pantheistic or polytheistic or 
monotheistic, 1i11ere not played off against each other but integrated into a common scheme 
(2.2.2, 2.3, 2.5) - even the exclusive ideas of God were incorporated to some degree in the 
concept of God as beyond fuU human comprehension (2.2.3}. Male and female, good and 
evil, mind and matter both had some place in the overall harmony of things (2.2.4, 2.5.2-3). 
Many of the post-traditional viewpoints were monistic and faced the problem confronting all 
monisms, to integrate the negative and dualistic aspects of experience with the underlying 
unity. The problem of absolutising the relative, with its attendant paradoxes (2.2.4, 2.5.1}, 
seemed to pose some chaUenges, and there was no total solution to this problem in any of 
the sources studied. 
Secondly, there ll'JaS a sort of polarity between more iraditionaffst Subsaharan' Africanised 
viwJpoints on the one hand, and modernised or Egyptological viewpoints on the other (cf. 
2.4.2, 2.4.3 etc.). Two different approaches existed among the authors, a less sophisticated 
traditional approach (Mutwa, Some, Neimark, and many Class A or B authors in 1.6) and a 
more sophisticated Hermetic or esoteric approach (Kamalu, Frye, Osabutey..Aguedze, and so 
forth). Yet the proponents of the latter view in Africa would not dissociate themselves from 
proponents of the former (cf. Kamalu 1990: 3) and certain authors ti'ilose interest seemed to 
gravitate towards the former view would nevertheless refer respectfully to proponents of the 
latter view (cf. Masolo 1994: 18ff, 24ff, 37ff). Hermetic African thinkers could be found to 
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claim that their roots stiU lay in the indigenous traditional reUgion of the African continent. The 
relationship was reminiscent of the situation of the myriad developed Christian theologies, 
whether Cathofic, Protestant, Hberal or conservative. These viewpoints, though more 
developed and complex than the biblical thought of the first century, did not see in this 
complexification any fundamental discontinuity llllith their bibUcal roots. This apptied despite 
the fact that the various contradictory tendencies arguably could not au be deemed equally 
reproductive of the original tradition, which presumably favoured at most either one or the 
other of any ttr-JO radically conflicting positions. Similarly debatable identifications were made 
by many post-traditional Africans of their myriad personal philosophies llllith their continental 
religious roots; although the mutual disagreements were not so harsh or prominent as in 
Western theology, the degree to which these claims could be reasonably justified was highly 
uncertain, and seemed to vary from author to author as described in 1.6. 
Thirdly, the themes of knowledge and power tended to be significant in the post-traditional 
African thought of this study. As far as knowledge of the divine was concerned, discourse 
about God involved the issue of his transcendence and represent ability (2 .2 .3, 2 .3 .1), and 
often the articulation of some sort of rational philosophy of the divine, and cosmology could 
not be discussed llllithout raising the issue of the cognitive significance and meaning of myths 
(2.6). As far as pot.".Jer was concerned, ethical questions relating to occult and social power 
arose whenever the divinities or spirits of the universe were discussed (2.5.2-3). The theme 
of the Word, a creative and entightening power, was important for many authors. The pattern 
of the universe was not unrelated to mystical awareness (2.6.2). This was a manifestation of 
' 
an interdisciptinary tendency ti'.ihlch constantly finked African cosmology to the psychology of 
the human (2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.6.1). 
Fourthly, questions relating to the manipulability of ideas formed a sort of hidden agenda 
coexisting llllith more overt cosmological aims. There were signs of an attempt to break the 
dominion of Western scientific and rational ideology over the intervening conditions which 
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acted on Africanised thought (2.6.1-2), by replacing objectivism and critical/sceptical science 
with a culturally oriented and often mythologised cosmology. The power of dictatorial 
leadership to exploit a non-rational or non-objectivised cosmology (2 .2 .1) was not generally 
recognised by authors, nor was there explicit interest in constructing an objectivised series of 
intellectual, moral and reUgious ideas whose domination did not lie in the hands of the State 
who professed accountability to them. 
Fifthly, the dualism of Being and Becoming, of Stability and Change, of Eternity and History, 
of ReaUty and Symbol, arose whenever the more 'static'. or unchanging traditions of 
indigenous Africa had to be integrated with the more dynamic and sophisticated concepts of 
civilised Egypt or the civilised West. This meant that expressions of panentheism, and other 
concepts integrating the transcendent with the immanent, arose frequently and shaped the 
overaU philosophy of post-traditional Africans into something nonsecular and at the same 
time temporally oriented (2.1, 2.2.4, 2.4, 2.6.3). 
The areas of interest in post-traditional thought, which constituted intervening conditions acting on 
the retigious He of post-traditional Africa, were therefore relatable to five broad areas: firstly, an 
inclusive and unitive view of ultimate or divine reaUty, incorporating and integrating a wide variety 
of God-concepts; secondly, the poofing of the resources of everything African, both Egyptian and 
sub-Saharan, and the exploration of these resources in order to find an African identity in the 
spheres of philosophy, culture and religion; thirdly, the search for an integration of science, 
re&gion, ethics, magic, and anything of interest to African individuals or peoples; fourthly, the 
search for a way of breaking the dominion of Western science over the cosmology of African 
peoples; fifthly, the articulation of a view which combined history and the world, as modern or 
ordinary humanity experienced it, with an experience or awareness of the sacred or divine. 
The variations between Africanised thought on theology and cosmology seemed to be more 
complementary than polemical, and it was less a matter of 'sides' to be taken in a controversy 
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(except for the 'anti-Western' or 'anti-<:oloniar side, which in most authors ~"Mnt without saying), so 
much as differences of emphasis on a question. Outright disagreements betv.1een authors, 
though not lacking (cf. 2.5.3), did not appear to be the life and soul of religion, as in many 
Western trends of thought. 
Some principal areas of conflict seemed to be: the degree of personalty in God (2.2.3); the 
admissibifity of Christian or Western God-concepts (2.2.2); the defensibiity of patriarchal ethics 
(2.5.2); the nature of cosmic evil (2.5.3); the historicity of m~hs (2.6); and the degree to which 
history should Intrude into the trneless cosmology of tradttiorial Africa (2.6.3). All of these 
disagreements seemed to center around the theme of exclusive particularity (the individuality of 
one being or class of beings over-against another) in relation to inci.Jsive uni1y in one's IJiew of 
theology, cosmology, sexuaHty, culture and history. 
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3 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AFRICAN LIFE 
The discussion in the last chapter, l/llhich concerned the general ideological intervening conditions 
acting on the religious life of the post-traditional African authors explored in the present research, 
concluded in 2.6.3 with some remarks on the acceptance of evolution for Afrocentric reasons. 
This phenomenon marked an intersection point of sorts between the general cosmological 
background to Africanised thought, and the more particularised Afrocentric approach to history 
that exercised a more immediate influence on religious and political attitudes. A ~~despread 
preoccupation in the authors of the study was the question of race relations, and the status of 
black African culture and reHgion in relation to the supposedly 'superior' culture and religion of the 
of the West. Many of the authors were concerned with rewriting the supposedly distorted Western 
history of civiHsation in general, to give African culture the place they thought it deserved in the 
history of human thought. Certain Egyptological trends in the post-traditional African thought of 
this study thus differed from traditional sub-Saharan religion in the sphere of the 'sacred history' 
of the African race ~'\Jhich it offered as an alternative to the Western conception. The Egyptologists 
tended to be mostly West African and American authors, although the example of Samkange 
{ 1971) from Zimbabwe shotl'Jed that Egyptological enthusiasts li'Jere not restricted to West Africa. 
3.1 AFRICA AS THE SOURCE OF HUMAN HISTORY 
Many of the sources studied subscribed to the theory, supported by paleontological findings, that 
Africa was the place l/llhere humanity first originated. Kruger (1995: 173-174) attributed to Africa a 
qualified sacred significance as the ancestral home of the human race, although arguing that 
independent of human conventions no one place in the universe was more sacred than any other. 
Barashango ( 1991 : xii) hOll'.iever showed no such reservation, but waxed lyrical in his praises of 
'fvlother Alkebulan' and did not hesitate to attribute everything admirable in world refigion to some 
African precedent. The significance of Africa seemed to be a sort of meeting point l/llhere scientific 
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and religious ideas happened to coincide, an important feature in a worldview ll'Jhere the 
approach to science and religion tended to be interdisciplinary or syncretistic (5.2.2). 
3.·i.1 THE AFRICAN SOURCE OF CIViLISATiON 
Many authors were not content to treat Africa as the origin of humanity, but insisted that, through 
Egypt, it was also the origin of civilisation. Sometimes this was carried to an exaggerated 
extreme: De Montellano (1992: 162) mentioned a source that did not confine itseif to discussing 
the verifiable influences of Egyptian thought on Greek philos.ophy and history (cf. Bernai 1937) 
but went so far as to argue that Egypt was the source also of ancient Aztec civilisation. Other 
authors appealed to non-Egyptian sources, particularly the ancient civilisation of ile-lfe to t1'llhich 
Yoruba reiigion traced back its roots (Gonzaiez-Vvippier i 973: i) and ll'Jhich, according to 
Nelmark ( 1993: 2j was the source of the worid's oidest mot1othelsiic reiigiot1, !lie !fa religion. 
Mutviia (s.a: 7, 9 etc.) was aione in explicitly tracing the origin of civilisation to a now-e:..1inct 
ancient race commemorated in the secret myths of the Zulu. Some (1994: 273) mentioned a 
vision of a vanished people which he experienced during his secret training, but the significance 
and degree of historicity of this vision 1r.ras not clear. 
3.1.2 AFRICA AS THE SOURCE OF RELIGION AND ACHIEVEMENT 
Soine auihors expressed, expiicitiy or impliciiiy, !he 1.mderstandabie conviction ihat the reiigion 
they had grottm up with in Africa was the only true one (cf. Masero 1991: 96). Others. though 
sometimes more tolerant of different perspectives. insisted that true religion originated in Africa. 
and that the Egyptians were indeed, according to an ancient classical saying, ihe first of men to 
be allotted the participation of the gods' (Bernal 1987: 120) and the originators of monotheistic 
religion. Adamo (1998: 9ff, 165) indicates some African contribution to biblical and Near Eastern 
religion. The primacy of Egypt in the sphere of religion ll'~as frequently interpreted in an 
interdisciplinary sense, so as to imply an equal proficiency in the spheres of science and magic -
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atthough only one source went so far as to suggest that the Egyptians invented the airplane (De 
Montellano 1991: 49). 
3.1.3 AFRICAN MONOCUL TURALISM 
It is needless to add that authors such as those described in the previous paragraphs obviously 
adopted the monocultural perspective, defended in the ~·Jell-knoi.'lln ~'\Jerk of Diop (1990}, 
according to which ancient Egypt and sub-Saharan Africa belonged to one and the same African 
culture and ~'IJere racially related. For this reason it was argued that the modem African could 
legitimately claim that it was his race, not the whites, which originated the admirable features of 
Western civifisation. A further conclusion, drawn implicitly by authors such as Kamalu (1990) and 
Osabutey-A.guedze (1990), was that the African had the legitimate right to draw on Egyptian 
mythology and mysticism for the construction of authentically J.\.frican' thought and philosophy. It 
was not surprising therefore that the 'sacred history' taken for granted by much of the post-
traditional Africanised sources of this study frequently assigned a privileged role to the ancient 
culture, retigion and achievements of Egypt, and fikewise to the mysticism of the Hermetic 
tradition. 
Perhaps worthy of comment was the fact that, given the nevmess of many of the religious 
viewpoints arguing for an African monocufturalism, the authors concerned were in the position of 
people challenging the confidence of orthodoxy. rney were not in the position of having to defend 
unpopular betiefs against new contemporary ideas, but rather they were themselves offering the 
new contemporary ideas. This meant that in their anti-Western arguments a state of affairs 1tJas 
generally presumed to exist where the West took the defensive role and the burden of proof 
rested on the Estabfishment. It was not clear therefore how much of the apparent popularity of 
their movement was due to newness and the unpopularity of the trends of thought they were 
replacing, and whether they would face problems with the passage of time, when it was no longer 
a matter of comparing their views with hated 'coloniar viewpoints but defending them in their 01to111 
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right. The verification of many of their more mystical historical claims posed a possible problem, 
although this was not a central concern of the present study. What shaU be remarked on, 
however, as their views are expounded belot.'11, are certain features of the Afrocentric treatment of 
history that introduce a problematic form of bias open to exploitation by a post-colonial 
dictatorship and/or impede the rational examination of history in other ways. 
3.2 ANCIENT EGYPT AND MODERN AFRICA 
As was indicated in 1.4.2, the present study was concerned not with historically verifying ihe 
claims of post-traditional Africanised refigion concerning its past, particularly its Egy-ptian heritage, 
but with understanding what various post-tradi1ional African authors could be found to betieve 
about their history, and how it affected their religious wor!dview. Thus, the material which now 
follot/\JS should not be taken as embodying real facts or conclusions concerning the history of 
post-traditional Africanised reUgion, but at most to indicate what many post-traditional authors 
believed about their putative African and Egyptian past. The scientific verification or falsification of 
many of the opinions explored in Chapter 3 must be left for future research. 
3.2.1 HOW BLACK WERE THE EGYPTIANS? 
ACCEPTANCE OF A BLACK EGYPT 
An important area of discussion for many authors ll'ras the question of whether the Egyptians 
were black Africans. An important proponent of this theory was Cheikh Anta Diop (1986a: 42ff. 
46-47), who appealed to historical evidence that the Egyptians regarded themselves as a black 
people and were so regarded by others. He mentioned an Egyptian word, k-m-t, which he said 
meant 'black' and was a name the Egyptians had for themselves. This word was also used by 
other aut,hors, such as Barashango (1991: 158), who used 'Kemetan' as a synonym for 'Egyptian.' 
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Diop (1986a: 49) further supported his thesis by arguing that the Senegalese language Wolof was 
related to Ancient Egyptian. Many authors, especially proponents of an Egyptological form of 
mysticism. accepted Diop's findings, and \.\!ere famiiar with his theories. 
THE REIATIONSHIP OF EGYPT AND TRADITIONAL AFRICAN RELIGION 
Some authors accepted that the ideas of Egyptian and traditional African religion ~-vere related in 
some way. Maybee (1999: 151-152, 158, 184, 170-171}, while respectful)y disagreeing with the 
strong Egyptological school of African thought represented by Obenga, nevertheless thought that 
Akan concepts could be useful in elucidating certain aspects of Egyptian ethics. Keita {1984: 59) 
traced the totemism and ancestral veneration of tradmonal sub-Saharan religion to precedents in 
Egyptian religion, and outUned a historical scheme of three stages in African thought: the classical 
or Egyptian phase, the medieval or Islamic phase and the modern phase. This resembled 
Kamalu's Unkage of Egyptian religion with traditional religion as mother and daughter (Kamalu 
1990: 2-3}. 
A NON-EGYPTOLOGICAL VIE\N 
MJ1wa (s.a.: 29, 111) seemed unaware of any strong identifying linkage between Egypt and 
African culture, treating Egyptians as another form of Westerner, and tracing the ancient 
ances1ors of the blacks to extinct races which seemed impossible to identify 11\!ith Ancient Egypt. 
The closest Mutwa came to accepting the 'E;yptian' thesis was to acknowledge that his people 
received from the Nubians the secret of herding cattle. The existence of a Nubian presence in 
ancient Egypt was accepted even by the American segregationist Putnam (1961: 4.3), one of the 
sceptical sources consulted in this s1udy (1.4..2), who nevertheless insisted that Egypt's 'Nubian' 
period was one of stagnation, and that the contribution to human progress of the medieval 
philosophers of Timbuktu was not worthy of comparison with the far more inikJential works of 
Aquinas. It appeared that tl/tutwa's ideas of the relationship between Africa and Egypt were 
88 
shaped more by the colonial-Western history of which Putnam's remarks were representative, 
than by the heavily Africanised and Hermeticised history accepted by G.G.M. James, Diop, and 
those who followed in their footsteps. 
3.2.2 HOW CIVILISED WERE THE EGYPTIANS? 
EGYPTIAN PRl~CY 
The Egyptians' supposed relation with Africa, and the African origin. of the human race, was not of 
itself sufficient to make Africa the supreme culture of our planet. It had to be shown, as Diop 
himself emphasised, not only that humanity was African in origin. but that civilisation itself was 
Airican in origin (Van Sertima 1986: 14). Thus, Diop ( 1990: 156. 157, 159, 161 , 164) argued at 
length not only that Egypt had attained civiHsed reffgion, but that the V\/est had nothing 
comparable to offer prior to the Egyptian achievement. The Egyptians. for example, were deemed 
by Diop not merely to have discovered monotheism. but to have pioneered it. 
THE ANCIENT WISDOM OF EGYPT 
Some stiU more mystical trends in post-traditional African thought made much of the superiority of 
Egyptian thought to Western thought. James (1954: 150) speculated that there were 
undiscovered and secret sciences hinted at in Egyptian documents that went beyond the atomic 
science of the West; and another source aUuded to in the data (De MonteUano 1991: 47-49), as 
11'.JeU as claiming that the science and technology of the West had been anticipated in ancient 
times, identified the secret wisdom of Egypt with occult forms of science, including 
'astropsychology' and 'psychoenergetics'. Barashango (1991: 183) seemed to follow a similar 
path, understanding intelligent thought in a broad sense as encompassing not only natural 
science but also 'academic' discip6nes (logic, dialectics and pure philosophy') and esoteric 
knowledge (invoilling such things as psychokinesis and aura vibrations). De MonteUano ( 1991 : 
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46, 50) recognised that this tendency among Afro-Americans was motivated by the laudable aim 
of dealing with the under-representation of minorities in science, but argued that the esotencising 
approach was the """ong way to go about it. h he put i (De Montellano 1991: 50): 
"Concerned scientists need to develop reliable and scientifically vaDd curricular material 
that deals with Africa and African-Americans. There is much in Egypt that would be 
useful, shorn of its New Age accretions. For example, the building of the pyramids can be 
usefully" developed into lessons about mechanics, there is interesting technology Involved 
in irrigation, and t.\le Q4.\le the division of the day and night into h"Jelve hours each to the 
Egyptians.• 
THE POSSIBLE M''ITf-l'OLOGISATfON OF ANCIENT EGYPT 
The "''ondrous achievements of Egypt were presented by many post-traditional Africanised 
esotericists as history, but the remarks of De Montellano (1991: 46) on the concern for-minority 
underrepresentation in science as a motivation for the Atican-American Baseffne Essays 
._,a 
suggested that an ulterior mythological motive might exist for the whole 'ancient Egyptian mystical 
civifisation' idea. E!iade (1959: 167ff) mentioned that in primal culures mythology described 
events in an 'illud tempus' or privileged sacred time in the past, which formed a sort of pattern to 
which events in the present had to conform. Thus, the central features of Dogon life, such as the 
craft of the smith, v.ieaving, ancestral veneration ceremonies, and so forth, were al traceable to 
mythologically related deeds about ancient times (3.3). Now how would such mythology fit Into a 
worldview that was familiar llVith Western civilsation? It seemed evident that the retention of such 
a mythological outlook by a person in the twentieth or twenty-lrst century would require a sort of 
technological upgrade in the inud tempus' paradigms: no longer could the people of ancient 
times, the models for contemporary behaviour, dri-'ell in villages or live in the wilderness. Instead, 
the ancient time had to be one of a mythical advanced civiisation, to furnish an ancient precedent 
for the ideals and drives more suitable to a modem civilsation. Thus mat we saw in Kamalu and 
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in the African-American Baselne Essays, namely the attempt to Unk Oogon mythology with 
Egyptian mythology and esotericism and with the great achievements of this vanished civilsation 
{cf. 3.3 below), was not wholly unexpected. 
It is not here being argued, of course, that aH the ancient Egy-ptian achievements, and aH 
connections between Egypt, Africa and the West, were in fact mythological. The tNOrlc of Bernal 
(1987: 27ff, 202) indicate.s that Western claims of the inferiority of Egypt to Greece, ll'Jhich ~"Jere 
influential in the development of modern white racism, tended to unjustifiably minimise the true 
achievement of Ancient Egypt. Nevertheless there were some. very debatable attempts to 
exaggerate the occult expertise and general influence of Ancient Egypt, and authors Uke James 
seemed to treat Hermetlsm as a real ancient wisdom of Egyptian origin, and not the post-
Christian development as which Western scholarship tended to treat it (cf. Steyn 1994: 74) thus 
paving the way for a possible scholarly disillusionment of Afrocentric and Egyptologieal reNgious 
ideals. 
THE DEMYTHOLOGISATION OF EGYPTOLOG!CAL MYTH 
A concern not addressed by any of the authors, but not tNithout a possible solution, was what to 
do, should it ever become necessary for this myth of Egyptian mystical achievement to be 
demythologised: was it possible to recover its basic meaning, that of the need to aspire to the sort 
of inteBectual, moral and technological ideals of excellence that made ancient civifisations great? 
Certain of the authors were already used to treating African cosmological mythology as 
symboBsm rather than history: and It seemed not beyond conception that, should the evidence in 
i favour of the largely mythical nature of many post-traditional claims about Egypt become 
irresistible, Egypt could stil live on as a sort of symbol for an interdiscipfinary worldview where 
science,'civiHsation, relgion and mysticism coexisted in harmony. 
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3.2.3 THE USE OF EGYPTIAN RELIGION 
The themes of Egyptian religion used by the Egyptological African authors investigated could be 
roughly divided into ideas and symbolism derived from the popular religion of Egypt, on the one 
hand, and beliefs derived from Hermetic mysticism on the other. 
POPULAR EGYPTIAN ML\TERIAL 
The most common form of popular Egyptian reHgious befief found among the authors of the data 
was the use of Egyptian creation myths, which were compared with the my-1hology of more sub-
Saharan religious traditions. Also of importance was the use of Egyptian belief concerning the 
afterlife: Diop (Moore 1986: 233) mentioned that Egyptian ideas about the afterlife lay behind 
Western beliefs in immortaHty, and several sources treated the Book of the Dead as a source of 
African religion. Barashango (1991: vii) however insisted that the title 'Book of the Dead' was a 
misnomer, that it was really entitled The Booking of Coming Forth by Day and by Night' and dealt 
with the creation of the world; and James (1954: 122-125) viewed Aristotelian psychology as a 
mere truncated version of Egyptian beliefs concerning the soul. There 11'.ias some attempt also to 
claim Egyptian moral insights as African creations (cf. James 1954: 30; Kamalu 1990: 142-143), 
but at this point Hermetic mysticism started to introduce itself. 
HERMETIS1v1 
The ancient mystical tradition of Egypt known as Hermetism, according to Faivre (1992b: 4-6) 
shared tl'Jith later trends of Western occultism four characteristics: a be6ef in a worldwide 
'perennial philosophy' admitting of reconstruction eclectically from world reUgion, a lack of 
absolute duafism (implying a monistic theology), befief in faB and redemption, and be6ef in the 
transformation of the world through the transformation of the human (which linked up with a belief 
in the magical interconnectedness of aspects of reaHty). These four tendencies were found in the 
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sources studied to be sfightly modified among African thinkers in so far as the 'perennial 
philosophy' was usually heavily Afrocentric and the theme of the faU tended to be de-emphasised 
and horizontafised, thus subtly attering the ideal of redemption in a socio-political direction (cf. 
James 1954: 153). Several authors, by means of Hermetism, were led to see an African 
connection with schools of esotericism in the West (Keita 1934: 61ff; Frye 1988: xi, 53, 55 etc.). 
Significant and recurring themes in the data relating to Hermetism were befief in the duality of 
Being and Becoming (cf. 2.6.2), the divinisation of the human, and an interest in the hermetic 
ideals of mystical (or gnostic) atl'Jareness and magical power. 
3.2.4 WHY DID EGYPT FALL? 
THE STOLEN LEGACY THEORY 
A predictable question to anyone reading of such glorious and utopian achievements as were 
attributed by post-traditional African sources to the civilisation of ancient Egypt ll'iJas: what went 
wrong? For obviously in modern times people were tl'-JeU a1r.iare that the civiffsation of ancient 
Egypt ~'IJas now extinct, and its glory a thing of the past. An answer of sorts was attempted in the 
'Stolen Legacy' theory of James (1954: 21, 27, 148-149, 154-155, 157, 161-162). According to 
this theory, Greek or Western clvifisation falsely claimed credit for Egyptian achievements. and 
sought to repress or supplant the Egyptian heritage with Western imperiafism. The damage 
hereby inflicted was, according to James, perpetuated in later history by Christian imperiafism 
and by anti-African feefing in the modern \/Vest. The need to repair such damage was given by 
James (1954: 151) as an explanation for the 1t.1riting of his book in the first place: 
"This is the legacy of the African continent to the nations of the world. She has laid the 
culural foundations of modern progress and therefore she and her people deseive the 
honour and praise which for centuries has been falsely given to the Greeks. And Ukewise 
it is the purpose of this book to make this revelation the beginning of a universal 
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reformation in race relations, which I believe would be the beginning of the solution of the 
problem of universal unrest." 
THE FALL OF EGYPT FROM WITHIN 
A more total potential answer to the problem of Egypt's faR could be inferred from the views of 
Kamalu on Ancient Africa in general (1990: 9). Kamalu explained the failure of ancient Atican 
civilisations to survive in terms of an excessive concentration on material ideals at the expense of 
the spiritual. The Egyptian civilsation was not explici11y included or excluded from the category of 
'Ancient African Civilsatlons' in this explanation, but Kamalu's dictum that 'Ma'at, the moral order, 
does not discriminate' (Kamai.J 1990: 8 cf. Q) seemed to imply that Egypt in the past fel from its 
own cultural standards of humaneness and moraity (Ma'at), and paid the price for this. Such a 
pitfal seemed a possible explanation for the fal of Egypt, a pitfaD that presumably would be 
avoided by the new schools of African thought which had arisen in modem times. Barashango 
(1991: 32) made the primacy of human values over materialism a priority in his Egyptologised 
theology, and seemed to view the 'Improvement of Bfe' in tenns of an Ideal that did not exclude 
material comforts, yet at the same time did not rule out more intangible forms of ife-improvement, 
such as the benefits of 'high culure science' (Barashan90 1991: 92). 
THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF THE 'AFRICAN FALL' CONCEPT 
As in the case of cosmology, the actual aim of post-traditional Africanised treatment of Egypt and 
Egypt's fal by the sources of this study was somewhat uncertain. It seemed impossible to say 
v.trether such treatment of Egyptian history constlttied a truth-argument or a power-struggle or 
both, and whether such sources were attempting to decolonise the mind from European 
dominance, rather than to search for the truth for interest's sake. The 'mythological' interpretation 
of the achievements attributed to ancient Africa, proposed in 3.2.2, led one to consider it 
theoreticatj possible that there PIQS, in the background of certain conceptions of the 'Fal of 
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Ancient Africa' or of Egypt a covert preoccupation with the conflict between contemporaiy African 
(humanistic) and Western (materiaUstlc/naturalistic) modes of thought. For example, the cause 
given by Kamalu for Ancient Africa's faU, namely the ignoring of human values, could be deemed 
an expression of the desire for a truly humanised form of civilisation, and of a befief that Africa 
could provide for it the ideological basis. As win be seen (5.2.2), post traditionalAfrican authors 
were concerned for many reasons to emphasis a humanistic and non-profane ideal of science in 
place of the purported Western secular and dehumanised technological ideal. 
3.3 THE DOGON COSMOLOGY 
The ancient mystical heritage claimed for Africa was not restricted to Egyptian models: an 
important exemplification of African mysticism !ay in the mythology of the Degon of Mafi. An 
important and influential text, alluded to by many of the authors, was Conversations with 
Ogotemmeli, by Griaule (1965), which advanced the thesis that Africans were not wholly unable 
to make their contribution to the thought and culture of the world, and defended this assertion by 
means of conversations with the Dogon wise man Ogotemmefi about the mythology of his people. 
3.3.1 THE BASIC IDEAS OF DOGON TRADmON 
THE CONVERSATIONS WITH OGOTEMvlELI 
The general structure of Griaule's book could be outfined as foRows. After a brief consideration of 
the background of thought about Africa, in the work of Placide Tempels and others, Griaule 
recorded conversations between himself and Ogotemmefi dea6ng with the Dogon creation myth. 
This myth was structured according to a logocentric scheme of Words: the First Word spoken by 
the god Amma generated the earth, two beings of water caUed Nummo, and a trickster-figure of 
Jackal. The Second Word generated eight ancestors, the seventh of whom gave the world the 
knowledge of the art of weaving. The Third Word lt'Jas responsible for the constitution of the 
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world-system, symboKsed In the structure of the Dogon granary. Connected with the enunciation 
of the Third Word v..as the death of the old man lebe, who underv.ient death in order to recover 
the Third Word from the seventh ancestor. According to OgotemmeH the symbolism of the Third 
Word was connected with various aspects of Dogon culture including the structtze of woven 
baskets, the layout of a viUage, the types of musical instrument and so forth. The conversation 
went on to discuss the symbols painted on a Dogon sanctuary, the various rituals practised by the 
Dogon, especially those connected ~..nth ancestral veneration, and the myth concerning the 
introduction of death as we presently know it and of ancestral veneration. Unfortunately the 
conversation was interrupted by the death of OgotemmeH, so the exposition of Dogon tradition 
was never completed. Griaule (1965: 209-216) finished off with an attempt to co~late Dogon 
mythical symbols with the signs of the Western Zodiac, and argued that the concept of Atican 
peoples as merely culture-bearers, and not culture creators, possibly had to be revised. 
THE USE OF DOGON IDEAS IN LATER THOUGHT 
The features of interest in Dogon mythology which most frequently recurred in later authors were 
" 
the idea of African cosmology expressed as a complex system of symbols (cf. Kamain 1990: 
111 }, and the idea of the Word as a creative principle (cf. Jahn 1961: 121, 127). In both of these 
motifs was a combination of the theme of creation with the theme of words or symbolsm. The 
idea of a creative word, or creative thought, was an important theme in certain Western and West 
African-derived ideas of magic (cf. Senghor 1964: 262; Jahn 1961 : 127), and gave the Dogon 
tradition the appearance of something esoteric. It was not therefore surprising to find indicated, in 
some of the sources of this study, evidence of a debate concerning whether or not Dogon 
mythologywas in fact an esoteric orsecretteaching. Griaule (1985: 3) argued that the knowledge 
of Ogotemmeff was not a secret but merely an expert or speciafist form of knowledge, availabte 
v«ien asked for but not studied in detail by the common people: and his vie~'f)olnt v'3s echoed by 
Odera-Oruka (1990: 40-41). Karnak.I (1990: 11) however regarded Oogon and Bambara 
cosmology as an esoteric wisdom revealed only to initiates. 
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3.3.2 THE SECRET WISDOM OF THE OOGON 
THE CLAIM OF A DOGON ESOTERIC ISM 
The perspective treating Dogon cosmology as an esoteric wisdom seemed to be implicit in 
several post-traditional viewpoints, which claimed that unusual occult powers could be achieved 
by means of the Degon teachings. For example, it was claimed that the Degon possessed 
superior astronomical knowledge, and knetN about a companion star to Sirius that was invisible to 
the naked eye (De MonteUano 1992: 165). The explanation offered for this by \Nelsing was that 
the Degon had discovered how to contact this star by extrasensory perception; it was further 
claimed that this star tNas an information source reflecting events on earth, which could be 
contacted by means of the melanin in the skin of the African, which had a sensitivity to vibrations 
not picked up by the ordinary senses. A more prosaic explanation was suggested by Sagan 
(1980: 89-90) tNho argued that the Dogon furnishing this information probably picked up the 
knotl'Jledge from exposure to Western ideas and integrated it into his tradition - if indeed the 
correspondence between an isolated datum in his admittedly complex mythology and an isolated 
datum in Western thought could not be accounted for by simple coincidence. 
A CONNECTION WITH MITHRAISM? 
The conjecture of a possible Degon connection with the mysteries of l'v1ithraism was suggested by 
a reference in Griaule (1965: 15) to the Dogon habit of wearing a Phrygian-style cap, a tNeU-
kno~'IJn Mlthraic symbol, leading to the title of the 'Capped One' found in Augustine's reference to 
the god Mithras (cf. Wynne-Tyson 1958: 9, 54-55). No author in the data investigated thisAfrican-
Mithraic connection in sufficient detail to make it a confirmed or disconfirmed hypothesis, a fact 
perhaps explainable in the Qght of Mlthraism's Qnkage with white Western militarism and 
imperiatism. 1t.Jhich Barashango (1991: 68) strongly castigated, and seemed to dissociate utterly 
from the genius of Africanised reHgion. 
97 
3.3.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOGON FOR MODERN AFRICA 
The above differences of opinion suggested that various levels of critical thought about the Dogon 
were possible, ranging from conventional Western scepticism or appreciation of their 
achievement as an ordinary African culture to the veneration of their culture as the repository of 
an occult wisdom. The post-traditional significance of the Dogon could be vieti'\ied from many 
perspectives: their culture represented the interdisciplinary ideal of the integration of life, refigion 
and cosmology; they were examples of a stiH-extant mystical tradition on the African continent, 
containing possible features paraHeUing those of significant ancient cultures, such as that of Egypt 
(cf. Kamalu 1990: 6, 11); they furnished possible proof that Africans were culture-creators and not 
just culture-borrowers. No author expHcitly commented on the fact that the Dogon culture and the 
cufture of Timbuktu were both from the same country (Mali) but it was ciear that the Dogon, like 
the people of Timbuktu, had special meaning for African authors as an index of their culture's 
potential sophistication and achievement. 
3.4 AFRICA AND THE EAST 
In addition to finkages with Egyptian and traditional my-sticism, a sman minority of authors claimed 
for their own convictions a connection with the wisdom of the East. The idea that the Dravidian 
race furnished an ancient connection between Africa and the East was reiterated by some 
authors (cf. Kamalu 1990: 3; Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 55). Barashango (1991: 33ff, 92, 95ff) 
argued that Eastern civilisation was African in origin and that Buddhism was a version of a 
distinctively African 'High Cufture Science': he also recognised the avatars of Hinduism as 
connected with his own refigion - alhough he criticised the Eastern befief in Brahman as 
originating in excessive honour paid to a forest god, and said that Buddhism had roots anterior to 
Brahminism (Barashango 1991: 86ff. 88, 91). Somell\lhat less extravagant indications of interest 
in Eastern thought lay in the attribution to Egypt of a quasi-Oriental idea of Dberation through 
reincarnation by Kamalu (1990: 70), and, among the Class B sources (1.6), in the comparisons 
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betl>-..een Bushman trance-s1ates and Hindu meditation, as well as the Hnkage of Bushman art 
v.iith the mandalas of the East, which were to be found in the v~rk of Kruger (1995: 321-322, 
326ff). Mutwa (1966: 344) claimed to be indifferent to the confict between Christianity and 
Buddhism: the important thing was rather that everybody should worship the same God. 
THE AFROCENTRIC APPROACH TO THE EAST 
Apart from Kruger (1991), who seemed interested in studying Buddhism in Its own conte:xt, as a 
tradition in its own right, the above authors seemed to look at the East through Afrocentric 
spectacles, and to investigate or alude to the East purety from the standpoint of concerns related 
to African culural existence. In KamaltJ this strategy produced fet.'-1 distortions, but in Barashango 
there was an attempt to co-opt al the good in every religious tradition as an African contribution. 
Tiamat of Babyfon, Kai, Krishna, Buddha, Jesus, the gods of the ancient West, the reDgion of 
Egypt - al of these were inked in a sort of mythological 'story' running through Barashango's 
book, the story of how the Blacks and their originated everything good in world reUgion. and the 
WMes originated most of the evil (in the form of Mithraism, Brahminism, Trinitarian theology, and 
' 
so forth}. The general argument of Barashango seemed to be based on theomachic m;.th4reated 
as history, rather than on strictty verifiable history itself, and it seemed that in his treatment of the 
East, ancient history was reinterpreted in terms of a (perhaps unconscious) myihologisation 1n illo 
temp ore' of the black-white racial struggle. 
THE PRESENT STATUS OF AFRICAN-EASTERN DIALOGUE 
The possibility of interreftgious dialogue between Africa and the East was an Issue related to this 
aspect of the subject matter. What could be said at this stage of pos1-tradltional reBgious 
development v1as that investigation of the East by Africans seemed from the Indications in the 
data to be stil in its early stages. Very few of the authors deal with this question at all (alhough 
those who did tended to be the more sophisticated among Africanised thinkers in the sources 
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studied), and those who did tended, apart from Kroger, to borrow Eastern concepts, or notice 
Oriental paraUels, from the standpoint of an intention to present Africa as a world-class culture, 
rather than that of a desire of reUgious dialogue for its own intrinsic interest. 
3.5 THE AFRICAN RESPONSE TO WESTERN CULTURE 
An important part of the post-traditional African self-understanding of a significant number of 
authors was the re-writing, from a more Afrocentric point of view, ofthe history of Africa in relation 
to the West. The story which many of the authors were concerned to refute, and whose attempted 
African refutation could be found in its essential features in G.G.M. James' Stoien Legacy (1954), 
could be stated in a simplfied form as follows: once upon a time the Western people, tr'IJithout 
significant aid from any other culture, originated science and culture and European civifisation. 
And on account of the exceHence of the Western way of fife and its refigion, the West gained we!l-
deserved dominion over many other cultures, including the cultures of black Africa. The Africans 
therefore had the colonial West to thank for their transition from barbarism to civifisation, a 
transition which, left to their own resources, they would have found near-impossible. Such was 
the picture that colonial black Africa grew up Vllith; and, predictably, the authors of the data were 
concerned to refute the idea of black inferiority impfied by such an attitude. 
3.5.1 THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY OF THE WEST 
An initial point of attack was at the origin of Western thought itself, namely the great philosophies 
from which the West claimed to derive its superior intelligence and accomp6shments. Many 
authors followed the argument of James (1954: 1, 9ff, 27ff etc.) that the essential teachings of 
pre-Socratic, Socratic and Aristotelian philosophy were borrowed from the cosmology and 
mysteries of Egypt, so that in fact it was Africa and not the West .--.mo invented the basic rational 
roots of Western civifisation. The great philosophers of the West simply borrowed their teachings 
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from Egyptian beHefs, and, judging by the criticisms of Western thought by some authors, did not 
improve them overmuch in the process. 
GENERAL ATTITUDES TO WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 
AFRICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SUPRElvtACISM 
As the originator in modern times of the 'Stolen Legacy' theory, G.G.M. James was of course 
among the harshest critics of Western philosophy found among the authors studied, who wasted 
fell\I opportunities of demonstrating what he perceived as the inferior and derivative nature of 
Western philosophy. James (1954: 98, 125, 136) frequently used the foftowing form of argument: 
Egyptian belief X and Greek belief Y are similar: beiief X is more complex and sophisticated; 
therefore Y is an inferior and derivative version of X. In such a way he implied that the 
achievements of the West were not worthy of comparison with those of Africa, and the 
philosophers of the West were t•.Jhclly unt'IJCrthy of the respect generally gh:en them (James 1954: 
160ff). 
In a similar vein, Barashango found it just about impossible to show respect for a white-skinned 
thinker. He routinely gave praise, or so it seemed, only to reHgious figures whom he had no 
problem thinking of or reconceiving as racially African - he believed Krishna was a black 
(Barashango 1991: 38ff) - and it was perhaps on account of his conviction that Jesus Christ was 
a black refigious teacher with an Egyptian background (Barashango 1991: 166, 168) that he stiff 
retained respect for the teaching of the Bible. White esotericists t'\Jere dismissed by Barashango 
as unable to understand African esoteric symbofism to the degree that was possible for black 
people. On the other hand, Barashango's admiration for anybody whom, rightly or wrongly, he 
conceived as a black religious figure (this included Jesus, Krishna, and of course everybody in 
ancient Egypt) aftowed him to be very respectful and open towards their teachings: he seemed 
more wiiling, for example, to learn from the teachings of Jesus in the Gospels than 1J1Jere other 
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authors such as Some (1994: 103) and Osabutey-Aguedze (1990: 33, 44ff, 71-74), who appeared 
to dismiss Jesus as respectively an absurdity and a myth. This Afrocentric tolerance thus seemed 
to offset to some extent the impact of his hostility to \Nestem thinkers. 
QUALIFIED AFRICAN PHILOSOPHICAL PRIMl\CY 
James and Barashango were the two most prominent anti-Western perspectives in the data, the 
former not being wholly anti-Western but manifesting hostmty to aspects of Western culture 11\.ihich 
he deemed connected with the plagiarism of the African or Egyptiiin heritage, the latter seeming 
to more or less oppose the West in so far as it was the West. Other perspectives took a more 
benign approach to Western philosophy, viewing it as beneficial and worthy of respect in so far as 
it had African roots, while criticising it for various faults such as materialism and dualism. Thus, 
several authors 1111ere admirers and users of the '.African' thought of certain Western thinkers (cf. 
Kamalu 1990: 33, 39; Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 32). Mutwa (s.a.: 173-174, 176, 177ff) noted the 
superiority of Western thought to Africa in the realm of technology, but insisted that the ability of 
Africans to think rationally was equal to that of Westerners, and in other areas (such as herbal 
medicine) the African culture was the superior partner. The attitude of 'benign superiority' to the 
West seemed to be the most widespread perspective in the data, the hostility of Barashango and 
his like and the general attitude of equal black and white contribution favoured by Mutwa and his 
like being minority perspectives, at opposite ends of the scale among the authors studied. 
ATTITUDES TO INDIVIDUAL WESTERN PHILOSOPHERS 
Tt/\JO of the most important Western thinkers considered by the data were Plato and Aristotle. 
These two figures were related to the ancient past which many of the authors of the data claimed 
for African thought, since the ancient Hermetic mysticism claimed by James and others to be an 
African cultural product had many features in common with Neo-Platonism (Steyn 1994: 74), 
while Hellenic and Aristotefian thought had been of interest to the ancient Moorish civiisation of 
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West Africa (cf. Keita 1984: 67, 68). Nevertheless, the approach of most of the African authors of 
this study to these philosophies was eclectic, since they did not accept the philosophies of either 
thinker as a rigid authority but at most accepted isolated ideas of interest, such as the Summum 
Bonum or the Platonic archetypes. Some authors were actually critical of Platonism and 
Aristotefianism. 
PLATO 
The Platonic idea most frequently referred to in the data was the idea of Forms or Ideas of divine 
origin, which contained the pattern of the world's creation. Kamalu (1990: 37) related the Platonic 
ideas to the Egyptian concept of 'aru' and treated them as archetypal god-concepts 
corresponding to major themes of philosophy: the relationship of the theme of archetypes to 
some post-traditional Africanised articulations of polytheism has already been remarked on 
(2.3.3). Some followers of Egyptological theories also claimed an African origin for Platonic ideas 
on the structure of society, and on the immortaHty of the soul (cf. James 1954: 87, 136; Oleta 
1984: 86, 88). Overemphasis on the spiritual and theoretical side of 6fe was a principal reason for 
the criticism of Platonic thought (Frye 1988: xii; Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 30). The striking feature 
of Platonism for the authors who referred to it, from both a positive and negative point of view, 
seemed to be its idea of the spiritual or ideational world. The scheme of cardinal virtues 
(Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance} shared by both Plato and Aristotle was accepted 
by James (1954: 29) and Kamalu (1990: 142-146) although both authors gave priority to the 
expanded Egyptian/Hermetic fist of ten virtues from which Plato, they said, had plagiarised his 
wm concepts of virtue. 
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AAISTOnE 
CRITICAL Vl&VS 
The views of the authors of the study concerning Aristoteianism were mixed. Aristotle was 
criticised by Frye ( 1988: xii) for overemphasising the theme of matter, as Plato had 
overemphasised the theme of spirit. James (1954: 125, 131, 136) viewed Aristotle as a 
plagiariser of Egyptian thought, whose psychology was an imperfect version of Egyptian 
psychology, and whose very arrangement of books into logic'; 'Physics', Metaphysics', and 
'Ethics' was borrowed from the outtine of the works of Hermes Trismegistus. James (1954: 112-
125) however, despite his hostiltty to Western philosophy in general and Aristotle's deficiencies in 
particular, gave the most detailed account of Aristotelian thought present in the data, ~.itlich 
seemingly suggested that, for James, .Aristotle's plagiarism from Egypt did not render the basic 
ideas in his system wholly umr.iorthy of serious consideration - provided, of course, that they were 
related to their proper origin, and assimilated in their more perfect Egyptian form. Such an 
assimilation was attempted by authors &ke Kamalu who, while accepting the 'stolen legacy' theory 
of James as vaHd, adopted a less overtly cmical attitude to AristoteHan thought. 
POSITIVE Vl&VS 
Positive assessments of Aristotle were found in several authors who tried to elaborate on their 
'Egyptian' heritage, vestiges of which were to be found in the ideas of ancient Western 
philosophy. The idea of God as the Unmoved Mover was accepted by Kamalu (1990: 45) and 
Olela (1984: 89) and related to themes in Egyptian mythology; Kamalu (1990: 39) also accepted 
the Aristote6an distinction bett."leen potency and act, and the idea of the Summum Bonum was 
common to Kamalu (1990: 129) and Osabutey-A.guedze (1990: 30), although Kamalu along Plath 
James viewed Aristotle as having departed from the original Egyptian understanding of the 
concept. 
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The AristoteHan/scholastic concept of motion and causaHty, according to which an object causing 
motion continues somehow to act on the moved object for as long as the motion is sustained, 
was influential in Kamalu's reinterpretation of Newtonian mechanics to fit in with the concept of 
'action at a distance'. According to his interpretation the motion of a bilHard baU once the cue baH 
had stopped moving was to be accounted for by the active force of the cue ball still somehow 
continuing to inhere in the bilfiard ball, as a result of mutual contact, despite their apparent 
separation in space: by this quasi-Aristotelian idea of motion Kamalu (1990: 81) sought to relate 
science and ,A.frican magic. 
Most of the spheres of interest in Aristotelian thought found in the data seemed to concentrate on 
ideas concerning the creative principle, more specifically motion, and the unmoved principle on 
which that motion depended. This was analogous to the interest in the creative ideas of Plato, 
!ilihich were also linked with ideas on the invisible basis of creation. Western philosophy seemed 
to interest the post-traditional African authors of this study on the basis of the shared moral ideals 
(traceable from Plato and Aristotle to an Egyptian origin) and on the basis of cosmological 
creative ideation, represented in the forms of Plato and the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle. Western 
philosophy, in other words, was valued for what it could reveal about the pattern or order behind 
the universe. The motif of logocentrism in West African thought, so influential in ideas of 
mysticism or magic, seemed related to both the Platonic ideas and the Aristotefian scheme of 
cosmic and moral order, and appeared to have some connection with the 'magicar or esoteric 
tendency to be found both in Hermetism and in some post-traditional enthusiasts of the Hermetic 
tradition. 
CULTURAL AND CRITICAL REASON 
An important feature of the treatment of Western philosophy by the African authors selected for 
this study - who were mostly non-Christianised and included many proponents of mystical and/or 
African Diaspora-related perspectives - was that, in the positive adoption of concepts, they 
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tended to follow the model of what could be called 'cultural reason' rather than 'critical reason'. 
These terms will be explained below. 
DEFINITION OF CULTURAL AND CRITICAL REASON 
The meaning of the terms 'cultural reason' and 'critical reason', as used here, is as foUOll\Js. 
'Cultural reason' works by means of the generally positive acceptance of a matrix of ideas, 
derived from some culture or tradition, within the midst of which the thinker works out his/her 
thought, in such a way as to preserve and retain the basic out One of the culture as handed down. 
'Critical reason' works by means of the rejection of aspects of such a matrix, and an attempt to be 
as parsimonious as possible in the retention of ideas. Foundationafist and antifoundationaffst 
worldviews can both be articulated from either the cultural or the critical standpoint. 
Ordinary human thought tends to retain both aspects for various reasons: in childhood education 
'cultural reason' is the main tool of thought, whose estabHshment is a necessary precondition for 
later 'critical reason' (for of course questioning the elementary foundations of mathematics and 
language is out of the question if one has not, by means of parental and educational authority, 
been taught to talk or count yet!). Cultural reason is not limited to childhood but exists in the form 
of conservative traditions. nevJ sub-cultures or fashions in thought and action, customs, 
professional ethics, or commonly-held conventions in any community, including the scientific. it is 
not necessarily false but can be found to retain some true concepts when analysed by means of 
critical reason. And the apptication of critical reason can be found, not only in sceptical 
viewpoints, but also in the form of debates within a conservative tradition (as in the case of 
differing schools lf'Jithin Catholic scholasticism). Cultural reason offers critical reason something to 
work with, and critical reason has the capacity of pruning and perfecting cultural reason. The 
relationship between the two sorts of reason here defined is finked to the integrative and 
transcendent dynamics of refigion mentioned by Krager (2.2.4), although, human understanding 
of these being variable, it is possible for schools of thought to conceive the dynamics either as 
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basically opposed or in dialectical con11ct, or as fundamentally in harmony and intending a 
common goal. 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF CULTURAL REASON IN CERTAIN FORMS OF AFROCENTRISM 
The Afrocentrism of James, Kamalu, Barashango, Frye and other authors, owing to the inclusive 
attitude lo Atican thought alJuded to earlier in this report ( 1.5, 2. 7), tended to stress the approach 
of 'cultural reasoning'. The concern was to preserve African tradition, the Egyptian legacy, the 
insights of Cheikh Ania Diop, the importance of the Dogon heritage, the rightness of the anti-
colonial liberation struggle, the greatness of African thought in al ages, the validity of traditional 
medicine and religion, the significance of al these traditions in our time. Most of the authors tried 
to preserve a basic outline consisting of aU the 'positive features' of African civilisation from 
ancient times to the present. Criticism and debate could be carried out within the framework of a 
viewpoint retaining the basic Atocentric big names Dke James, Diop and so forth: but there was a 
reluctance to dethrone any aspect of the glorious tradition and heritage that the thinkers were 
trying to refashion for themselves in the spirit of Afrocentrism and the Atican Renaissat1ce. 
·,: 
Loyally to this seemed an overriding concern (see Chapter 4). The big names themse!V~s also 
gave the impression of being uninterested in submitting black ideas to the same detailed criticism 
as they applied to white ideas. 
THE RACIAL IMBALANCE OF CULTURAL ANO CRITICAL REASON 
The habits of crtticism mentioned above meant that in James and many commentators on Atica's 
Egyptologlcal heritage, there could be noticed a racial subdlvfsion between cultural and crltlcal 
reason: cuaural reason predominated in the analysis of black or Afrocentric thought, critical 
reason in the analysis of white or non-Afrocentric thought. James did not ask, for example, 
whether or not .AristoUe, if his philosophy was in fact attenuated Egyptian philosophy, might have 
done Egyptian thought a favour in simpifying its ethics and psycho6ogy and getting rid of 
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'deadwood' on the name of parsimony. On the contrary, James seemed to adopt the approach 
that the Egyptian tradition as he saw it should have been preserved in au its splendour and 
sophistication: and if ftristotle had constructed a less complex version, this had to be viewed as 
an inferior 'gutting' or cheapening of the original African thought and al its profundity. 
CULTURAL REASON AND LOGOCENTRISM 
DEF!N/TlONS OF 1..0GOCENTR!SM 
The logocentric motif in the post-traditional African thought of this study. instanced in the Dogan 
cultural Word' and the patterns behind cosmology, seemed to be linked to culural reason and 
veneration for the sophistication of one's given African heritage, whether traditional or recently 
constructed as an 'emerging cutture' (cf. Jahn 1961). Logocentrism, as the term is used here, 
means the concern with a given pattern or order of some sort in one's ife and world, comparable 
to the Logos of Christian and Platonic thought. An alternative and more facetious definition of this 
concept is given in Beard and Cerf (1992: 38) as follows: 
"[Logocentrism is] ... the beHef - in the face of evidence to the contrary presented by 
deconstructionist Jacques Derrida - that truth, meaning and reality are actua.,, 
"knowable" and can thus be represented by language, and that those claiming 
"knowledge· or the abifity to use words clearly or argue convincingly are someh()(.'' 
superior to those who cannot. logocentrlsm is commonly accompanied by a feeling of 
contempt for the differently logical.• 
POST-TRADITIONAL AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR LOGOCENTRISM 
Logocentrism as defined by Beard and Cerf was indeed accepted by most of the authors in this 
study: they generally seemed to take for granted that it was possible to know and describe the 
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1NOrld (5.2), as was normal in most non-deconstructionist viewpoints. They did not refrain from 
passing judgements or observations of uncleamess, cognitive falsehood, Incoherence, absurdity, 
or even reprehensibility, on views they disagreed with. The only author in the data to explicitly 
utiHse a deconstructionist styte of writing, namely Kruger ( 1995: 185), restricted the unknowable 
and unspeakable part of life, in the name of radical empiricism, to that v'1ich lay beyond the reach 
of the human sensorium, admitting a limited sphere of valid cognition, a 'cognised world', within 
empirically decided boundaries. The \.Vord' in the form of reBgious symboism apparently formed 
part of his universe, and of the integrative dynamic of reffgion as he conceived it (cf. Kruger 1995: 
65ff), although he made some attempt not to absolutise it centrally. Other African authors 
fuYowed him in similarly restricting the unknowable to a transcendent area of Hfe and admitting 
knowability of truth in the empirical area, alhough here it was full understanding of unseen realtty, 
not understanding of unseen reality as such, that was negated (2.2.3). The success of Kruger's 
attempts to abolish the necessity for discourse about the non-empirical itself will be discussed in 
5.2.1. 
lNTELLECTUAL AND ANTl-/NTELLECTUAL TENDENCIES 
In the appropriation of Western philosophy, one could perceive in certain post-traditional authors 
of this study a basic desire to integrate, to build sophisticated thought, to intellectuaHse. A highly 
pro-intellectual tendency was very prominent in the thought explored, and to some extent this 
could be attributed to the interest in the African Renaissance that motivated the general 
exploratory process of the present research, and to the use of iterary data sources (cf. 1.4, 1.8). 
Yet, as could be argued from the indications in Wright (1971: 20), evidence of a tendency in post-
colonial African thinkers to oppose Western ideals of intelectual attainment was not lacking. 
Some authors in fact seemed to apply critical thought more to Western than African tradition, or to 
impicitly devalue the Western achievements In crlical phUosophy (as in James' attitude to 
.Aristotle referred to earlier). This meant that a certain imbalance was introduced into the concern 
for the truth that motivated such post-traditionalAfricanised intelectuaisation (cf. 2.5.1). 
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3.5.2 THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE WEST 
Although Barashango (1991: 68) and Diop (1990: 156ff) devoted some attention to the defects in 
the ancient pre-Christian religion of the West, for the most part the authors of the study confined 
their attention, in the criticism of Western religion, to the Judeo-Christian tradition, the religion of 
the colonial West and the most common form of Westernised refigion in Africa. Viet'llpoints in the 
data ~·Jere polarised between outright hostifity to Christianity and qualified openness to it. To 
some degree the fact of concentration on non-Christianised sources (1.3.1) in this study meant 
that apart from some Rastafarian perspectives, some very heterodox Egyptological theology, and 
various viewpoints related in some ""ay to less expficitly Christian post-traditional African mystical 
ideas, such as that of Senghor ( 1964), the authors that were explored tended on the whole to 
hold beliefs to some degree uninfluenced by the central concerns of the Christian religion. It 
should therefore be borne in mind that, had this study included more Christianised African 
thought (such as black theology or incullurated African Christian theology), the picture of Jesus 
and Christianity presented in the data would have possibty been more positive than the one 
actually uncovered by the present s1udy. 
JUDAISM 
The problem of the Jews and their oppression by the ancient Egyptians, and the reconciliation of 
the biblical picture of the harsh yoke of Pharaoh with the high degree of enlightenment and 
civifisation attributed by many authors to ancient Egypt, was not addressed in detail by most of 
the constructors of African history - and admittedty these tended to be non-Christianised sources 
- tl'Jho were included in the present research. Most authors preferred to criticise Western reDgion 
in its Christian rather than its Jewish form. The critique of Christianity, in so far as it extends to 
Old Testament teaching, can of course generate ideas relevant to the study of Judaism, as in the 
case of the tracing of African mythological, historical and finguistic undercurrents of Genesis by 
Oduyoye (1984: 6ff, 26, 51, 87) and the v-JOrk of Barashango (1991: 135) on Genesis. 
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THE REINTERPRETATION OF JEWISH IDENTITY 
One author \l\lho touched on aspects of the problem was Diop (Finch 1986: 229), who questioned 
the historicity of the Exodus story, more specifically the idea that a Jewish child (fv1oses) could be 
adopted by an Egyptian princess. He argued that any Jews coming out tom Egypt would in any 
case be thoroughly Egyptianised, speaking Egyptian as their ftrst language. In this way he 
seemed to imply that the ftrst 'Jet.~' were more Egyptianised/Africanised than the West conceived 
them to be. A similar attempt to minimise the racial separation of the Jews from 'Africa' was the 
Rastafarian idea that the Jews of ancient times 1.'IJere reincarnated in the btack race of the present 
era, vmo were the true Jetl'.ls or lsraeites (Turner 1980: 53) and thus, presumably, the true heirs 
of the Exodus. 
JUDAISivlAND EGYPTOLOGISED THEOLOGY 
Barashango {1991: 167) Ukewise tried to minimise any racial distinction of the disciples .of Jesus 
from Atican people, by implying that Jesus' disciples were actually black. Barashango was very 
critical of what he portrayed as the plagiarism of the Jewish people from Egyptian sou~es: he 
was especially critical of the Genesis account of creation v.ihich he deemed an inferior version of 
the account in the Egyptian 'Book of Coming Forth by Day and by Night' (Barashango 1991: 127-
142) . .AJhough not denying Genesis all value as a human document, he found fau• with what he 
deemed to be contradictions in Genesis 1 and 2. 
For example, the fact that Adam was a servant of God in Genesis 2 and a master of the earth in 
Genesis 1 was deemed a contradiction. (Such an argument suggested that Barashango's thought 
lacked the concept of 'stewardship' whereby these concepts were reconciled in Western Christian 
theology, and this had implications for his view of the status of the humanity in relation to nature 
which !Nil be discussed in a later chapter.) .Also criticised were the two different accounts of the 
creation of vild animals in Genesis 1 and tame animals in Genesis 2, the question of whether Eve 
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was created separately from ,A.dam or together with him, and (on the basis of a somewhat literaist 
interpretation of 'day' in Genesis 2:4 and Genesis 1) what he deemed to be a discrepancy in the 
length of time ascribed to the creation. Barashango's arguments against Genesis seemed to be 
directed against it in the context of a literalist reading (e.g. of 'day' as 24 hours rather than a 
period of time of unspecified length, of 'male and female he created them' as implying an exact 
sequence of creative acts rather than a general statement of origin of both sexes from God). Not 
surprisingl'f, therefore, he made it clear that his main attack ~vas more against Christian literaDst 
interpretations of Genesis than against those who valued Genesis as a human document but did 
not insist on a literaHst reading. 
AFROCENTRIC lv~GINAllSATIONS OF THE JEWISH PROBLEivt 
An important point in the post-traditional African ideas about Judaism uncovered in this study was 
that most of the authors tNho dealt with Judaism showed no explicit sign of interest in the JevJish 
problem for its OtNn sake. As in the case of Eastern religion (3.4), Afrocentric spectacles 
predominated in the treatment of Judaism. The question of how black the Jews were seemed to 
·~ 
cons1i1ute a frequently recurring 'hidden agenda'. An example of such an agenda guiding one's 
interpretation of Scripture v.ias found in Samkange (1971: 51-52): in discussing the objections of 
Aaron and Mriam, in the book of Numbers, to Moses' Ethiopian wife, he avoided wi1hout detailed 
discussion the obvious explanation for their objections viz. that the Ethiopian wife was black and 
tv1oses' family wasn1, an inconvenient admission if one was trying to present the Jewish founder 
as Africanised. Instead he explained it as an objection by the 'aristocratic' family of Aaron to 
Moses' marrying beneath his station. This seemed a somewhat contrived or laboured reading, 
appled to a text which made perfectly good sense tNithout the introduction of such a between-the-
fines reinterpretation - given the fact that the passage in question, in explaining Aaron's 
objections, did not mention riches or poverty at al, but merely said that she v.ias 'a Cushite 
woman' (Numbers 12: 1). Dialogue with Judaism for its own sake did not seem to be a 
widespread or popular cause in this study's research population. 
112 
.JESUS 
Since most of the sources of this study were non-Christianised, there were some authors that 
simply did not deal overtly with Christianity, much less the Christian-African common ground 
indicated in Bediako (1992: 293, 3SS), or else, while professing Christianity, dissociated their 
religion from the African perspectives they were discussing - such as De Rosny (1935: 201). 
Nevertheless there were still a number of authors who touched on the themes of Jesus, 
Christianity, and the Church. The treatment tended to be hostile to traditional \Nestern ideas 
about his status, often being coloured by acquaintance with the results of colonial Christianity. 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO JESUS 
Four different approaches to the person of Jesus stood out in the data, significant primariiy in a 
collective sense as sho1/1Jing a spectrum of possibilities open to post-traditional African thought 
outside or on the borderline of mainstream Christianity. From the most Christianised to the least 
Christianised, these approaches could be arranged as follows: 
Firstly, some authors adopted an approach to Jesus that, implicitly or explicitly, gave him 
divine veneration and/or a supreme status of sorts over other religious teachers. Senghor 
(1964: 27ff), a principal figure in the Negritude movement, gave a positive assessment of 
Jesus, saying that his tNorship was popular tNith Africans and that emotional devotion to 
Jesus was praiseworthy, at least more so than attachment to the HeUenic God of reason. As 
has been mentioned before, Senghor was a Catholic, although his ideas on Negritude, magic 
and reHgion arguably constituted a ne\I'~ development in this tradition andior a movement 
beyond former Westernised perspectives and theological schools within Christianity or 
Catholicism. From a much less orthodox point of view, one could also point to an attitude of 
emotional divinisation of Jesus in the Umbandista refigion (McGregor 1966: 176-177, 203): 
Jesus was syncretised with the Orisha Oxala and accepted as Supreme Master of Spiritism 
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in Umbanda, and the Umbandistas Africanised the 'Jesus' of Kardecist spirtuaHsm so as to 
make him more of an active than an intellectual figure. 
Secondly, Jesus coukJ be venerated as a divine figure, but not necessarily a supreme 
manifestation of God. Barashango ( 1991 : 88ff, 89, t 66) vie1Ned Jesus as a Black Messiah, 
and on a par with other Eastern Avatars who were also identified as Black tvlessiahs. The 
motif of a tvfessianic Jesus ~\las reminiscent of the Rastafarian idea of Ras Tafari as an 
incarnation of God (Hood 1990: 89, 90-91; Legesse 1994.:.331-332) although Barashango 
(1991: 22-23) specifically stated that his beliefs were not accepted by the Rastafarians as 
compatible wilh their ovm. Both Barashango and the Rastafarians shared a conviction, 
different from that of mainstream Christian tradition, that God was not restricted to incarnation 
in Jesus but 11.ias also incarnate in other humans. This trend, popular in certain Afro-American 
perspectives, was represented also, to some degree, in the ideas of Father Divine (Martin 
1990: 51 ff). 
Thirdly, Jesus could be treated as a divine myth rather than a human teacher. Osabu1ey-
~ 
Aguedze (1990: 8, 33-34, 39, 44-45, 72-74) and Kamalu (1990: 16) viewed Jesus as a 
symbol, related to the Egyptian Horus and to Christ-figures in other traditions. Osabu1ey-
Aguedze argued, following the precedent in Frazer, that the Dying God symboism shared by 
a(f the reigions of the world proved that Jesus was just a virtual composite of various pagan 
Christs and was not a singular historical person. According to him, lots of people in Jesus' 
time were caled 'Jesus' ar:d 'Christ'. Whether one of these historically plural 'Jesuses' 
corresponded in some respects to the Jesus of the Gospels was a question that seemed to 
hold no interest for Osabutey-Aguedze. The use of biblical criticism in the data tended on the 
whole to be based on nineteenth-century modemis1 perspectives, or approaches reminiscent 
thereof, rather than contemporary centrist biblical scholarship. 
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Fourthly, there was the approach of Some (1994: 103) that simply dismissed Jesus as the 
white man's god, for whose death the blacks could not be held accountable, and whose 
redemption their race had done without for ages. and could do without indefinitely. 
ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT CHRISTOLOGICAL POSITION 
Of those authors tl'Jho exercised creative thought about African religion rather than articulating 
expftcit post-traditional African perspectives from an insider's point of vietrJ, special mention 
seemed to be appropriate for the work of Krager ( 1995: 184), whose panentheist reinterpretation 
of Christ as the principle of concretisation in the universe resembled in some respects that of 
Barashango. Kruger (1995: 85-86) did not apparently belong to any one organised religion but 
adopted a 'between reHgions' orientation that showed interest in Christianity, Eastern thought and 
African thought. It was not therefore certain whether his Christology really belonged to post-
traditional Africanised thought or not. It did however correspond in some respects to a post-
traditional African approach to Christclcgy which attempted to extend the idea of 'Christ' beyond 
the Christian tradition, to include other manifestations of God that were not specifically Christian. 
The presence of the 'inclusive Christ-idea' as a significant tendency in the (non-Christianised) 
post-traditional African trends of thought studied seemed to be sufficiently substantiated by the 
data despite the idiosyncratic variation in the Christologies of individual authors. 
CHRISTIANITY AFTER JESUS 
VIJhile statements on the person cf Jesus ~'\lere limited to a fet'll of the authors in the data 
(abhough these tended to be the ones with the most complex and deeply thought-out be6ef-
systems, and thus had an importance that could not be overlooked), statements on the Christian 
religion itself, without direct reference to the person of Jesus, were much more common. These 
tended on the whole to be negative assessments. Although Jahn (1961: 17) insisted that both 
Christianity and African re6gion had to be judged by their best manifestations, not by their worst 
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expressions, and although some African authors indicated that Christianity had roots in the 
African reHgion v.Jhich they admired and had some good in it to that extent (Keita 1984: 60), many 
authors - and sometimes the same ones who spoke positively of the African roots of Christiani1y -
tended to find fault with Christianity. 
A f€Jl'J authors acknowledged that African thinkers such as Augustine had infkJenced Western 
Christianity in ancient times (cf. Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 89ff; Barashango 1991: 135). But these 
authors seemed on the whole to take a rather dim view of the beffefs of the African Fathers: 
Osabutey-Aguedze did not approve of what Augustine had, in his view, done to the African 
concept of predestination by bringing in concepts of original sin; and Barashango viewed Origen's 
and Augustine's aUegorical interpretation of Genesis as related to a general desire of the 
priesthood to keep the true meaning of Genesis concealed from the common people. Augustinian 
and patristic theology did not figure as major interests or influences among the less Christianised 
authors of the study, a~hough had the study included Christian and Islamic movements, instead 
of concentrating largely on post-traditional trends outside these categories, a greater interest in 
the theological concepts attributed to the Fathers might have been discernible in the data. 
PIETlstv1 AND THE REMOTE GOD 
A very frequent area of criticism was the unworldliness or social disinvolvement encouraged by 
the Christian reftgion, especially in colonial times. Nkrumah (Axelsen 1984: 233) related this 
disinvolvement to the concept of original sin, which in the sense of total depravity was also 
rejected by other sources. The idea of a 'remote God' or transcendent deity was often rejected in 
favour of a more immanent or pantheistlclpanentheistic dMnity (Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 77, 
tvlutwa s.a.: 132, 133) and various reasons were found for rejecting the Christ of the West. The 
particularity of Jesus seemed to be a stumblng block: Some (1994: 103) quoted v.-ith sympathy 
an African perspective that found it difficul to comprehend how the death of a white person 
unknown to Africa for centuries could have anything to do ~h the black race. Osabutey-Aguedze 
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( 1990: 8) and Barashang o ( 1991 : xii, 23, 159) both rejected the idea of a reHgious monopoly on 
truth, and perhaps for the same reason both rejected the idea of an 'exclusive' Christ or a God 
incarnating in Jesus of Nazareth only. Arguably a sufficiently immanentist God-concept could not 
identify any part of the universe as not being a vehicle of divine incarnation. Osabutey-Aguedze 
(1990: 75) derided the Christian divinity as half God and half human, a caricature that may 
nevertheless have indicated a sense that the VVestem God, as understood by pietistic 
perspectives, was detached or dissociated from our normal state of human life. A common thread 
running through the post-traditional Africanised criticism of Western theology in many sources 
was the remoteness of the Western God from nature and humani1y: and the criticism of Some 
added the further dimension of remoteness from the black race itself. One could say that the 
Western God in Some's view imposed himself on the black race without having any connection 
with them, or nearness to them. 
THE PROBLEMS OF THE CHURCH 
All of the assessments of Western missionary activity in the data were generally negative. The 
'· 
only real exception seemed to be Bailey (1964: 107 cf. 130-132), whose views seemeil to be 
tinged by a pro-colonial mentality and a bias in favour of Protestants and against Catho&cs. 
Mutwa (s.a. 248) admitted the personal integrity and contributions of some missionaries, but laid 
emphasis on the negative resuls of the Western missionary effort. The complicity of missions in 
coloniaosm and racism was frequently reiterated. In a more general sense, there tr'ere found 
criticisms of the religious formaftsm of the West: Mutwa (s.a.: 249) gave a vivid description of the 
funereal appearance of Western church services in African eyes. Some of the authors were ex-
CathoBcs who had left their former faith in favour of a more Africanised worldvlew. Some (1994: 
95ff) related a horror story about being abducted from non-Christian parents by Western 
missionaries and forcibty re-educated as a Cath'oic - a re-education 1Nhich, needless to say, he 
was later on in his autobiography to abandon, in order to become initiated into the African 
traditional esotericism and magical discipine that, according to him, was taught in secret by his 
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own people. His account of Catholic education, ghastly as it was, did not appear to have any 
palpab~ 'Maria lv1onk' type exaggerations or other examples of traditional anti-CathoHc ~h. 
Despite the 'evil priestcraft' atmosphere pervading his story, nuns were not waHed up, the Pope 
was not worshipped as Almighty God, and nobody paid for their confessions. Nevertheless Some 
intertwined his life-story, and his case against Catholicism, with accounts of paranormal events 
(such as his initiation and the persecution of his father by ancestral spirits) whose historicity did 
not seem a straightfo1ward issue. 
Some's ( 1994: 33-35) anti-Cathofic message included his story - of' uncertain historical verifiabiltty 
- of the suffering and calamities his father had to undergo at the hands of the ancestral spirits, for 
refusing, as a Catholic, to have his son traditionally initiated. This suffering came to an end after a 
traditional healing ceremony had been consented to; and eventually Some If.las initiated. In this 
way the ancestral religion, for Some, scored a triumph over Catholicism - though, in this case, 
arguably more by violence and force than by demonstrating innate beauty, truth and goodness! 
The fact of a preoccupation ~"lith violence, visible and invisible, underlying certain elements of 
post-traditional African thought, wil be dea It with in Chapter 4. 
RELIGIOUS EXCLUSIVENESS AND INCLUSIVENESS 
Some of the authors, discussing the mission of the Christian church from what seemed to be an 
outsider's perspective, touched on something reminiscent of v.lhat Saayman (1991: ix, 1-21, etc.) 
referred to as the 'missio poHtica oecumenica' or the struggle of the church to at the same time 
preserve unity among its Otl\ll'l members and remain relevant to the poitical situation of 
evang effs ed peo pie. Since this study concentrated on non-Christianised sources, the vtewpoints 
here referred to were for the most part outside the movements of 'Black Theology' or '.African 
Theology' which attempted to address these questions from a Christian insider's perspectm. 
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RELIGIOUS DISUNION 
On the question of tr.Jhat the Christian church should do about reHgious disunion there were two 
opposed viewpoints. One viewpoint treated religious disunion as a scandal: representative of this 
stance was tv1utwa (s.a.: 248-249; 1966: 324) who contrasted the Vl/estern denominational spHts 
unfavourably with the unity of his own Zulu tradition, and even advised that missionaries of all but 
one carefully selected denomination should be banned from his country to avoid confusing the 
people. On the other hand, a more inclusive approach was adopted by Barashango ( 1991 : xii, 
23ff, 159) and Osabutey-Aguedze (1990: 8) who were anxious to avoid monopoHsation of the 
truth by any one religious group. The common problem faced by both was that of religious 
disagreement and the associated quarrels: but the two suggested solutions of pluralism and 
resolution of disputes in favour of one group were mutually incompatible. it should be noted 
however that tv1utwa (1966: 344) did not extend his restrictions on denominational groupings to 
the broader area of re6gion as such: he was willing that Western and African and ev-en Eastern 
religions should aD coexist in South Africa, but on the proviso that there be no infighting within any 
of the traditions. This insistence on a unified tradition instead of a pluraHty of sects may have 
owed something to Mutwa's Catholic background (which believed in only one visible Church of 
Christ), afthough, since he spoke of the CathoHc-Calvinist split as undesirable, it is possible that 
Mutwa would have seen his ideal of unity more directly embodied in the Zulu tradition itself 
(Mutwa 1966: 332). 
This problem was related to the issue of inclusiveness versus exclusiveness in theology, or 
cultural versus critical reason (3 .5 .1), and possibly indicated tension betv.ieen an unwillingness to 
criticise Africa and at the same time a need or desire to respond to the claims of non-African 
exclusive reUgion. 
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POUT/CS AND RELIGION 
As far as politics ~'llas concerned. Mutwa (1966: 324) and Bailey (1964: 132) stood alone in 
requiring, explicitly or implicitly, the exclusion of politics from religion in Africa. Other viewpoints in 
the data tended to support the vie.,.., of James (1954: 162), reminiscent of later trends in Black 
Theology, that missionaries should concentrate more than previously on the Social Gospel and 
happiness on this earth rather than in a remote heaven. VVhile not all authors expllcit~.1 gave the 
church a netl\I manifesto for social action the way James did, they implied the need for such a 
thing in their criticism of the apolitical attitude of colonial missionaries and their recommendation 
that religion be demonstrated in actions ratherthan emptywords (cf. Kamaiu 1990: 72, 142). 
3.5.3 WESTERN ACHIEVEMENT AND FAILURE 
If the religious achievements of the West met i.\Jith less than complete approval by post-traditional 
African authors, the achievements of \Nestern civi5sation scarcely fared any better. There were 
several attempts in the data to minimise in various ways the significance of the technological 
achievement of the West. 
WESTERN TECHNOLOGY 
THE PRE-TECHNOLOGICAL IDEAL 
Mutwa ( s .a.: 254) protested that he had no real b'llish to become a "black white man•, arguing that 
"All I ask of life is to be granted the opportunity to live again in a typical Zulu kraal, at peace with 
the world ... • Although he admitted that the West excelled Africa in technological development, he 
pointed out that Africa exceUed the West in other more human areas, and seemed to imply that 
traditional Africa had chosen the better part (cf. 5.2.2). Several authors commented on the 
fragmented understanding of reafity and the loss of unity of vision that the 'modern' scientific 
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mentality had brought with it (Frye 1983: 89-94; Kamah.J 1990: 24; Kaboha 1992: 71 etc.), and 
many sources spoke in favourable terms of the simpler and more peaceful lifestyle of the 
traditional African and the less technologised human. Some (1994: 208-209) v.ient so far as to 
claim that Vl./estern 'science' was a barrier to alternative mystical states of perception, and related 
ho~'\I in his initiation he had to struggle against the barriers to atNareness imposed b.y Western 
education. 
THE SOURCE OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY 
Some authors did not deny the existence of the tangible benefits of Western technology, nor 
indeed of the intangible benefits brough1 about by the introduction of Western reUgion and 
philosophy. But they got around this threat to African cultural self-esteem by claiming that the 
West did not deserve the credit for any of this - on the contrary, the ideological basis of 
technology was in fact African in origin. These authors ~'>!ere of course generally the same ones 
who claimed an African origin for civilisation as a whole (3.1.1, 3.2.2). Where the ideologi~al basis 
of Western science was demonstrably aften to African thought (e.g. in its hostility to magic), the 
strategy was sometimes adopted of claiming that the African idea was superior, or at lea~qually 
vafid on the grounds of the cu•ural relativity of science {cf. Kamalu 1990: 28, 75ff). Many 
expedients were resorted to, in order to avoid acknowledging straight out that Western people 
were better than Africa in the area of scientific discovery. 
ANCIENT AFRICAN CLAIMS OF ACHIEVEMENT 
OccasionaDy the scientific status accorded to ancient Africa, as has been said, verged on myth, 
as when the Egyptians were credited with advanced knowledge of astro-psychology and psycho-
energetics, and the invention of the airplane (3.1.2). Such a viev.ipoint 1t"1S not hoP14ever essential 
to an Afrocentric or African-Efrj'Jrtological viewpoint. Samkange ( 1971: 35ff, 51 ), despite his 
Egyptologica( interest, avoided the more mystical or esoteric claims of post-traditional African 
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reHgiosity in this area, merely claiming on a more moderate scale that most significant 
contributions to human culture in prehistory were African in origin. Samkange (1971: 44) indicated 
that the desertification of the Sahara round about 2000 BC marked a time of African decline from 
its former exceUence, and a time when African cutture was cut off from the rest of the world, thus 
accounting for its loss of ancient ti\IOrld-teadership in the sphere of culture. 
WESTERN INFERIORITY TO AFRICA 
CULTURAL INFERIORITY 
Several authors v.ient cut of their way to prove in other 1.•Jays that 1111hite civiUsaticn was inferior to 
black civiUsation. Apart from the frequent references to the non-holism and fragmented vision of 
the West. and the frenetic pace of their unrestful lifestyle, there were also references to the 
barbaric origin and history of the white races. Diop (1990: 155ff) traced white civilisation and 
religion to nomadism on the fringes of civiDsation, and Barash an go ( 1991 : 22, 67ff etc.) interwove 
with the history of African achievements a subtext on the introduction of patriarchaftsm, 
intolerance and oppression by various types of \Nesternised or white thought. The Western injury 
to Africa through colonial racism was of course brought up as a matter of course, and mention 
has already been made of the accusations of a 'stolen legacy' pioneered by James (3.2.4). In 
some trends of Rastafarianism hatred for the ways of the whites was elevated into a principle of 
religion: everything white was evil or taboo (Turner 1980: 53). 
RACIAL CRITICISM 
THE RACIAL UNIQUENESS OF THE WHITES 
The criticism of the West did not alillays stop at what Westerners had done but occasionally went 
so far as to question the very dignity and being of the Westerner, even as the Westerner had 
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once questioned the dignity and being of the African. Cheikh Anta Diop alluded to problems faced 
by whites in proving their racial distinctiveness from the black: he sh011~ed familiarity with the 
theory that denied that any existing race (e.g. the whites) was an absolutely pure stock unmixed 
11'.itth any other race, although he did not accept the denial, on the basis of racial theories, that 
Black Africans could be identified as a race in their o~'Jtl right (cf. f\/1oore 1986: 235; Diop 19S6c: 
350; Diop 1990; Van Sertima 1988: 9). No post-traditional black author, however, appeared to 
question the dignity of his/her OC.Wl black race. 
ATTITUDE TO FOR.MS OF RACIAL DISCF~!A1/NAT/ON 
The idea of 'malignant apartheid', here defined as oppressive racial discrimination by whites 
against blacks, was not accepted by any black author, and as far as 'benign apartheid' or 
segregation was concerned, Evlut~·Ja (s.a.: 253) was the only black author to suggest that the 
racial differences between black and white justified the benign segregation of their communities. 
Some (1994: 29) implied that it was not a good thing to be separated from the land_of one's 
people, but did not argue for international segregation of Africa and the West on this basis. 
Th'£ QUESTION OF ANTI-WHITE RACISM 
It should be noted that the above definition of malignant apartheid was specifically formulated so 
as to leave open the question of oppression by blacks against whites or so-called 'reverse 
racism'. Casual observation of media-reported events in Zimbab11.ie during the 11.Jriting-up period of 
the present research suggested that there was, at least in the minds of many contemporary 
Africans, no manifest connection whatsoever between rejection of an1i-black oppression and 
rejection of anti-\Nhite oppression: and this conclusion seemed to have impRcations for the 
interpretation of post-traditional Africanised viev.is on racism. 
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The stance of Barashango ( 1991 : 22, 159, 203) seemed to confirm the idea that the non-
recognition of any connection between opposition to anti-black racism, on the one hand, and 
opposition to anti-whtte racism, on the other, was not restricted to self-styled war veterans and 
po!iticians in Zimbabwe, but could even be discerned in some of the sources of the present study. 
For Barashango, while rejecting anti-black discrimination, nevertheless made various remarks on, 
for example, the inherent inability of white thinkers to adequately understand black religious 
symbolism, 11vhich could be construed as a racial slur on 1.\lhites. Stil other indications of a racist 
attitude existed in the religious trend of which Barashango was part, since the 'melanin scholars' 
coun1ed among their members Leonard Jeffries, of whose anti-vmite vie11.,1s more will be said later. 
Barashango's position on black Hberation. arguing that the blacks had the right to be a free and 
sovereign people without any mention of racial equaUty or non-racial social ideals, seemed to 
amount to a conception of black sovereignty reminiscent of popular European patriotic idealism, 
of the 'ruling at heaven's command' type, albeit articulated in a black rather than a white context 
(cf. Barashango 1991: 167). 
Similarly Nkrumah's consciencism, which formed part of Kamalu's cultural vision, seemed to 
'· 
address race relations and social problems in terms primariilj of Afrocentric liberatffin and 
empov.ierment rather than racially unrelated democracy (cf. Axelsen 1984: 233; Kamalu 1990: 
148). This tended to marginalise. if not utterly exclude from serious consideration, the question of 
equal rights for everyone in a post-independence government. The important thing was that the 
black government should gain and retain povJer, and democratic principles would not under any 
circumstances overrule this (cf. A.ssimeng 1989: 228-230). It could be argued from the examples 
of Barashango, Jeffries, and Nkrumah - whom Mutwa (1966: 327) caled an ogre, and not a true 
Bantu - that post-traditional thought about reffgion and other issues was not in all authors wholly 
compatible wilh generalilj accepted Western ideas on basic human rights and freedoms. 
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THE MELANIN SCHOLARS 
Barashango seemed to accept Leonard Jeffries' stereotype of blacks as caring agricultural 'Sun 
people' and whites as vicious 'Ice people' (Barashango 1991: 171 cf. Beard & Cerf 1992: 30, 60) 
which resembled an exaggerated version of the theory of black and white racial history 
propounded by Diop. There was evidence that Barashango (1991: 6) foUowed the melanic theory 
of racial achievement, whose racist implications will be detailed below. Leonard Jeffries, the 
originator of the 'Sun People' theory was deemed by De fv!onte!!ano (1992: 163) to be a partner of 
the 'melanin scholars' in creating a ne11\l scientific rationale for A.frocentricity. Jeffries was a person 
of notoriously anti-tNhite convictions, viewing whites as less biologically proficient than blacks on 
account of their melanin deficiency (Beard & Cerf 1992: 32), a view which will be explained in 
more detail belo1t\J. The melanin scholars were mainly Afro-American, but Wade Nobles, an 
associate of the melanin scholars, had an indigenous African admirer in Kamalu, who 
nevertheless made no mention of the claims of melanic racial theory. 
De. Montellano (1992: 164) mentioned that: '\/l/e!sing ... uses the notion of whites as melanin 
recessives to explain white racism on a "scientific" basis. She professes that white men have to 
destroy black men in self-defense because black men have the potential to destroy white men 
genetically.' Having discussed her theories, he t"Jent on to discuss some .more extreme claims by 
other authors who in his view expanded melanic theory to the point of 'classical racism 5 • 
THE MELANIC THEORY OF RACIAL ACHIEVEMENT 
The most overtly racist perspectives in the data of the present study were to be found in 
Barashango and the authors alluded to by De Montellano, au of these being sympathetic to 
melanin scholarship. The explanation for this appeared to be related to the melanic theory of 
racial achievement held by these authors. According to this theory, blacks had a special 
substance in their skin called 'melanin', produced by the pineal gland, and utterly lacking in the 
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skins of ~\lhites. This substance conferred genetic and biological superiority on the species that 
possessed it, and accounted for racial achievement and excellence. It accounted for the fantastic 
achievements attributed to ancient Egyptian civilisation, and was something of which blacks 
seemed to be assured of a monopoly by virtue of their pigmentation. According to De tvlontellano 
( 1992: 165-166), the claims made for melanin could even go further than this: 
"According to Welsing the Dogon's melanin functions in a manner similar to an infrared 
telescope, and they were able to detect Sirius B through the melanin in their pineal 
glands. Welsing claims further that everything that happens on Earth is converted to 
energy and beamed up to Sirius B. She maintains that the high melanin content of black 
people enables them to tap into that information. She alleges that Greek oracles were 
black and their melanin enabled them, as it does present-day blacks, to foresee the 
future.· 
WADE NOBLES ON MELANIN AND HUJ\M.NITY 
' 
The .Afro-American author Wade Nobles {quoted with approval by Kamalu (1990: 28, 4.gJ as an 
authority on the significance of Africanised science and African mythology, albeit admittedly not in 
the context of melanic theories) identified melanin as part of what makes us human, and 
proposed the equation CNS + EMS = HB. That is, central nervous system plus essential melanic 
system equals human being. The implication of this was obviously that whites, who lacked 
melanin in their skins, were not fulfy' human. De Monte Dano (1992: 164) reacted to this by pointin~ 
out that ·~heJ idea that people to be discriminated against are not fufy human has always been 
used by racists as a justiftcation for their actions. It Is sad to see it being used by people who 
have suffered so much from racism themselves.• He also criticised Afrocentric melanic 
scholarship strongly from a scientific point ofvie114 (De lv\ontellano 1992: 163-164): 
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"The alleged properties of melanin, mostly unsupported, irrelevant or distortions of the 
scientific literature, are then used to justify Afrocentric assertions. One of the most 
common is that humans evolved as blacks in Africa, and that ~W\ites are mU1an1s (albinos, 
or melanin recessives) ... No one disputes that humans evolved in Africa, but the rest of 
the statement profoundly distorts genetics. Afrocentrics treat skin colour as if it was 
governed by only one gene, and thus subject to absolute Mendelian 
dominance/recessiveness. If this were true, humans could only be black or white. 
However, skin colour, Hke intelligence or height, is controlled by several genes, which is 
why humans exhibit a wide colour spectrum ... There is also no evidence that the amount 
of melanin in internal organs correlates with the amount of melanin in the skin. For 
example, the amount of melanin in the substamia nigra is normal in albinos .. ." 
THE PROGRESSIVENESS OF BLACK THOUGHT 
A disturbing trend noted by De Monteftano ( 1992: 165) as particularly fostered by the-melanic 
theory of racial achievement was one of indifference to effort as a means of cultural exceffence: 
"The consequences of a wide acceptance of this notion by Aft'ican-American 
schoolchildren could be quite damaging. Children could reject appeals from teachers to 
study hard for years in order to become scientists. Black children could respond that in 
order to be a scientist aU they need to do is 'Let my melanin pick up the vibes.' 
A tendency of disincHnation to work for social progress, in a more non-melanic comext, could be 
suspected in certain trends of thought that theorised about the excellence of the Egyptian past 
(cf. Kamalu 1990: 148}: they gave the impression of 'resting on their laurels', of luxuriating in the 
supposed achievemen1s of the African past wtthout making any frm effort to personally and 
externally contribute to these efforts in the present. Although the formulation of post-traditional 
African philosophy and mysticism by various authors was itself a sign of improvement of thought 
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In the subjective sphere, and Barashango (1991: 6ff), tr.Jho followed the melanic racial theory, 
pursued these ideals with vigour it was not altogether obvious what contribution such thought 
could make externally to present-day technology, economic growth or sophistication of lifestyle. 
The ancient Egyptians certainly seemed to have had a motivation to develop their own 
civilisation, but it was not clear tl1Jhether the anti-technocratic viewpoint of many authors in the 
data ll'Jould in any way encourage such a tendency in modern African thought. Did mysticism 
impede the development of critical science? In the abstract, arguably, it did not have to, if 
mystical perception was treated as a supplement or enhancement of. rather than a replacement 
of, ordinary human reason. But in the concrete, it seemed that the danger of replacing ordinary 
knowledge with questionable forms of non-rational knowledge-claims was a possibility (cf. 5.1 :I). 
3.5.4 THE PROBLEM OF WESTERNISED AFRiCA 
Apart from the ancient traditions of Egypt and Africa, and the heritage of the West, a final element 
in the historical consciousness of post-traditional Africa was modern Africa itself. There were two 
major concerns in the data concerning modern Africa in a religious context: firstly, the relationship 
of V\/estern and African culture in the area of philosophy and reHgion, and secondly, the impact of 
post-colonial African politics on the post-traditional African worldviet .. J. 
THE DOUBLE LIFE 
As far as the relative perceived value of African and Western culture trJas concerned. many 
relevant points have been raised already in 3.5.2-3. A further phenomenon which recurred, 
however, ~'\las the comment that the modem African 11Jas forced to wrestle t111ith the dilemma of a 
double life - on the one hand, the traditional heritage of his/her culture, and, on the other hand, 
the newly introduced ideas of the West (cf. Jahn 1961 : 21-24). The problem, arising in a religious 
context, was not confined to Africa but also arose in the problem of the self-definition of Afro-
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Caribbean movements: the Umbandistas, whose reHgion was derived from a combination of 
African and V-./estern spirituaHsm, recognised the African contribution to their belief but fe• the 
need not to be confined rigidly by these traditions but to define themselves autonomously (Ortiz 
1989: 90). 
RECONCILIATORY APPROACHES 
Kamalu (1990: 9), understanding the 'African' side of the double fife to include Egypt, argued that 
the African experience of being fop dog' and 'underdog' at different periods of history gave them 
a broadness of perspective that uniquely fitted them for significant contribution to future history. A 
similar positive interpretation of the 'wo worlds' experience, given by Some (1994: 40), was the 
motif of a mutually beneficial reconciiiation and interaction between ancient tradition and modern 
culture, leading to dialogue and harmony. Epega (1993: xv-xvi), Neimark's spiritual teacher, 
expressed approval for the fruitful combination of tNhite and black vJays by pointing out that the 
orisha Obatala was white-skinned, and in our esteem for traditional African reUgion we should be 
thinking 'African', not just 'black'. Jn the area of philosophy a reconciHatory approach surfaced in 
the wilHngness to be open to the ideas of non-Africans and adopt a global rather than a ni\rrowly 
ethnocentric approach to philosophy (cf. Kamalu 1990: 23-24) - although this was in the case of 
Kamalu defended on the grounds that much of Western philosophy was on!lj borrowed or 'stolen' 
African philosophy any.nay. 
NON-RECONCILIATORY APPROACHES 
Certain authors, however, were not sympathetic to the idea of a Western contribution to African 
thought. This tendency was present in a relative!lj benign form in Mutwa (s.a.: 249; 1966: 339) 
vtio simply argued that African tradition should not be changed or corrupted, and it would be best 
if the Western habit of tinkering with reHgion and ideas, and forming many denominations etc. 
were not adopted. This attitude for Mutwa was a sign of disrespect for reBgious tradition and 
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failure to see that humanity was made for reHgion and not vice versa. In a more rigid fashion 
James (1954: 159-160) argued against respect for Western ways in so far as they stemmed from 
the theft of the African legacy, and even advised the refusal to join societies like Phi Beta Kappa 
etc. which were based on an undeserved respect for the Greeks. Barashango tried to integrate 
syncretism with anti-Western hostility by, in effect, applying to the beUefs of the world the acid test 
of African relationship and Afrocentricity. He tt\Jas very much open to ~frican' beliefs (including the 
religion of that famous and enlightened 'black', Gautama Buddha), and very much closed to non-
African ¥Jhite' beliefs (cf. Barashango 1991: 83, 203). The 'Osaist' religion of Osabutey-Aguedze 
(1990: 28) Hkewise accepted or rejected ideas in other traditions .on the basis of relation to an 
Afrocentric corpus of beHef and tradition. 
THE PROBLEM OF iNCUl TURATiON 
iNCULTURATlON OF'vVESTERN THOUGHT 
There were some approaches to the problem of the double life which were largely !eft out of this 
study on account of the predominantly non-Christian character of the sources consulted (1.3.1 ), 
for example those of complete Westernisation or inculturated Christianity. The status of 
Senghor's ideas on 'negritude' was uncertain: they contained indications of sympathy ~"Jith 
Catholicism, which was his personal religion (cf. 3.5.2), but at the same time Senghor (1964: 
264ff, 267ff) also found interesting features in traditional African religion and in the magical beliefs 
of Eliphaz Levi. It was therefore not clear whether Senghor's ideas were independent of any 
particular reffgious confessional standpoint. or constituted an inculturated form of Christian 
thought. They did not seem to be directly theological in nature, in the sense of appealing to 
bibHcal or ecclesiastical precedent directly, but had a more philosophicaVexperiential character. 
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INCULTURATION OFAF.R/CAN THOUGHT 
Of the approaches to the West uncovered in the data that remained in addition to those 
mentioned in the above paragraph, most appeared to invoive an incuituration which was the 
reverse of that found in inculturated Christianity - in other words, we were seeing attempts to 
present African thought in terms of ideas that the \/Vest could understand. The type of 
inculturation varied from inadvertent and Western-influenced philosophications (cf. Tempels 1995 
etc.) to Afrocentric perspectives that were anything but uncritical of the Western thought tfJhich 
they confronted, although they took into account such things as \Nestern science, philosophy and 
Christianity in the defence and exposition of their beHefs (cf. Barashango 1991, Kamalu 1990 
etc.). There were fetrJ, if indeed any, purely African viewpoints in the data untouched by Western 
influence in some way, and most sources had to deal with the probiem of hotN much of Western 
thought to agree 1.'\Jith and how much to criticise. The dilemma of the double life t.'.Jas not simply 
resolved in such authors by the strategy of ignoring or blindly resisting the incursion of the \Nest 
into the African world: some sort of position had to be taken up on the use of cultural \.'ersus 
critical reason, and the result was not ai.Nays a strict and harmonious balance (3 .5 .1). 
POST-COLONIAL AFRICAN POLITICS 
The theme oi postcolonial African poiitics was ailuded to in some oi the sources, and indeed 
some trends in post-traditional religious thought were related to political philosophies. Both 
Afrocentric and more global tendencies were represented in the sources studied. 
NKRUl\MH 
The thought of the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah involved an anti-pietistic approach to 
rellgious issues representative of certain trends seen elsewhere in post-traditional African reiigion 
(2.5.3); his philosophy of consciencism, a Marxist-influenced political viewpoint taking African 
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conscience as its starting point, was endorsed by Kamalu (1990: 3, 15, 44, 132, 148) and 
portrayed as not necessarily non-refigious. Themes of interest to Kamalu included a conception of 
pragmatism in ethics. an awareness of conflict as a basic reaHty in nature and society, and a plan 
for the Afrocentric restructuring of society and culture. A significant theme suggested by all these 
motifs, albeit one difficult to reconcile with Western democracy, was the idea of an emergent 
African state guided by the norms of violent revolution rather than more universal principles 
relating to human rights (cf. 3.5.3). 
The question of such a possible threat to democracy posed by N.krumah's pragmatism t/\las not 
commented on by Kamalu, although history seemed to show this was not an empty misgiving (cf. 
Assimeng 1989: 228-229). The identification in consciencism of progressive social tendencies 
with revolutionary violence, and the impHed rejection of non-violent tendencies favouring peaceful 
and fully democratic transition as reactionary - again, not an empty fear at all, given the paranoia 
against alleged enemies of the state, and the non-reHance on democracy, displayed in history by 
Nkrumah and his ilk (cf. Assimeng 1989: 229ff) - ll'Jas likewise not dealt with by Kamalu. On the 
whole the data sources studied seemed n~t to address in detail the possibifity of a logical 
connection between political corruption and post-traditional Afrocentrism and anti-\/\lesternism, 
especially as manifested in Nkrumah's philosophy. Kamalu ( 1990: 141) attempted to formulate a 
response to the ethical issue of violence as follows: 
"Violence is rarely, if ever, an end in itself. Often it is used to take possession of people 
or things; conversely, it may be the only means of self-defence. Now we cannot justify 
violence that puts things before people. We cannot justify the violence that justifies the 
domination of some people by others. But ll'Jhat of the violence used to end this 
domination and restore a moral order?" 
Kamalu thus rejected violence that placed things before people, and led to the domination of one 
people by another (as in white racism and colonialism). Since, however, the violation of human 
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rights in the name of the African people and their liberation did not exactly fit either of these 
descriptions of violence, while attempts to resist the same could be made to flt these criteria 
easily by playing the 'money-grabbing white racist' trump card, ~ was difftcul to question certain 
aspects of Nkrumah's dictatorial poicies (e.g. his forcibly detaining people without trial}, and 
those of other African leaders, using Kamalu's ethics. 
SENG HOR 
The negritude philosophy of Senghor (1984). a post-independence leader of Senegal, offered a 
plan, in less expHcitly Afrocentric terms, for the equal contribution of both black and white to the 
emerging global cufture. His words. given on the jacket of the book Uberte 1: Negritude et 
H'umani.sme, defined Negritude as follows (my translation): 
"Negritude is the totaHty of such cultural values of the black world as are expressed in the 
5fe, institutions and works of black people. As for us, our concern, our unique concern, 
has been to affirm this Negritude by living it, and, having lived it, by plumbing the depths 
of its meaning, in order to present i1 to the tNorld as a cornerstone in the constnft'tion of 
that Universal Civilisation, which will be the common work of all the races, of aH the 
different civilisations, or else will never exist.• 
Senghor's philosophy offered an alternative to the nationalistic and anti-Western approach of 
Nkrumah, and focussed on the concept of blackness as transcending national boundaries. This 
concept of Negritude defended by Senghor was also influential in the perspective of Jahn (1961: 
140, 148) !Nho argued in favour of a new global African culture no longer confined to the continent 
nself. The esotericist Frye's definiion of 'Black Philosophy' was similarly transcultural and 
universal, and indeed he specifically rejected the term 'African philosophy' as being too culture--
specific to correspond his own particular ideas on blackness (cf. Frye 1988: xi, xiii, 4.-5). 
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Nevertheless he did not rule out the possibifity of using ethnographic data about Africa as sources 
of philosophy, as was the fashion among contemporary African ethnophilosophers (Frye 1988: 3). 
THE ISSUE OF POST-COLONIAL MISGOVERNMENT 
The problem of the conflict betttveen the vievJpoints exemplified above by Nkrumah and Senghor 
respectively, and indeed the problem of the less-than-spotless history of post-independence 
government in Africa, was not discussed in detail by the authors studied. Some ( 1994: 95) 
blamed the corruption of African government on the t.'\Jhites and their system of education. 
Geschiere (1997: 7) identified sources of political instability within the African tradition in the form 
of trends inspired by witchcraft, which constituted 'other languages of po1tJer' dissenting from the 
constraints of the status quo. Ai the times of publication of the sources empioyed in the present 
study, various significant events in African history (e.g. the Zimbabwean land invasions. the war 
in the DRC) had not yet happened, and this may have been a reason why the post-traditional 
religious sources studied did not deal in detail t•Jith the problematic side of non-VIJestern militancy 
and governmental oppression in Africa. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION AND POLITICS 
The relationship of post-traditional religion to postcolonial pofitics, on the basis of the preceding 
paragraphs, could be indicated as follows. Although the possibiUty of a religious critique of post-
colonial African governments was not yet an important issue for the authors studied (3.5.4), the 
general non-secular frame of mind adopted by many authors meant that the problem of black-
tr-Jhite political relations tended to acquire a religious aspect (3.5.2). Among the 'melanin scholars' 
the mystical properties of melanin and their claimed connection with the achievements of ancient 
Egypt furnished a connection between occultism and support of Afrocentrism (3.5.3). The quality 
of 'blackness' was moreover linked with mystical or religious experience in Barashango (1991: 
203-204) and Senghor (1964: 24-25). The adoption of political philosophy, in addition, was linked 
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with ethics, and ethics was finked with religion. In consequence, a philosophy like 'consciencism' 
(3.5.3) offered itself as an alternative to religious pietism and religious democracy (Assimeng 
1989: 228-230} and thus competed with religion in its own sphere. In the thought of Kamalu 
consciencism itself possessed a quasi-religious dimension (2.2.4). The important iinks between 
black religion and politics appeared to 6e in the sphere of the religious or occult significance of 
blackness itself, and the replacement of religious pietism by a political activism admitting of a 
quasi-religious interpretation. 
3.6 AFRICAN SELF-DEFINITION 
The exploration of the historical spheres of interest in post-traditional Africanised authors, 
summarised above, led to the emergent idea of an African 'sacred history'. Although not all 
authors constructed history the same way, many themes tended to recur in their constructions. 
Firstly, an ancient past that lent dignity to the black race (3 .1-4). Secondly, an encounter with 
the culture of the West, and the suffering of indignity from the same (3.5). Thirdly, an aUempt to 
recover the same dignity in an encounter with the modem world (see beiow). These stages were 
not rigidly separated, since the ancient past and the indignities of the past could be deemed to 
continue even in the present. Nevertheless they presented a quasi-historical picture of ancient 
glory, faff and redemption - and James ( 1954: 153) used the metaphor of 'redemption' explicitly -
which was influential in the attempts at black historical selfsdefinition which shaD be discussed 
below. 
3.6.1 PHILOSOPHICAL SELF-OEFINmON 
Many of the sources consulted in the study dealt with African philosophy. The importance of 
philosophy for self-definition was indicated by an ongoing debate on what African philosophy 
actually was, a debate which was polarised between ethnophilosophers who focussed on the 
data provided by indigenous African sources, and more global philosophers ll'Jho demonstrated 
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interest in the philosophical heritage of the West (cf. Fiye 1988: 3). African philosophy was not 
restricted to theistic belief, but among those perspectives which paid attention to theism and 
religion there could be found three broad groups: firstly, 'philosophications' or artificially created 
worldviews generated by the imposition of systematic frameworks on African traditional religion: 
secondly, interest in philosophically significant features of traditional thought, and thought critical 
of African tradition formulated by expounders of the tradition, such as were explored in Odera-
Oruka's ~·rork on Sage Philosophy (Odera-Oruka 1991); and thirdly, intricate philosophies related 
to Egyptian Hermetism. These three sorts of philosophy corresponded roughly to the three 
classes of literaiy sources mentioned in 1.6, although these cla~ses included non-philosophical 
material in addition to the philosophical trends to which they corresponded. The existence of the 
subdivisions revealed that post-traditional African self-definition was not in au cases purely a 
matter of preserving African dignity in the face of 'Western influence, but in certain contexts 
involved a decision on the degree to which African tradition had to be elaborated or modernised. 
More wiD be said on the relationship of philosophy to African tradition in Chapter 4. 
3.6.2 RACIAL SELF-DEFINITION 
Racial self-definition in the sources of the present study tended to be connected with two themes: 
the concept of 'blackness' as such, and the historical consciousness of what Ke it a ( 1984: 57) 
caned '.A.fricanity'. 
BLACKNESS 
As far as the first was concerned, reference has already been made to the melanic theoiy of 
racial achievement (3.5.3) and the concept of negritude (3.5.4), which furnished respectively a 
biological and cuttural understanding of blackness from a mystical perspective. The definition of 
black philosophy given by Fiye (1988: xiii) as an 'inter- and intra-psychic striving for consistency 
with au that is through an identification with the essential manifestations, or archetypes, of all that 
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is' identified inclusiveness as a particularly distinctive feature of the black worldview. This was a 
more benign and non-raciaftsed counterpart to the 'Sun People' concept of Jeffries, which gave 
the worldvietN of the black race a virtual monopoly on the qualities of inclusiveness, caring and 
harmony (3.5.3). Senghor's philosophy of Negritude, which identified emotion as a defining 
quality of the black soul, was related to the phenomenon of inclusiveness in so far as it was linked 
with the humanisation of aU of nature (Senghor 1964: 23-24). The idea that the defining quality of 
the black was the possession of a more inclusive attitude than the white was echoed in such 
tendencies as the preference for integration of religion and politics, and the articulation of 
immanentist theologies, by many of the Africanised authors studied, 
AFRICANITY 
As far as the second category was concerned, ~ricanity', as outlined by Keita (1934: 57ff), 
involved an atAJareness of the glorious past of the African people, especially as expressed in 
Ancient Egypt and Medieval Timbuktu. Preoccupation with this sort of ~fricanity' was present as 
a matter of course in ail the Egyptologically influenced authors of the study, but Vlas also found in 
the work of f\11utwa (s.a. etc.) who tried to demonstrate, in his claimed revelation of the secret 
aspects of Zulu tradition and of the sagas which, according to him, were handed down by his 
people, that his WJn people had a tradition and history of their own comparable with that of the 
whites. The theme of ~fricanity' manifested also in some attempts to rev.irite non-Africanised 
history and redefine modern culture from an African perspective: Rastafarianism was a case in 
point, with its redefinition of the Israelites as blacks, of Ethiopia as the promised land, and the 
virtual creation of a new culture for young people outside Africa t'IJho had no firm roots in 
indigenous Africa or in the West (Hood 1990: 99ff; HiH 1980: 81). Barashango's reinterpretation of 
global refigious history carried the tendency of preoccupation trJith 'Africanity' to the most 
exaggerated extreme found in the data. 
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THE ISSUE OF A DEFINITIONAL SANDBOX SYNDROME 
The possibiDty faced by a definitional debate such as the one discussed. of people wasting much 
words and ink on deciding who or what a 'black' or 'African' was, that no time was left for 
constructive debate or action on more concrete social issues, was not wholly ieft out of 
consideration by the authors of the study. As has already been mentioned, the possibility of 
blacks resting on the laurels of their historical self-definition was an issue to b•Jhich attention t•Jas 
expftcitly dra1Nn by Kamalu and De Montellano (3.5.3). Moreover, a connection could be 
consciously made bett111een self-definition and concrete issues in the real world, in the sense that 
there were authors who recognised that the question of self-definition had to have some sort of 
concrete impact. in the attitude where~'llith a black approached the problems of his/her life and 
society. 
The idea that personal achievement was based on effort and action was not absent fiOm the 
data, and indeed the rejection of original sin (2.5.3) and the propounding of a Pelagian-Hke idea of 
salvation ( 6 .2 .1) by certain post-traditional Africanised authors tended to emphasise this theme. 
But the point where self-definition came in, was the need for a sufficiently confident black self-
understanding to inspire the contemporary African to the requisite heights of achievement. And 
this raised the issue of black self-definition through achievements. 
3.6.3 SELF-DEFINITION THROUGH ACHIEVEMENTS 
THE CONTRAST BEnNEEN WHITE AND BLACK SELF-CONFIDENCE 
The problem of black self-definition could be explored in a concrete everyday-life-oriented fashion 
by a consideration, related to certain questions raised by Barashango (1991: 5-9), of the contrast 
betlt.Jeen the historical self-understanding typical of a colonial white and a colonial black. The 
colonial white generaily looked back in pride to the achievements of the British empire, the fruits 
138 
of Western science, exploration and discovery, the accomplishments of Western art and 
fiterature, and his/her culture's high reputation for achievement. This created a sense of potNer, of 
being able to tackle anything and achieve exceHence. Whereas, on the other hand, the mentally 
colonised black looked back on a history of barbarism, savagery, remoteness from civifisation, 
scientific primitiveness, inferiority in every respect to the great civilisation of the white. Even after 
emancipation from oppression, the black stiU laboured under this sense of inferiority, a sense that 
learning and intellectual advancement was a \•Jhite thing', that blacks 1tJOuld not be able to imitate 
or equal, much less surpass what the West had done. 
THE BLACKS AS PIONEERS AND ACHIEVERS OF CIVILISATION 
A question at the back of Barashango's mind, and also the mind of Diop (cf. Van Sertima 1986: 
12) was this: could the African regain a sense of being supreme in the world, a sense of power 
such as belonged to the white, which would spur him/her on to inteHectual excellence, 
achievement and confidence in himselt'herself and his/her pot•Jer to attain 1tJhatever heights of 
civilisation he/she desired? Both Diop and Barashango ansli'.iered, "Yes•. The means of restoring 
this consciousness of confidence and control of one's ovm Ufe was not merely consciousness of 
the uniqueness of the African person in general, or of the black experience: it lay in an awareness 
of the particular history of the African people as originators of civilisation, as pioneers in Egypt cf 
an that was good in subsequent cultures and civiUsations, and of the superiority of the resources 
of African culture to the resources of the Nordically-inspired civilisation of the whites. On a lesser 
scale lvruagwu (1991: 260), while not making any exaggerated claims about the Ancient 
Egyptians, held that education should invot.te, for black people, the teaching of the history of 
one's own people, and not just white history. 
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THE TEMPTATION TO MYTHOLOGISE 
The problem of the mythologisation of ancient Africa was acute here: how much of the ancient 
past, the basis of a post-traditionai African Renaissance, could be expected to survive a criticai 
and sceptical investigation of, say, the achievements of ancient black civilisation as related by the 
melanin scholar Frances Cress Welsing? Resources for dealing with such a problem existed in 
the form of an interest in the positive aspects of more verifiable African history generally 
overlooked by possessors of a conventional colonial !l'Jor!dview. For those who might viet!'J a 
mystical or esoteric Egyptological exaltation of the African past as difficult to credit or verify, other 
sources in the data raised the possibility of investigating less Kemetan cultures of sub-Saharan 
Africa and developing the philosophical and other resources to be found there. Griaule's 
indication of the sophistication of the Dogon mythological system (Griaule 1965: 216) was 
influential in such investigation, and the construction of Net/IJ-Age-like mystical systems on the 
basis of African beliefs, yet without everything standing or falling on the tradition of an ancient 
past (as in Neimark or Gonzalez-Wippler), was yet another 1/'Jay of regaining a sense of power in 
being African. Many of the important tendencies in the investigation of the netl'J emergent African 
culture, from a standpoint based more on negritude than melanin, were summarised in Jahn's 
book on Muntu: The New African Culture (Jahn 1961). 
SELF-DEFINITION VS. UNDERSTANDING THE OTHER 
A possible feature of the preoccupation with 'self-definition', but not a widely shared area of 
concern among the authors studied, was the question of whether an intense preoccupation ll'Jith 
self-definition might not impede one's ability to understand the other. It was perhaps predictable 
that the only author to attempt dialogue other non-African reHgions for their own sake, Krager 
(1995: 88ff), paid some attention to the need for understanding other people and religions 
empathetically. In other sources, the self-definitions of non-African reHgions were frequently not 
taken seriously on their own terms but rather forced into a prior Afrocentric mould (3.4, 3.5.2). 
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The possibiHty was a real one, that concern for racial self-definition and self-development could 
lead directly to racial prejudice, and/or lack of concern for the Afrocentrically uncoopted 
perspective in its otl\Jn right. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
While the intervening ideological conditions acting on the religious life of the thinkers and 
befievers of this study were characterised by a broad inclusiveness of perspective, the immediate 
causal conditions which influenced post-traditional African thought through their effect on its 
historical consciousness tended to be characterised by awareness of conflict and polarisation, 
between black and Vlihite, and betttreen nationalist and globalist. The areas of disagreement about 
histor1 and black self-understanding in the authors studied 1t'Jere greater than the areas of 
disagreement about theology. 
If there were any areas of unity, they lay in the concern for preserving what was good in the 
heritage of Africa (3 .1-i), critically confronting the chaftenges posed by Western thought, refigion 
and civilisation (3.5), and achieving some sort of self-understanding in relation to Africa and the 
West (3.6). Of the debates and disagreements found in the data, the follotilling were most 
prominent: 
Firstly, the interpretation of the African past and the influences contributing to and relating to 
it was an area that gave rise to some differences of perspective (3 .1 .1-3, 3 .4). The 
relationship of Egypt to Africa was a question on which some differences of viewpoint existed, 
not all authors offering the same affegiance to the traditions of Egypt as purported sources of 
African thought, civifisation and religion (3.2). Moreover, the significance of the Dogon 
tradition gave rise to a few more areas of variation of opinion, especially on the questions of 
whether it was a form of esotericism and, if so, whether or not it offered any keys to occult 
power (3.3}. The problem of hwJ ancient Africa fell from its glory was addressed by some 
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authors (3.2.4). Nevertheless, the question of possible disasters faced in turn by modern 
post-colonial Africa was not addressed in detail, despite certain indications thereof alluded to 
or indicated in the viewpoints of some authors studied (cf. 3.5.4). 
Secondly, the philosophy of the West, particularly of Platonism and AristoteHanism, was 
assimilated or rejected to varying degrees, areas of interest tending to include logocentrism 
(3.5.1 ). Opinions varied on the degree and fashion of adapting to the \·Vest in the course of 
black or African philosophical self-definition (3.6.1 ). The question of how to integrate cultural 
and critical reason (3.5.1 ), how to make a choice bettNeen, or harmonise, the preservation of 
the outlines of a tradition and the radical questioning of commonly held assumptions, was an 
issue that recurred in various forms throughout the exploration of black and white history, 
culture and racial conflict, and responses varied from conciliatory to anti-white Afrocentric 
approaches. An important problem in the area of black self-definition was the tendency to 
define 'other' in terms of 'self, to Afrocentrise the understanding of Eastern, Jewish and other 
reHgions instead of treating ttJlth them empathetically from the standpoint of their own view of 
themselves. 
Thirdly, the religion of the West was assimilated or rejected to varying degrees, preference 
being shown for immanentist and inclusive forms of theology as opposed to exclusive or 
transcendental theologies. There were differing assessments of what !Mas wrong with the 
Church and how it could improve in the area of religious union and political activity (3.5.2). 
Fourthly, the significance of Western technology was accepted or rejected to varying 
degrees, and varying viewpoints tNere held on its impfications for African inferiority or 
superiority to the West (3.5.3). 
Finally, differences in pofitical opinion and racial attitudes ranged from globalist perspectives 
which accepted racial equality to Afrocentric ideas that had features tending to encourage 
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anti~'llhite racism (3.5.4). This range of opinion was related to reHgion in various ~'\Jays. 
Varying opinions were held on the way in which Africans could achieve a cultural self-
confidence comparable to that of the whites (3.6.2-3). The theme of Afrocentrism, definable 
as concern for the particularity of the African heritage, could be understood either in benign 
terms as a simple appreciation of the role of Africa in the histoiy of humankind (3.1), or in 
extreme terms as a vietrJ that nothing good in humankind could come from anyt•Jhere but 
Africa (3.5.3). 
A widespread problem in much of the post-traditional debate on the 'sacred history' of Africa 
explored in the study was how much of the ancient and contemporary world to identify with, and 
hot.'\I much to exclude from African tradition. The inclusive approach found in the exploration of 
African theology and cosmology seemed to be in operation in certain Afrocentric reconstructions 
of history that seemed to see African connections everyt.'llhere. But pure inclusiveness was not 
aiNays possible when authors tr.iere faced with the problem of responding to the religion, 
philosophy and civilisation of the \Nest, and the issues of racial conflJct and colonialism - and in 
dealing tAJith issues of inferiority and superiority. Black self-definition in post-traditional Africa 
involved a confrontation between an inclusive or harmonising tendency of thought related to 
indigenous African cosmology, and a polarising, argumentative and at times even polemical 
tendency of thought, related inter aHa to the confrontation of Africa with the V\/est and the 
experience of colonialism and oppression. 
It was not to be thought, of course, that aspects of the indigenous African tradition were without a 
violence and preoccupation with conflict which were all their own. In the next chapter the nature 
of the African traditional heritage as perceived by the authors of this study, tAJhether conceived in 
Egyptological or sub-Saharan or Afro-Caribbean terms, wiU be explored from the standpoint of 
abiding characteristics and fundamental qualities, including the overaU attitude to Ufe itself. 
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4 THE ROOTS OF AFRICAN LIFE 
In addition to cosmological and historical ideas which could function as the background to 
Africanised refigious fife as post-traditionally conceived, the data of the study included ideas that 
formed part of the immediate perceived context of African life, such as indications of esteem for 
the traditional or indigenous way of life, or concepts of morality or ritual. The contex1 of post-
colonial modernisation placed these ideas in a precarious and paradoxical position: for although 
these were identified by certain authors as the abiding 'roots' of African cutture, they trJere often 
threatened by the influence of modernity which led to the discontinuing of traditional customs. 
Although some of the authors in the data had actively engaged in traditional African ritual, such 
as Neimarl< ( 1993: 21-22 etc.), many authors seemed to attend more to the spirit of traditional 
African ritual than the letter, and the inner significance of traditional culture, ritual. mythology and 
so forth seemed to matter more than the actual practices. Thus, the ideological cultural roots 
described below could be understood as proximate contextual conditions in a state of transition 
towards becoming more remote historical conditions - as things which were t.-'lloven into much of 
African Ufe at the time of publication of the sources, but which in later times ~·Jould probably have 
vanished into obsolescence under the impact of the West. The problem of the gradual slipping-
away into oblivion of African cultures subsequent to modernisation and Westernisation was an 
issue that had to be borne in mind whenever references were found to non-modern traditions in 
post-traditional authors. 
4.1 THE SACRED SPACE OF THE TRADITIONAL WORLDVIEW 
The vast majority of the authors studied insisted that the African worldview VJas deeply religious, 
and that religion was an integral part of life. Such statements were found not only in the 
discussion of traditional cultures, but also in more post-traditional viewpoints which attempted to 
integrate religion with the scientific paradigm in an interdisciplinary fashion (De Montellano 1991: 
46). Western civilisation was frequently criticised as having divorced religion and mysticism from 
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He, in addition to its other offences against hoUsm (cf. B'Nasseem 1992: 25; Kaboha 1992: 76). 
Although Kamalu (1990: 71-72) stated that neither theism nor atheism could be proven with 
certainty, his ll'KJrldview nevertheless showed respect for magic, mythology and philosophical 
concepts of divinity. Certain viewpoints explained African non-secularism by saying that African 
reUgion was founded on direct experience of the sacred (cf. Barashango 1991: 204; Osabutey-
Aguedze 1990: 138). There were also references to the Egyptian concept of Ma'at, an 
interdiscipUnary 1ruth' that included concepts of factual, moral, mystical and religious order 
(Kama!u 1990: 7; De Montellano 1991: 47; Barashango 1991: 173). The esoteric ideal of a new 
mode of knowledge that would link science, religion, mysticism an_d morality into one was similar 
to the 'seamless web' associated ti'Jith African traditional culture. This seemed related to the 
relationship between the themes of 'shaman' and 'magus' in world religion noted by Steyn (1994: 
67-68), which wiU be dealt with later in the report (5.3.3). 
4.1.1 LAND AND NATURE 
Sacredness in African religion was in some authors associated with the phenomenon of land, 
especially the land of Africa. Barashango ( 1991 : 167) regarded the land or earth as a mystical 
source of knowledge and consciousness, while other authors on a lesser scale simply insisted on 
the importance of land for the traditional agriculture-practising African (Maquet 19 72: 17, 22ff ; 
Senghor 1964: 274). The attachment to one's land could take the form of an unconditional 
preference for residence on one's native soil (Some 1994: 29) or simply a recognition of the 
importance of sacred places in general and the sacredness of Africa in particular (3.1 ). Certain 
post-traditional perspectives referred net only to reverence for land, but also reverence for nature 
as such, and confessed support for ecological ideals (Kamalu 1990 138; Mutwa s.a.: 141). 
Neimark (1993: 36-37) argued that even animal sacrifice had to be carried out in an 
environmentally friendly fashion, with an attitude of appreciation towards the animal for providing 
itself for the ritual, and so forth. Although basically in sympathy with the ecological ideal, Neimark 
( 1993: 18) argued that ecological objections to sacrifice were based on an unwillingness to face 
145 
the reality of dea1h, and regarded butchery as far more of an injury to animals than the practice of 
sacrifice. 
LAND AND THE CONTEXT 
Land, and other contextual features such as society and tradition, tended to be interwoven with 
thought in Africa, and by reason of this relationship a pragmatic attitude to moral issues, such as 
that of Neimark, could become a sort of deontolo gy-equivalent, like conventional Christian 
observance of the commandments, by reason of the constancy of the contextual fea1ures 
appealed to. and the unv.rillingness of the Africanised cutture concerned to give them up. 
Ecological values could be deemed 'relative' to the situation of being in contact with nature: but It 
seemed likely that an attachment to !and and nature, which Africanised persons might be 
unwilling to give up in the face of urbanisation, could lead these relativities to take on the 
character of quasi-absolutes. Human values might be relative to a social structure: but they could 
take on a rigid and uncompromising character if the social structure ~'llas conserved and 
perpetuated. Thus what will be said later about a pragmatic attitude to morafity (4.2.4) observed 
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in various post-colonial thinkers studied in the course of the present research, does not rule out 
the presence of rigid and even dictatorial rules articulated in the context of these 'pragmatic' 
systems. In Nkrumah's 'pragmatism' a rule, being pragmatically formulated, needed in the eyes of 
its formulator no defence in terms of an absolute system, yet could become oppressive if its 
contextual ground (e.g. the instability of poUtical conditions in Atica, requiring the detention of 
suspicious people without trial) achieved a semi-permanent state (cf. 4.2.4). 
THE ABSOLUTISATION OF THE RELATIVE IN ETHICS 
The problem of the 'absolutisation of the relative', already remarked on as a problem in pos1-
tradi1ional Africanised immanentist theism (2.2.4), seemed to surface in some fonn, in the 
integration of pragmatic attitudes in the data with the desire to conserve tradition. This was to 
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some extent only to be expected, since religion and morality were often related in the post-
traditional Africanised thought explored in the present research, and problems in the former area 
could have repercussions, in the form of problems in the latter area. Thus 'absolutisation of the 
relative' was not a purely philosophical problem but could have practical implications in the 
sphere of ethical rigidity based on uncertain foundations. 
4.1.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIETY 
In addition to natural space, there were also signs in the data of the recognition of social space as 
sacred for Africans. More specifically, stress was laid on the themes of the priority of the 
community over the individual (Shutte 1993: 75; Oguah 1934: 220; Uka 1991d: 190; Maybee 
1999: 168) and corporate responsibility (Kamalu 1990: 13 7). This social emphasis nevertheless 
was not universal: the presence of individualistic ethical ideals in the cult of Ogun has already 
been remarked on (2.5.2), and two authors, both of them mysticaUy incfined and interested in 
meditation, argued for a post-traditional individuaUstic ethic, Barashango (1991: 7) speaking of 
the need modern African youth had for individual satisfaction with self as a key to behaving weU, 
and Some {1994: 287) stressing the need to gain religious ans~'llers from within the self, not from 
others. Senghor (1964: 275), in contrast to both one-sided communitarianism and individuatism, 
attempted a balanced personalism that emphasised the importance of the community but did not 
deny the value of the individual. Kruger (1995: 34, 35, 193), although not accepting the traditional 
Western idea of the metaphysical self, also endeavoured to balance emphases on individuals and 
on society. 
There seemed to be a tendency, in thought about Africa - more noticeable in sources relying on 
indigenous sub-Saharan African thought than in A.fro-Caribbean or Egyptological perspectives - to 
stress the community over the individual, particularly in an ethical context (cf. Uka 1991d: 181, 
191-192). This was generally deemed necessary as a corrective to Western selfishness and 
potitical indifference. Authors like Senghor who stressed the contrary need to avoid devaluing the 
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individual, tlllhile not absent, tended to be less easy to notice on the actual continent of Africa. 
Among Afro-American Egyptologists and Afro-Caribbean authors, though, the individuafism of the 
\l\/estern Hemisphere seemed to be taken for granted. 
This distribution of communalism versus individualism in values seemed to be linked with 
proximity to \/1/estern culture. The individualistic authors in the data tended to be those who had 
enjoyed some prolonged exposure to vVestern culture. as in the case of Some (1994: 1, 7ff, 40) 
and the Afro-American melanin scholars, and the Francophile Senghor. Those ll'Jho favoured 
communalism, however, seemed to possess sympathy with African culture in a form that t.'\las 
more untouched by VVestern influence. It would have been simplistic to equate white values with 
individualism or black values ~·Jith communalism (cf. the philosophy of Ogun in 2.5.2). 
Nevertheless, interest in individualism in the post-traditional authors of this study appeared to 
derive in many cases from a positive relationship to Vl/estern culture. Thus, the balancing of 
individuafism versus communalism in ethics could not be vie~111ed in isolation from the attempt to 
find a fruitful accommodation between African and \l\/estern values in contemporary society, a 
problem which was touched on earlier (3.5.4). 
4.1.3 THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE 
Many authors referred to the value of the family as an important concern for traditional Africa. The 
sacredness of the family was indicated by two principal themes: firstly, the recurrent theme of 
concern with the ancestors (Griaule 1965: 27, 60, 123; Barashango 1991: 206), and secondly, the 
theme of ethical ideas connected with sexuality and fecundity. The implications of a fertility-
oriented ethic, and the hostility to both celibacy and homosexuality implied in such a stance both 
in traditional thought and in modern thought, have already been remarked on (2 .5 .2). Uka ( 1991 a: 
4 7) and Mutwa (s.a.: 507) linked the themes of ancestors and fertility, the former claiming that 
marriage was a requirement for ancestral status, the latter claiming that the duty to marry was 
one of the High Laws of the Bantu handed down by ancient Zulu tradition. 
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Mutwa (s.a.: 251) and Osabutey-Aguedze (1990: 169-173) dealt with the question of traditional 
African polygamy, and they both defended the practice against Western Christianity. Osabutey-
Aguedze based the custom on the woman's need for protection and argued for its superiority to 
the pseudo-monogamy of the \/Vest, tAJith its frequently broken marriage vows. He also appealed 
to the Mormon practice of polygamy. 
One gained the impression that one was here dealing with 'cultural reason' rather than 'critical 
reason' and that perhaps Osabutey-Aguedze tNould not have bothered to defend polygamy to the 
modern ~'llortd if it was not a basic part of African culture to begin with. That he was defending 
polygamy for Africa's sake seemed a plausible idea; that he V<Jas defending it for its own sake 
seemed less certain. Osabutey-Aguedze was not unfamiliar with critical reason, but in him, as in 
certain other Afrocentric authors, much of the critical dynamic was directed outwards, towards the 
\/Vest, rather than tot.'IJards indigenous African tradition itseif and its various practices (cf. 3.5.1 ). 
4.1.4 LAW, ORDER AND GOVERNMENT 
Ideas on the sort of government which tr~ould best preserve the traditional values of Africa -
totr..ards which, as has been indicated in the last paragraph, the attitude of authors was not 
ai'llays consistently critical-varied from author to author. Barashango (1991: 125) and Osabutey-
.Aguedze (1990: 144) both seemed to be arguing that Africa was the primary source of Western 
civilised and legal government as such, \l\lestern values and even the Ten Commandments being 
borrowed from this. Yet there was no one 'true' system of African government ascertainable in the 
sources studied, but rather a wide variety of viewpoints. 
DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTIONS 
Some authors argued for something approaching Vl/estem democracy, popular sovereignty and 
absence of dictatorial rule, as best representing the ideal and traditionally sanctioned government 
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for Africa. Oguah (1984: 223, 225) argued that the traditional government of the Fanti embodied 
what he called 'libertarian basicallsm', and Diop ( 1990: 162-163) argued that the government of 
the ancient Nubians, unlike some systems in the Nordic \/\/est, was not an aggressive-militaristic 
one delighting in ll'Jars of conquest. 
Aithough Gyekye ( 1987: 129ff) argued that the ethics of the Akan were secular rather than 
theistic, other authors grounded democracy in theism. Senghor (1964: 270-271) described 
traditional government as a 'democratic theocracy' under benign rule by chiefs. Legesse (1994: 
331, 333ff etc.) applied to Rastafarianism the concept of 'democharisma', whereby experience of 
the God within gave every ordinary believer the charism belonging by right to the ruler of his/her 
peopie. This betief that could be expressed in the dictum that "Ras Tafari is in every black man 
and all he has to do is recognise it.• 
Admittedly, both of these examples showed some Christian influence. Other non-Christianised 
material relating to consciencism expressed a preference to keep God in the background of 
pofitical life rather than applying his absolute lavJS rigidly to concrete situations (Kamalu 1990: 
141, 142; Assimeng 1989: 228-230). 
MONARCHICAL AND DICTATORIAL CONCEPTIONS 
Mention has already been made of the way in which the Afrocentrism of Nkrumah conflicted with 
democracy in the sense of equal rights for everyone in the community (3.5.3). Also opposed to 
the democratic trend was the view of fv1utwa (s.a.: 257) which viewed Western democracy as 
unsuitable for Africa and preferred the custom of government by chieftains in the traditional Zulu 
fashion. Many other authors llkewise expressed an admiration for African monarchy, but in many 
cases the ideals of monarchy or unitary leadership and democracy were combined, the example 
of Rastafarianism being a case in point (4.1.4). Casual consideration led to the hypothesis that 
this preference for simultaneous monarchy and democracy was not unrelated to the Zambian and 
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Zimbabwean idea of a one-party state aUegedly' espousing democracy or humanism (cf. Wright 
1971: 21) - a combination of uncertain workabifity in practice. A.It hough the Rastafarian example 
suggested that acknowledgement of a unitary ruler did not have to be oppressive or dictatorial. 
the difficulty inherent in reconciHng unitary rulership and democracy in post-colonial African 
government was not explored in detail by any of the explicitly post-traditional sources studied. 
4.2 ETHICAL IDEAS 
The discussions of African values among the authors explored in the present study occasionally 
went beyond the realms of political preference and of general principles such as those discussed 
in 4.1. The study found indications of explicit ethical systems claiming to summarise the values of 
the African tradition: and these had an arguable significance, since they seemed to embody the 
most lasting and survivable contributions of indigenous or ancient African tradition to the 
contemporary context. There were three broad varieties of ethical system handed down in the 
data: Traditional African, Afro-Caribbean and Egyptological. 
4.2.1 TRADITIONAL AFRICAN ETHICAL SYSTEMS 
African ethical systems in the data tended to be based on traditions indigenous to the continent. 
Often they 1111ere expressed in terms of values rather than rules, as in the system of Uka (1991d: 
181, 184ff, 188f, 192). Uka stated that every society required rules concerning sexuality, violence, 
property and respect for human life, sanctioned by appropriate authority in the society. He 
characterised African ethics as 'prescriptive, societary, teleological, communitarian and legalistic'. 
He mentioned the idea of ,aboo' as an important expression of African ethics. Mutlt'Ja (1960: 
507ff) mentioned some important High Laws of the Bantu such as the obligation to marry, the 
prohibition of violence against father and mother, and the prohibition of false slurs on a young 
woman's virginity; the motifs of kinship and fifial piety seemed to play an important role in Mutwa's 
system. Other references to a family-oriented way of Hfe favoured by African tradition, and its 
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associated ideal of fecundity (cf. 2.5.2), could be found in Osabutey-Aguedze (1990: 155ff, 169ff, 
etc.) and other authors. 
As so described by these authors, the African way of iife seemed to be based more on 
deontology than on a contextually adapted system of ethics. This was a curious fact given that 
other authors attributed pragmatism to the typical African moral attitude (4.2.4). But as has been 
argued earlier, a rigid law could sometimes arise when the situation to tl11hich it was adapted ~·Jas 
perpetuated as part of the whole which was tradition (cf. 4.1.1 ). 
4.2.2 AFRO-CARIBBEAN ETHICAL SYSTEMS 
THE COl'vMANDMENTS OF VOODOO 
T~'\JO of the authors (Gonzalez-\fVippler 1973: 25; Hood 1990: 53-54) ieferred to the 
'commandments of Voodoo', an Afro-Caribbean system constructed along the lines of the 
V\/estern Ten Commandments. It could be outlined more or less as follows: 
1 . Do not steal. 
2. Do not kiB, except for food or self-defence. 
3. Do not practise cannibalism. 
4. Do not covet. 
5. Do not curse. 
6. Honour your father and mother. 
1. Accept your destiny. 
8. Do not commit suicide or fear death. 
9. Teach your children the commandments. 
10. Obey the laws of God. 
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Gonzalez-Wippler added an eleventh commandment: Be at peace. 
Th'E MOSAIC AND VOODOO SYSTEMS COMPARED 
Comparison li'Jith the \Ne stern Ten Commandments (Exodus 2 0: 1-17) revealed that the 
commandment to worship no God but the lord was missing, and there was no prohibition of 
graven images or Sabbath-breaking. Like1111ise the commandment to refrain from adultery ~<Jas 
missing, and the commandment not to covet one's neighbour's wife - which in a Cathonc 
environment, such as formed pan of the background to Voodoo {cf. Metraux 1959: 323) would 
ha~ been taught as a separate commandment from the commandment not to covet one's 
neighbour's goods (cf. Mambo Press 1994: 573-576, 577-580). The prohibition of false 1,'litness 
was also missing. On the other hand, there were, among the Voodoo commandments, the new 
features of a prohibition of cannibalism, and of injunctions to accept destiny, to be tl'Jithout fear of 
death, to teach one's children to behave !Nell, and to obey the laws of God. 
POSSh~LE EXPLANATIONS FOR DlFFERENCES 
Many tentative possibilities could be suggested to account for the similarities and differences in 
the Western and African sys1ems mentioned above. The Voodoo value-system apparently shared 
with the West a concern for filial piety - even more so than the vVest, judging by the 
commandment on the upbringing of children - and likewise abhorred violence, envy and 
disrespect for property. The rules on violence hov~ever needed clarification and an important 
loophole in Commandment 2 1111as plugged by Commandment 3. {One could not justify the killing 
of a human on nutritional grounds!) The practice of polytheism and voodoo ritual seemed to have 
led to the substitution in Commandment 10 of general respect for the Supreme Being - implying, 
in the context of African tradition, observance of ceremonial taboos - for the restrictions on orisha-
worship and non-Chris1ian ri1ual impHed by the tvtosaic system. The rejec1ion of Wes1em sexual 
ethics may have been related to polygamy, which in Catholicism J/.IOUld have been understood as 
153 
forbidden by the Sixth Commandment (cf. Mambo Press 1994: 539ff, 550). The Yoruba beliefs on 
destiny or fate (especially in the context of !fa) required an important series of commandments 
not emphasised by the lv1osaic Decalogue (cf. Abimbola 1994: 111}. And finally, the prohibition of 
false witness, as understood in Catholicism (Mambo Press 1994: 564.ff), might have posed 
problems for a person 111Jho pretended outi.'\Jardly to be a good practising Catholic, 1."Jhile resorting 
to Voodoo ceremonies in secret (cf. Jahn 1961: 55; Metraux 1959: 345ff). 
NEltvtA.RK'S ETHICAL SYSTEiv1 
Neimark ( 1993: 7, 16. 18, 117) took a less rule-oriented approach to the issue of Yoruba ethics: 
while accepting the need to observe some taboos, he offered pragmatic justifications for 
prohibitions of theft, adultery and harm to the environment, and professed a disbelief in absolute 
moral truth, in as much as the Universe itself 1rJas morally neutral. The basic values of the 
Yoruba-related Voodoo system were reiterated by Neimark ( 1993: 7) in the form of the Sixteen 
Principles of !fa. These outlined an entire t/\lorldview, not just a moral system, although they 
included moral ideas, and could be summarised as follows: 
1. There is a single God. 
2. There is no devil. 
3. Except for your dates of birth and death, there is no event in your life that cannot be foretold 
and, if necessary, changed. 
4. It is your birthright to be happy, successful and fulfille1. 
5. You should grow and obtain wisdom. 
6. You are reincarnated in your blood-relatives. 
1. Heaven is Home and Earth the Market-Place, and we are in constant passage between the 
bt.10. 
8. You are K1erally part of1he universe. 
9. You must never initiate harm to another human being. 
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10. You must never harm the Universe. 
11. Your temporal and spiritual capacities must work together. 
12. You are born with a specific destiny, to be traveUed of your own free will. 
13. Our ancestors exist and must be honoured. 
14. Sacrifice guarantees success. 
15. The orisa live within us. 
16. You need have no fear. 
Significant resemblances to the Voodoo code and to traditional.African ethics existed in the 
references to destiny, fearlessness, the orisha and the ancestors. Certain of the principles such 
as Nos. 5, 8, 10, however, seemed to argue a New Age influence (cf. Steyn 1994: 209ff, 213, 229 
278ff}. As has been said, moral principles omitted from the sixteen truths of lfa tended to be 
justified in pragmatic terms by Neimarl<. 
In fact the coexistence of absolute rules with pragmatism was arguably not really absent from the 
Hsts of Voodoo commandments in Hood and Gonzalez-\1\/ippler, since the list of rules, though 
offered as commandments, bore signs of having resulted from a pragmatic adaptation of the 
Western commandments to an Afro-Caribbean context. 
4.2.3 EGYPTOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
The Egyptological systems of ethics found in the data tended to be related to the Ten Virtues of 
James (1954: 30) which were claimed to be the original virtues underlying Western philosophical 
systems. They were, respectively: under the heading of Justice, control of thought and control of 
action; under the heading of Fortitude, steadfastness; under the heading of Temperance, 
identity with the spiritual life; under the heading of Prudence, having a mission in life and having 
a call to the priesthood, under the heading of Courage, freedom from resentment under 
persecution; under the heading of Fidelity, confidence in the teacher, and in one's own ability to 
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learn; and finally, in a class by itself, the virtue of Preparedness for Initiation. Perhaps the most 
significant characteristic of this system was its utter lack of apparent relationship with any of the 
Africanised systems hitherto discussed, apart from an affinity to the concept of 'destiny' under the 
heading of Prudence: it had a concern with intellect, mysticism, priesthood and asceticism that 
was utterly absent from the previous systems. Nevertheless this did not prevent certain authors 
from treating Egyptian inteUectually-oriented ethics and traditional African communitarian ethics 
as complementary (Kamalu 1990: 136ff, 142ff, Maybee 1999: 151, 155ff. 158, 164, 168).After an, 
inte!!ectuaVmystical concern on the one hand, and respect for fami~J and community on the other, 
were not necessarily logically opposed to one another. 
Hw,ever, a noteworthy feature of this 'Egyptian' component of Africanised ethics was the fact that 
pragmatic considerations did not come into it as an essential constituent part of the system. The 
ideals were simply proposed as virtues to be followed, and that appeared to be that. This was a 
major difference from the standpoints typical of the less Egyptological Africanised Sy-stems 
mentioned above. (Kamalu lt'Jas an exception here, since he attempted to embrace both 
pragmatism and the Egyptological virtues. Nevertheless, Egypto!ogical ideas did not occupy 
centre stage in his discussion of Nkrumah's political policies, judging from the quotes given belo1111 
in 4.2.4.) 
4.2.4 ABSOLUTE LAW OR PRAGMATISM? 
It has been mentioned repeatedly in the previous paragraphs that pragmatism formed a 
significant part of the post-traditional~.Y proposed ethical systems in this study; certain ~·Jorldviews 
explored in this study, especially Afro-Caribbean ones, manifested a concern for reconciling 
absolute rules of morality with pragmatic adaptation, in such a way that definite systems of 
conduct were drawn up, but concern with efficacy of practice, especially in the realms of religion 
(cf. De Rosny 1985: 194ff) and pofltics (Kamalu 1990: 132) led to the structuring of choices in 
terms of what appeared to work rather than 1tJhat was right. 
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IDEALS VS. HISTORY 
Kamalu foHo~\led Nkrumah's distinction between rules and principles - an approach which had the 
problematic quality of emptying the 'principles' of much practical significance. Kamalu {1990: 141) 
said: 
"Ideally we t"'loufd be happy to follow all righteous ethical rules if these were foflot"'led 
universally: for we sense tNithin ourselves that the spirit of these rules is correct. 
However, t.\lhen these rules are not obeyed universally, t.'\le continue to abide by them .. in 
some cases, at our ovm peril. History shows this and it is because of this that we must go 
along with Nkrumah in founding our ethics, not on ideaust conceptions of the goodness of 
human beings, but on our observance of the nature of human beings. Let us take, for 
example, the commandment ihou shalt not kiU' ... fn the present reality it is not foHotNed by 
all and it has become a law which forbids the victim of aggression the right of self-
defence; for effective self-defence often involves armed struggle: 
~ 
\Nhen one bore in mind that the violent struggle Kamalu defended here helped establish a 
dictatorial regime that set aside the democratic rights of some of its citizens (cf. Assimeng 1989: 
228-230), a certain problem area seemed to suggest itself. Certainly, some absolute ideals had to 
sometimes be modified in the face of historical obstacles. But there was all the difference in the 
world between the attitude of supporting maximal objective rights and duties, defending absolute 
vc;:lues, not necessarily to the point of impossibility, but at least to the point of maximum possibiHty 
(as in the criteria laid down by the Christian Just war' ethic), and between appealing to situational 
difficulties as an excuse for abandoning the ideals of objective law and letting histoiy rage out of 
control (as in the concept of 'martial law' which simply suspends human righ1s until the war is 
over). The former alternative adapted values to situations while trying simultaneously to 
maximally avoid their compromise, while the latter alternative suspended the values totally while 
a problematic situation lasted. The viewpoint of Kamalu (1990: 142) seemed to gravitate towards 
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the latter alternative in the realm of political non-violence. Discussing the reasons 1.'\Jhy a theist 
might reject a non-violent ideal in practice. he said: 
'He or she may conceive that although God exists as the ground of our reaUty, God does 
not exist as a human being and therefore cannot be associated with such human acts as 
listening, speaking etc. or. in this case, judging, unless this is through human beings 
themselves. Thus the oppressed, by retaHating in self-defence, have not made the final 
judgement. For in this sense, God and histor1 may be seen as one in determining the 
final outcome.• 
In other words, when situational considerations (e.g. the need for self-defence) prevent the 
observance of an ideal perfectly, we suspend the ideal, do what seems fit at the time, and let 
history show 1Nho was in the right. Understood in the light of the earlier citation concerning the 
commandment "Thou shalt not kiH", Kamalu's l/'.Jords seemed to require not merely a mitigation of 
the ideal of non-violence, but rather the suspension of the ideal itself as something useless, in 
situations where self-defence was needed. Therefore, Kamalu's vietNS seemed to imply, if 
Nkrumah or any other African dictator tNas faced with a situation of emergency where perfect 
non-violence was unobservable, this was no time to worry about better or vJorse exceptions to the 
rule. Rather, it 1."Jas time to take action in virtual independence of the rule itself. A subsequen1 
victory by violence would historically or situationally justify whatever means was chosen to 
resolve the state of emergency, even if there 1Nas no attempt to reduce compromises tf'Jith 
democracy. This interpretation of what Kamalu's vie~·.is implied was in ltne with Nkrumah's own 
impatience with "conventional niceties" such as the issue of the democratic rights of political 
detainees during the times his government seemed to be under threat (Assimeng 1989: 229). 
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CONSTANCY VS. ADAPTABILITY 
Among the Class C authors of the study (1.6), there t111as no detailed attempt. along the lines of 
Jel/\Jish, Christian (Jesuit) or Islamic casuistry, to lay down any firm moral norms for responding to 
conditions, in such a way as to minimise the compromising of principles: although, with regard to 
his own conditionalist sy--stem of ethics, Kruger (1995: 119, 299-300) made some attempts in this 
direction by specifying qualities of the context that might call specifically for this or that change of 
emphasis, by distinguishing force and authority, and so forth, and othen,..Jise preventing situational 
considerations from turning ethical decision-making into a total free-for-au. 
lt appeared that the goals of situational adaptability and constancy ll'Jere both pursued by authors 
in the realm of post-traditional Africanised ethics. But at ihe present stage of deveiopment there 
were not yet, as far as could be gathered from the sources explored in the present study, any 
fully-formed attempts to specify in detail the way in which pragmatism should or should not be 
articulated. in such a t•Jay, for example, as to rule out the disappearance of human rights during 
periods of political instability in post-colonial Africa. While only two of the post-colonial thinkers in 
this study - Nkrumah and Kaunda - both openly proclaimed dictatorial poficies and attempted to 
address religious issues simultaneously (many other African pofiticians with similar policies were 
not included in the study otNing to the non-religious nature of their work) - there t111as a noticeable 
silence or absence of detail in the data concerning the correct response to such dictatorial 
tendencies in Africanised thought and politics, a silence tAJhich has been remarked on several 
times in the course of this report. 
4.3 EXPRESSIONS OF AFRICAN LIFE 
The previous paragraphs dealt tNith the precarious African cultural heritage in so far as it vilas to 
be found in laws and abiding attitudes to 5fe. But there were also references in the data to cultural 
features which were less constant, which allov-.red more room for personally inspired variation, 
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and tNhich were threatened in many ways by the intrusion of the VI/est. These included pre-
technological adjustment to life, the traditional orally transmitted African knowledge-base, the 
indigenous art of Africa and the rituals of Africa. It was already mentioned in the first paragraph of 
this chapter that in post-traditional thought these features were starting to siip away into history, 
and become more a memory than a living reality. 
4.3.1 THE EMOTIONAL LIFE CF RELIGIOUS AFRICANS 
Since colonial times (Bailey 1964: 107) it had been noticed that. traditional African culture laid 
emphasis on the emotional side of life, without a Western-llke tendency to let the rational 
approach to life t1'1holly suppress emotion. There were some references to this side of African 
thought in the data, including Senghor's opinion that emotion was black, in the same way as 
reason was Hellenic (Senghor 1964: 24). References to emotional life in the data de aft with both 
positive or constructive emotion, and negative or destructive emotion. 
CONSTRUCTIVE EMOTION 
The racial theories of Leonard Jeffries (3.5.3) tended to imply that African culture had a monopoly 
on constructive emotion: but references to love were few in the data and tended to be racially 
polarised. Some (1994: 2) criticised the Western God as a God of wrath, and Barashango (1991: 
159) criticised white civilisation as a civilisation of hate. But apart from this, there was no attempt 
to reflect in detail on the nature of 'love'. Ideas of constructive emotion were more likely to be 
expressed not so much in terms of 1ove' as in terms of 'peace', or the absence of fear: the 
Voodoo commandments iDustrated this general attitude (4.2.2), and references to the 'reiaxed' 
and non-frenetic Ufe of the African, lived at nature's pace, could be found in the data (cf. Mutwa 
s.a.: 32). Kamalu (1990: 117) said that "Life should be lived at nature's pace: it should not be a 
race to out run [sic] time itself." Some (1994: 256) spoke of the value of ~he power of quiet' 
tapped in silent meditation: 
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"The po~'iler of quiet is great. it generates the same feenngs in everything it encounters. It 
vibrates 1nith the cosmic r~hm of oneness. It is evel")lll'Jhere, available to anyone at any 
time, the force within that makes us stable, trusting and loving. It is contemplation 
contemplating us. Peace is letting go, returning to the silence because it is too pure to be 
contained in words. This is why the tree, the stone, the river and the mountain are quiet." 
Mystical union or adjustment with nature seemed to He behind most ideas of constructive emotion 
in the data. Nevertheless, especially when investigating sources relating to the Voodoo 
worldview, it was difficult to avoid the impression that the Afric<lnised 'peace', presupposed in 
certain sources, was an uneasy truce arranged vmh the violent and hostile forces of the universe. 
For Kamalu (1990: 15), the apparent harmony of nature was a resultant of mutually opposing 
forces that waged a bitter conflict behind an appearance of placidity (cf. Kamalu 1990: 15). The 
uneasiness of such an Africanised idea of peace adrnittedflf was open to a more positive 
evaluation, i.e. as an element of non-utopian realism in one's adjustment to a vrorld in conflict (cf. 
Neimark 1993: 36-38). 
DESTRUCTIVE ElvlOTIONAND ITS lv\ANAGEMENT 
VIOLENCE IN AFRICAN REL/GI OUS LIFE 
When it came to the themes of violence and martially oriented virtue, the data was more expUcit. 
Bailey (1964: 113) blamed the whites for inciting to violence, by their oppression, the naturally 
peace-loving African. But other indications in the data revealed this to be an oversimplification. 
What Uka (1991d: 181) pointed out, that every society had to have some means of deaftng with 
violent behaviour, indicated that no society could ever be naturally immune to the problems of 
violence. Indications of martial values and an traditional ethic of violence and vo1arfare were not 
lacking in the data (Mrtwa s.a.: 185; cf. 2.5.2). In a modem context these values were not 
necessarily abandoned entirely in the name of civilisation, but rather continued in the form of a 
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support (albeit qualified by teleological considerations) for post-colonial revolutionary violence, 
linked in the philosophy of consciencism to an awareness of conflict as a basic reality in nature 
(cf. Kamalu 1990: 15. 141-142). Violence also entered African worldviews in the form of unseen 
po1rJers dangerous to humankind. De Rosny (1985: 224.ff, 248-249) related his own experience of 
initiation by an African claimant of ndimsi or paranormal consciousness, and stated that the 
principal effect of the ceremony was to open one's eyes to the hidden violence and conflict that 
raged on in nature, unknottJn to most humans . 
. MANAGE.!V.1ENT OF VIOLENCE 
The African universe. as perceived in tradition and assimilated in post-traditional thought, 
appeared, from the indications of the data, to be not so much a universe of peace as a universe 
of violence. opposition and conflict. But there 1111as a positive feature to this: in a universe where 
violence was a present reality, violence had to be managed or dealt with. Thus there i/\Jere some 
attempts in the data to find ways to face violence. Chief among these were the cultivation of the 
virtue of fortitude (4.2.3 etc.) and the refusal to harbour fear. Post-traditional African religion, as 
manifested in Neimark and other \/\/est-African-related authors of the study, sought a religion 
without the \/Vestern sense of fear - not because danger and violence in the universe li'Jas denied 
(cf. Nelmark 1993: 80), but because religious resources such as beffef in personal immortality 
(Mutli'Ja s.a.: 185), initiation (De Rosny 1985: 248-249) and the experience of ritual sacrifice 
(Neimark 1993: 36-38) offered ways to concretely deal with these problems. 
4.3.2 THE KNOWLEDGE-BASE OF INDIGENOUS CULTURE 
In a more peaceful fashion, the oral tradition of Africa offered a response to the tensions of life in 
the form of proverbs, myths, and traditional wisdom. While the analphabetic knowledge-base of 
sub-Saharan African culture made it more difficult to· access the resources of this culture than if it 
were written down (cf. B'Nasseem 1992: 29-30) it was emphasised by many authors that the 
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um.'llritten nature of the tradition 11\Jas a positive quanty: various authors indicated that it was a less 
exploitative form of cultural transmission than writing (Jahn 1961: 186), that it. bore witness to a 
mystical state of consciousness that transcended the letter (Frye 1988: 39) and that it embodied 
wisdom (Gyekye 1987:11, 13f0 and even revelation {Uka 1991b: 156f0 albeit more of a 
traditional/experiential/cultural than a scriptural nature. 
THE \IVISDOMAND PHILOSOPHY OF AFRICA 
It !Nas frequently repeated that non-literacy was not a barrier to philo'sophy, cultural richness or 
rationality. African proverbs were treated as vehicles of wisdom by some sources, especially in 
the context of !fa divination (cf. Neimark 1993: 16 etc.). and lv1utt11Ja's vast repertoire of what he 
claimed to be the orally-transmitted traditional history of his people, transcribed in his books, was, 
according to him, of guaranteed authentici~J because ancestral reverence prevented Zulus from 
l)~ng about their history (Mutr;~a s.a.: 111). Odera-Oruka (1991) sought for evidence of 
philosophical sagacity among the representatives of oral 111Jisdom in Africa, and Gyekye (1-987) 
devoted a book to proving that non-literacy did not prevent the Akan people from having their own 
philosophy of life - although this required a broad understanding of 'philosophy', analogouf to 
James' understanding of philosophy as 'accepted belier or 'belief ttJorthy of acceptance' (James 
1954: 158). For those who, against the standpoint of Osabutey-Aguedze (1990: 80), might require 
some evidence of civilisation and literacy as proof of philosophical achievement, it was always 
possible to appeal to the ancestral 1Nisdom of the Africans of Ancient Egypt, foilo111Jing Barashango 
(1991: 206). 
MYTHOLOGY 
The role of myths in Africanised cosmology related to the Dogon worldview and similar beliefs 
has already been commented on. It was frequently pointed out by the sources that myihs were 
not simply a form of mistaken belief about the origin of the world, but were vehicles of symbolic 
163 
truth (cf. Osabu1ey-Aguedze 1990: 8, 10, 11, 12} or else of philosophy (lvloore 1986: 238; James 
1954: 75). Not all authors agreed in equating myth with philosophy (Odera-Oruka 1990: 2; Jahn 
1961: 110), however much the t\NO might be related in African thought. Barashango (1991: 18-19) 
distinguished betv.ieen aesthetic myths (animal stories), heroic myths, and explanatory myths 
embodying cosmological truth. Kamalu ( 1990: 49) quoted a very moving passage by V\/ade 
Nobles which viet·red myth as a vehicle of truth transcending the medium of the letter and even 
seruing to provide guidance for effecting a fink between the seen and unseen world: 
"The importance of mythology is of course that tt is a · form of documentation which 
transcends the human record in as much as it states truth rather than fact. lv1'yth can be 
considered as a form of reason and record keeping which goes beyond reason and 
record keeping by providing an impltcit guide for bringing about the fulfilment of the truth It 
proclaims. !vfyth connects the invisible order with the visible order. lvtyth is therefore the 
form in which the experience of a people has become conscious and as such should be 
viewed as a carefully constructed symbok cloak for their abstract thought: 
Nobles' explanation of the cognitive import of mythology as a guide to realising in realtty wtra1 was 
mythically related blended into an understanding of myths as tools of po\l'Jer, a theme which will 
be touched on in Chapter 5. 
THE DEFENCE OF ANALPHABETISM 
THE PROBLEM OF 8AT!ONALJSATION 
The traditional knowledge base, despite the claims of philosophical potential that 1.\lere made for 
i1, seemed to be based primarily on culural reason rather than on critical reason: eVfln though 
Odera-Oruka (1991: 119, 126, 128) tried to look for cri1icalAfrican viewpoints, most Africanised 
and Afrocentric approaches in the data refused to confront their tradition in a sceptical or critical 
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fashion. In the case of African non-literacy, as in the case of polygamy, it was not easy to teH 
whether any innovative post-traditional thinker would be defending analphabetism, if it were not 
already a part of African culture, something L•Jhich could not be subtracted without disfiguring the 
whole, and yet a source of an embarrassment if unrationalised before the contemporary world. 
Hoti\J much of the insights in the data about the advantages of analphabetism were reasonings, 
and ho1tJ much were rationafisations? Was it a case of the tailless fox in Aesop's fable telllng the 
other foxes ho1n much better it was to be L•Jithout a tail? 
LOGOCEl\/Tl=?./C tv10T!VES FOR ANALPHABETIS.M 
The question of the motives for defending analphabetism ~..,hich it was difficult to settle purely on 
the evidence of the sources. To some extent views like that of Frye l!'Jere based on mystical 
perspectives, in the Gnostic or Hermetic tradition, that exatted the word above the letter, not 
because of an attempt to rationafise illiteracy, but because of a conviction that the letter someho1tJ 
killed the spirit, or diminished religious vitality through formalism. According to Goosen ( 1994: 83), 
tt~ho used a narrower definition of !ogocentrism than that given by Beard and Cerf in 3.5.1, 
logocentrism in any philosophy tended to exalt the flving 1111ord above the dead letter, this being its 
distinctive feature. Concern for the living word was certainly a predominant feature in many forms 
of post-traditional African religiosity (3.3, 5.4.3). Goosen explained the priorities of logocentrism 
generally in terms of an outlook that gave priority to the internal immediate aspects of reality 
rather than Ufeless external facts. If for 'internal' one substituted 'divinely immanent' or 
'participative' it seemed that this Western explanation of logocentrism could be applied also to the 
context of the kno~·Jledge-base of some key trends in post-traditional African !ogocentrism -
particularly those appealing to the Dogon heritage. 
Thus it was possible, on the basis of the evidence available, to argue that the analphabetic 
interest of post-traditional thinkers was not necessarily the rationalisation of a cultural feature that 
would otherwise be embarrassing: it could be regarded as manifesting an opposition to formafism 
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in religion and thought, in favour of the living and spoken word. It could even be argued that the 
integration of indigenously or traditionally inspired analphabetic conceptions of the African 
knoti'Jledge-base 1.•,ith the Hermetic/Gnostic preference for word over letter was an important 
creative step in the integration of African thought with traditions outside the continent. 
4.3.3 ARTISTIC ANO RITUAL SELF-EXPRESSION 
In addition to prosaic material such as myths and oral tradition, the data contained references to 
African ritual, music and art. Traditional and modern ideas on the significance of these 
phenomena tended to blend, and the transitory and inconstant character of these phenomena 
and their meaning ~'llas shown by some sources. Drewal (1992: S, 9) in particular gave some 
indications of the influence of modernity on Yoruba ritual - referring to such things as the degree 
of permission or restriction of the use of cars in traveliing to rituals, the use of modern offerings 
like Gordon's Gin and Beefeaters in the veneration of the ancestors, and the need foi Afiicans 
travelling abroad to invoke the spirit of the founder of London and so forth, as t•Jould have been 
done when visiting cities on the mainland of Africa. Mutwa's criticism of Christian rituai on account 
of its formaHsm (Mutwa s.a.: 250-251), echoed by Neimark's rejection of formalism in general 
( Neimark 1993: 13) suggested a viel/\IPoint that saw no value in the pure retention of external 
practices as such. As far as internal orientation is concerned, Mbiti (1975: 2-3 etc.) has provided 
evidence suggesting that traditional African ritual, though emphasising communal representation 
by authority-figures, includes some attempt by them to personally contact divine reality (cf. 5.3.3). 
RITUALS 
A significant portion of the authors in the data 11\Jho dealt with rituals did so in the context of 
traditional African religion and its description, and belonged in Class A or B of the classes of 
Hterature described in 1.6. Among the Class C authors detailed references to indigenous sub-
Saharan African ritual were more difficult to find: Osabutey-Aguedze (1990: 44ff, 78, 97, 197ff) 
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discussed African ritual in detail and even suggested that the Western sacraments t111ere au 
derived from Africa: he emphasised the role of ritual as a vehicle for meaningful symbolism. 
Kamalu (1990: 89, 90, 92. 95) likewise referred to ritual in terms of symbolism. this time the 
aesthetic symboUsm of the paradoxical union of noumenal and phenomenal, expressed in such 
things as the masks which represented ancestors in African ritual. Barashango (1991: 22-24) 
discussed rituals mainly in the context of the inculturation of Christian ritual (using a black Jesus 
instead of a ~'llhite Jesus, for example), but included a reference to the primarily symbolic 
significance of ritual, and the need not to be tied do!l'm by traditional symbolisms but rather to use 
symbols creatively. This t111as a further example of post-traditional treatment of rituals as 
logocentric forms of communication (by Goosen's definition in 4.3.2) rather than as things to be 
done or performed rather than understood or interpreted, this being a more traditional conception 
(De Rosny 1985: 197}. Such a lack of attachment to externais seemed to suggest a readiness to 
manipulate or change ancient rituals, perhaps beyond the recognition of less post-traditional 
Africans. 
fv\.6.G IC AND RITUAL 
The rituals which tended to be treated as living options for the Africanised person by the authors 
studied vo1ere those which had a magical aspect, such as possession rituals. initiation ceremonies, 
various rites connected with traditional medicine, and ceremonial chanting in the rites of Afro-
Caribbean and Yoruba-related religions in the \iVestern hemisphere. (By 'magic' here is meant 
anything reminiscent of occultism, or tending to grant the individual the use of power for his/her 
personal ends). Gonzalez \."Jippler ( 1973: 14 7-171) painstakingly recorded every last syllable of 
several Santeria chants and spells in her discussion of Santeria from a Western occult 
perspective. There were also some references to sub-Saharan African traditional medicine, 
ranging from Some's ( 1994: 7, 8-9 etc.) and Mutwa's ( 1960: 497) allusions of the power of such 
rites, to Chavunduka's (1994: 59, 76-80} detailed description of the types of rite used in 
Zimbabwean traditional medicine. 
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SA.CR IF ICE 
The ritual of sacrifice or animal slaughter played a significant part in the traditional religion of sub-
Saharan Africa, as certain authors indicated (Senghor 1964: 7:3 etc). Explicit post-traditional 
references to sacrifice tended to be concentrated in Afro-Caribbean and related movements: the 
Umbandista religion had discontinued the practice of sacrifice (Ortiz 1989: 94) but other 
movements with more reverence for the o!der traditions retained the practice. Neimark (1993: 16, 
32-39) gave a detailed defence of the permissibility and necessity of offering animal sacrifice, 
appealing to the sacrificial motifs of the Cross and so forth in non-African religion, defending the 
practice against ecological objections (4 .1.1), and pointing out that pragmatic considerations or 
personal need would lead many people to practice sacrifice in emergencies even if they 
professed not to believe in the practice. Gonzalez-Vl./ippler (1973: 51) and Neimark (1993: 2-3, 
37) related hOtN they personally came, in the course of ritual experience, to inwardly adjust and 
habituate themselves to the violent element of saciifice. It seemed that i.-'Jhere sacrificial ritual ltJas 
stiD practised, its significance !l'Jas not purely symbolic but, like De Rosny's initiation and other 
strategies of violence-management (4.3.1), the ritual of sacrifice ailoir,Jed one to face and deal 
trJith the concrete phenomena of violence and death, in addition to possessing significance as a 
form of communion tl1Jith nature (Senghor 1964: 73). 
EGYPTIAN RITUAL 
References to the Egyptian rituals tended to concentrate on magical or esoteric rites: the rite 
most frequently referred to was the Egyptian practice of initiation. Details of Egyptian ritual were 
not discussed comprehensively, but discussions of the laws of magic which might be thought to 
underHe them could be found in the data (James 1954: 103 etc.). The use of the Ptah-principle in 
meditation and creative thought was discussed in detail by Barashango ( 1991 : 166-181, 190), 
and the practice of praise as a form of positive thinking t .. vas mentioned an instance of application 
of the laws of visualisation, which were related the use of the Ptah principle. 
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MUSIC3 DANCE AND ART 
MUSIC AND DANCE 
Music and dance were mentioned by certain authors as a significant part of Africa's unique 
cultural contribution to the world (Senghor 1964: 36; Jahn 1961: 164-169). Trends in indigenous 
African tradition seemed to 'v'ie~·J music as an important part of life, as ll'JaS indicated by its role in 
the mythology of the Dogon of Mali (Griaule 1965: 66) and in the Zulu myth concerning the origin 
of the Marimba related by Mutwa (s.a.: 21ff). In less traditional refigions one could also point to 
the role of music in Rastafarian ceremonies (Hood 1990: 94) and even references to the 
important role of music in Egyptian education (James 1954: 133 etc.). The role of the drum as an 
instrument not only of communication (jahn 1961: 188, Kamalu 1990: 97-98) but even of magic 
was referred to more than once: Mutwa (s.a.: 30-31) called the drum a healing instrument while 
Some (1994: 229) said it could be used to facilitate shamanistic journeys in the spirit world. 
ART 
Treatment of the significance of African art (cf. 2.3.1) was also frequently magical or mystical in 
nature: Jahn (1961: 157-158, 176) referred to the magical or logocentric elements involved in the 
creation of an image for magical purposes, and Kruger (1995: 326ft) compared Bushman 
symbolic paintings with Eastern mandalas. The power inherent in the constructions of images 
(2.3.1) as t"Jell as their significance as recorders of history (cf. Mut11"\Ja s.a.: 113) and 
concretisations of the spiritual t'\Jorld (Kamalu 1990: 90, 92 cf. 4.3.2) was aHuded to. Senghor 
(1964: 279) stated that African art was productive, functional, united, for and by au, and social. A 
significant problem with African art, though, tl\laS the possibility of certain important forms thereof 
becoming obsolescent or the relic of a dead past, or at least losing its former character, under the 
impact of religious opposition to idolatry, and also of modernisation (cf. Jahn 1961: 176-177. 
177ff, 181ff; Kruger 1995: 330). 
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4.4 HUMAN ONENESS WITH LIFE 
The contribution of the tradition of sub-Saharan Africa to our modern 1rwrld could be found in the 
total impact of this tradition, as embodying an ideal of oneness with life or nature, which the West 
had lost. fvlbiti ( 1991 : 20-25) by identifying African refigion \llJith a wide variety of phenomena, and 
locating it in aft aspects of life, provides indications of this underlying oneness (cf. 4.1). This 
indeed seemed to be more likely to survive than the individual forms of tradition ritual and art. 
Certain references could be found to an ideal of harmony with nature associated 1t'Jith Africa, that 
went beyond even the contributions of known indigenous tradition: 0 sabutey-Aguedze ( 1990: 31-
32) argued that the Egyptians had the secret of longevity, and Mutti\la (s.a.: 7) referred to an ideal 
of natural harmony practiced by an ancient and extinct people who 1i"Jere the precursors of his 
(and our) own race. Al: any rate, a common factor of union of humanity with nature seemed to be 
alluded to by authors as the key to happiness and wen-being offered by the African tradition. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The heritage claimed by the post-traditional African tendencies of the present study, retained by 
thinkers on the inside in the form of memories and ideas, if not ak.'IJays on the outside in the form 
of surviving practices and culture, seemed to combine any and every strand of befief and practice 
that could be accepted as part of Africa. The authors of the study explored sub-Saharan 
traditions, Egyptian traditions, Afro-Caribbean traditions, and modern forms of thought based on 
Afrocentric consciousness in the modern context. 
Common or widely-instantiated factors in the immediate contextual conditions (in terms of the 
modified paradigm of 1.4.2) acting on various forms of post-traditional African religious life were 
an appreciation of the ideal of the integration of reHgion and Ufe (4.1), of oneness with nature 
(4.4), of the sacredness of land (4.1.1), of the need for moral ideals especially in the realm of 
family values (4 .1.3. 4 .2), of the desirability of peace and justice (cf. 4.2.3, 4.3.1 ), of the need to 
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positively value the non-literate tradition of Africa (4.3.2), and of the positive contribution to be 
expected from music and art 11\Jith an African background (4.3.3). Logocentrism, defined as a 
concern for the predominance of the living word over the dead letter, 1111as presupposed in many 
anti-formalist approaches to ritual and art (4.3.3). 
Realms of divergence and disagreement in the data could be indicated as follows: 
Firstly, there was some disagreement over the significance of mythology and ritual (4.3.2, 
4.3.3), which was linked to varying understandings of the role of symbolism in the African 
tradition. It was debated by some authors in what sense African myth could be understood or 
reinterpreted (if at aU) as a vehicle for philosophy - if indeed there was such a thing in African 
tradition at all (cf. 4.3.2), and the degree to which ritual was to be changed in the name of 
modernity was a complex question. 
Secondly, the construction of an African moral system had a different series of emphases 
according to whether an author chose a sub-Saharan African model, an Afro-Caribbean 
model or an Egyptological model for the construction of an African ethic (4.2.1-3). The theme 
of a 'system' sometimes existed in tension with a more pragmatic approach to moral 
guidefines (4.1.1, 4.2.4). This tendency was more noticeable in non-Egyptological sources, 
and gave rise to the possibiHty of an uneasy integration of rigid norms with insecure or non-
absolute moral foundations. In addition to the tension between absolute norms and relative 
situations, the theme of violence, tension and conflict as such, present in certain expressions 
of the African tradition, posed a challenge for those who perceived African tradition as 
essen1ially peace-loving ( 4 .3 .1). 
Thirdly, the problem of individualism versus sociatism came up 11\Jhenever African authors in 
the study tried to assimilate or reclaim in the name of Africa what they deemed to be good in 
the democracy of the West (4.1.2). 
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Fourthly, the areas of disagreement were strongest where sensitive poUtical issues were 
being dealt with in the data, in the interaction of African tradition with Western ideals. Such 
issues included how far to stress the racial and national attachment impffed in '.Afrocentrism' 
(4.1.1), whether to follow an African-centered or a racially neutral modei of government, and 
how to understand the role of a monarchic leader in governing African society according to 
traditional guidelines or ideals (4.1.4). 
A frequently recurring problem was the tendency to absolutise the relative in the moral sphere, 
elevating norms originally based on pragmatic adjustment into rigid rules that could in certain 
circumstances become dictatorial, being founded on uncertain or unstable foundations. and at the 
same time unquestionable (4.1. f). This tension seemed related to the problem of what to 
conserve in the reiigious sphere, and 11\Jhat on the other hand to adapt and/or allow to grow. Both 
of these corresponded to features to be found in African traditional culture that were viewed 
positively, namely the concern for upholding domestic and other values li1iithout compromise (4.1 ), 
and the ability to resolve, cope with and adapt to the tensions of life (4.3.1 ), thus managing 
conflict and allo1111ing for the concrete involvement of one's day-to-day problems in religion. 
The challenge arguably facing certain post-traditional African thinkers about ethics 11\Jas to prevent 
pragmatic or situational considerations from compromising democratic, social, domestic and other 
values, and at the same time not to attribute absoluteness to non-ultimate things like political 
struggles, political figures and pragmatic traditions ~<IJhich had outlived their usefulness. As an 
example of such a tradition, the average Westerner might cite polygamy. As practiced in Africa, 
polygamy seems to deprive b..iomen of full possession of rights to the body of their husband, but 
not vice versa, and thus has a sexist element which could be viewed as unsuitable for a non-
sexist society. 
Influential areas in the above disagreements on African values, especially in the political sphere, 
were the respective significance, in the context of Africa, of individual intelligence and individual 
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freedom. Many aspects of African tradition tended to apparently militate against these ideals in so 
far as indigenous traditional society was non-literate and emphasised the community over the 
individual. Postcolonial African philosophies of government which vilified Western culture, 
rejected Western logic and ignored the v .. /estern concern 11.itth freedom and individual initiative, in 
accordance lNith Afi"ican precedents, seemed to confirm that there were trends in traditionally-
inspired African thinking which did indeed militate against the culture of learning and freedom (cf. 
\.l\/right 1971: 20, 21, 23). But there t.\lere expounders of post-traditional thought about Africa that 
were not content to be thought of as heirs to a tradition of stupidity and oppression, as if this were 
all that AfriCa had to offer. They sought to present the signs of intelligent thought, philosophy, 
democracy and positive moral ideals which were to be found in the African and Egyptian 
traditions, and so ensure that Africa would be remembered by posterity not as a source of 
savagery but as a contributor to enlightenment. 
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5 THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN LIFE 
A considerable and distinctive part of post-traditional religion, by definition (1.3.2), was the 
attempt to introduce innovation into the frame~'llork of traditional African religion. These were the 
strategies in terms of which authors reacted ideo!ogicaily to, inter aiia, the given ideoiogicai 
context and the conditions imposed by historical atAJareness, cosmology, and a desire lo fulfil the 
ideals of fulfilment offered by their tradition. The present study uncovered many indications of 
innovation in post-traditional African thought, in the realms of intellectuality, mysticism and 
concepts of magic, which introduced an element of greater complexity and sophistication into the 
sub-Saharan A.frican or Afro-Caribbean background of the authors, often expanding this 
background to include ancient Egyptian precedents. 
Generaily, innovation or development is accepted in contemporary society as a good or positive 
thing. But the innovations of post-traditional African religiosity indicated by the present study 
seemed to show innovation as something, at the very least, two-sided. Innovation was a sign of 
growth, development, sophistication and the broadening of horizons: but it also meant that there 
!l'Jere netAI forms of distraction from concrete reality, that there t~~as more space for rationa!!y 
indefensible ideas to proliferate, and that there t/\Jas more room for traditional values to be 
overthrown for the sake of overthrowing. Since, as has been already indicated, cultural reason 
tended to prevail over critical reason in the exposition of African retigion by post-traditional 
sources in this study (3 .5 .1), it foUowed that there was a tendency not to question the place of 
such things as magic and witchcraft in the Ufe of traditional culture. 
One could certainly argue that the elimination of magic, ll'Jitchcraft and occultism from post-
traditional Africanised thought would kill quite a lot of innovative systematisation and render 
African thought more dependent on non-African thought for creative resources. Yet, on the other 
hand, if one retained the magical worldview, then the errors, the distractions, and the aura of 
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moral suspicion inherent in such a worldview ~'\lould remain ineradicable so long as the world at 
large remained as it was. 
5.1 INNOVATIVE RESOURCES OF TRADITIONAL CULTURE 
The discussion of Africanised intellectual and mystical concern may begin with an expkmttion of 
the view hinted at above: that the strategies of intellectual concern and mystical concern in post-
traditionai Africanised thought, atthough not apparently developed with as much complexity in 
sub-Saharan African tradition, were not lNholly without precedent in the analphabetic culture of 
the African continent. Indications did exist that more modern, and undeniably innovative, 
mysticism and magic in the thought of post-traditional Africanised persons studied seemed to be 
related in function and content, often explicitly, to the themes of traditional medicine and 
witchcraft (cf. Kamalu 1990: 75). 
5.1.1 TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 
TRADITIONAL rvtEDIClNE AND INTELLECTUAL SPECIALISATION 
The practice of traditional medicine seemed to be a possible area of innovative thought in Africa. 
The formation of a quasi-church of traditional healers in Zimbabwe by Chavunduka (1994: vii, 23) 
under the name of ZINATHA (Zimbabwean National Association of Traditional Healers) and the 
attempt to address the question of the relationship of traditional healing with modern medicine 
(Chawnduka 1994: 41 ), seemed to indicate a particularly significant complexification of previous 
African tradition, comparable perhaps to the foundation of a new church in the Christian tradition: 
and there seemed to be indications that the accepted role of a traditional healer involved in some 
areas access to useful and privileged knowledge, making the profession of traditional healer, at 
least in theory, a form of intellectual speciaDsation (cf. Thorpe 1991 : 59). In particular the 
phenomenon of initial illness, eccentricity, or inexpDcable discontent with one's present ordinary 
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state of Hfe, as the sign of a can to the profession of traditional healer (Thorpe 1993: 105-106}, 
suggested that there might be a connection betvJeen the profession of traditional medicine in 
indigenous African culture, and the state of discontent with the status quo that was an impetus to 
inteUectual development or innovation. Accordingly, it was suspected that traditional medicine 
~'Jas a possible perceived resource for innovative thought in indigenous African tradttion. 
Yet despite the superior kn()(.\lledge expected of traditional healers, and especially the new 
standards of competence expected of them by virtue of membership in ZINATHA, Chavunduka 
( 1994: 23, 32), though maintaining an overall favourable attitude t.01.<Jards traditional healing as 
head of Z!NATHA. indicated that there were prob~ms posed by the anecdotal and, by Western 
standards, non-scientific fashion in which traditional healers used recipes that mixed true 
information with irrelevant data. 
THE PROBLEM OF ANTI-PROGRESSIVE TENDENCIES 
TRADITIONAL \/S. MODERN EXPE8TlSE 
Chavunduka (1994: 41} stated that the integration of traditional heaffng with Western medicine 
was impossible, owing to the culturalf.j irrelevant, psychologically uninterested and overly analytic 
approach of vVestern medicine to patient care which could hamper the efficacy of traditional 
practice; and in addition the problem existed of who ll'Jould be subordinate to ll'mom if traditional 
healers VJere to collaborate with Western doctors. This view was echoed in a broader context by 
other authors who, despite interdisciplinary preferences, argued that \Nestern science in general 
was in-some ways unsuited to African culure (Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 185) or impfted that it 
had no absolute claim on African culture for reasons of cultural relativity, as in the definition of 
science given by Wade Nobles (Karnak.I 1990: 28) who said that science "is the formal 
reconstruction or representation of a people's shared set of systematic and cumulative ideas, 
beHefs and knovJledge (i.e. common sense) stemming from their culture." The point of such 
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perspectives seemed to be not a blanket hostiHty to true science but rather a caK for an 
'appropriate technology' suited to the values and pace of African life. the resources of traditional 
cutture in the sphere of medicine .. and the spirttual and religious sensitivity of African tradition. But 
as De Montellano (1991: 46, 48) indicated, even this sort of stance could cause problems by 
violating the constitutional separation of reUgion from public education, by making science and 
pseudoscience difficult to distinguish, and/or by rendering a pupil less competent to learn or 
practice science as it 1Nas understood in the West. 
THE AUTHORITATIVE STATUS OF THE TRADJTJONAL HEALER. 
A possible problem that could be suspected in the rehabiHtation of traditional medicine was the 
fact that it 1nas - or at least appeared to be - transmitted in an authoritarian rather than a scientiftc 
way. Recipes or rites were handed dovm, and there was, in the eyes of the casual Western 
onlooker, no indication of any attempt to verify or improve much of them. Hence an image of the 
traditional medicine as a purveyor of superstition arose, 111Jhich many post-traditional African 
thinkers attempted to combat by portraying traditional medicine or magical beliefs as an area 
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where Africa 1111as broader of viet.\I than the science of the \Nest. Despite the traditional ~ealer 
Mutwa's protestations that African tradition was immutable (Mutv.ra s.a.: 249}, there stiH seemed 
to be a widespread opinion in the data that African traditional medicine was a sphere 1Nhere 
African culture knew more than the scientists of the West, which arguably implied that this was 
perceived as a sphere of superior quasi-scientific progress or competence (cf. f\tlutwa s.a.: 177-
178; lwuagtNU 1991: 261). Nevertheless no well-known source detaiHng a fully scientific 
explanatory overvie11v of an aspects of the practice of traditional medicine seemed to be available 
at the time of the present research, a sign of how far traditional medicine, as presently practised 
by the traditional healers, stiH had to go in order to achieve intellectual recognition in 
contemporary society. 
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THE BASIS OF TRADITIONAL HEALING 
On the exact nature of traditional healing, and the reason for its efficacy, certain of the sources of 
the data were silent, preferring just to allude to the recipes or rites without explaining how they 
worked or if they could be changed, or indeed whether any perspectives other than that of 
traditional medicine needed to be considered (cf. De Rosny 1985: 198). Yet there 1tJere some 
indications that 1.'\Jithin Alrican tradition the practice of an individual medical practitioner could be 
evaluated (De Rosny 1985: 108) as better or worse, fraudulent or genuine. As far as Africanised 
thought and religion in the Western hemisphere was concerned,· indications of an attempt to 
explain the efficacy of African-derived medicine. especially herbal remedies. were found in the 
post-traditional esotericised thought of Gonzalez-\Nippler (1973: 88), l.'Jho by stressing the theme 
of 'nature' as a source of the power in herbal remedies, implied that unity of a mystical sort with 
the earth or nature was the key to the efficacy of 'natural' medicine (cf. Gonzalez-V·Jippler 1973: 
88). The theory of Barashango (1991: 32, 92, 167), that the earth was a source of knowledge for 
black people, seemed to echo this, by implying that knowledge, which he deemed an il~fluence 
relevant to well-being, was derived from contact with nature. Several authors indicated that the 
laws of magic formulated by Frazer could provide a key to understanding how African-"lnagic 
ir.iorked (cf. Kamalu 1990: 81) - and on this basis one could argue that the 'nature-connection' 
theory of the efficacy of traditional medicine was an instance of the latN of contagion (5.5.2). 
THE PROBLEM OF THE ESOTERIC EXPLANATION OF AFRICAN MAGIC 
i,/Vas the sort of mystical explanation of African magic found in esotericists Hke Gonzalez-\Nippler 
proper science? Certainly an esoteric explanation of magic in terms of laws tended to simpHfy and 
s1reamHne the concepts thereof, creating an intemalty consistent sys1em 1Nhich, in the eyes of the 
uninitiated lay-person impressed by the trappings of apparent inteHectuality, could create the 
impression that, at last, magic was now on an equal footing with systematic science. But when 
one asked how the laws were deduced, their basis, as far as could be gathered from the sources 
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studied, appeared to have more to do ~'llith tradition and the authority of magicians and mystics 
than with reason and publlcly repeatable experimentation. Thus, the laws of the sophisticated 
Africanised esotericisms in the data seemed to be hardly on firmer ground than the recipes of 
analphabetic traditional medicine in sub-Saharan Africa. The laws of 'patterning' found in certain 
African cosmologies (2.6.2) and in the esoteric treatment of Africanised thought by Gonzalez-
Wippier (1973: 122) offered an element alien to contemporary Western science, reminiscent inter 
alia of the astrological reasoning, in a work published shortly after the death of Copernicus in the 
sixteenth century, that iinked the seven openings in the head to the seven planets in the solar 
system (Armitage 1956: 70). 
5.1.2 WITCHCRAFT 
Another source of innovation in African tradition, in addition to herbal or other medicine, was 
rnlated to lNitchcraft or belief in it. The detailed study by Geschiere (1997: 2, 7 etc.) on the 
relationship of tNitchcraft to politics made witchcraft essentially an innovative or alternative trend 
in the traditional reHgion of Africa, and thus brought au such tendencies under the definition of 
'post-traditional religion' proposed in this study. And indeed, it would not be easily defensible to 
include Africanised Hermetism and other forms of thought influenced by Western occultism in this 
study without also giving some attention to indigenous forms of African occultism. 
CAN ONE BELIEVE IN \NITCHES? 
Sources were included in the study t•Jhich were sceptical of magic or ll'Jitchcraft and its verifiability: 
Odera-Oruka (1991: 126) recorded a perspective which professed disbelief in such things even 
from a standpoint related to indigenous traditional reDgion. Bodunrin (1995: 374, 376, 377, 383), 
apart from aUuding to the lack of practical demonstrations of witchcraft (except in the subjective 
realm of perceived or 'virtual' reality), raised the difficulty that even if witchcraft worked, the 
explanation thereof by the practitioner on the basis of mystical intuition or gnosis would not 
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necessarily be pubHcly meaningful. These arguments were formulated in the context of a reply to 
Oluwole ( 1995: ~SO) who had, in a positive treatment of 1rJi1chcraft-beHef, referred inter aHa to Its 
virtual reality for belie~rs. Chavunduka (1994: 93-94, 98-99, 104) also dealt with this question, 
pointing out that there 11.iere individuals who had confessed to being v.Jitches, some of them high-
status members of the community, thus ruling out desire for higher social status as an 
explanation for false confession. He ended up by pointing out that the problem of witches could 
not be solved by denying their existence, any more than a doctor could get rid of malaria by 
saying that there was no such thing. 
\/\/HAT DO V·JITCHES BELIEVE IN? 
The problem of ~·.Jhat a witch was constituted a ver:J difficult question. Chavunduka (1994: 87, 99-
100) pointed out that many accusations of lNitchcrall were more about identifying disruptive social 
influences than making ex1raordinar:J claims, and that 'IJ'Jitchcraft' could involve cannibalism or the 
making of poisons (which ~'\Jere natural and verifiable activities) as ~'\Jell as less verifiable '!ctivities 
such as riding around on hyenas in the middle of the night etc. Thus 'witches' of some sort did 
. .. 
exist, although their claims of power might be questionable. Many sources treated ~'\Jttcheg>more 
as evil po1rJers than as people whose beliefs were described in any detail (2.5.3) so it was difficult 
to find out what exactly a self-proclaimed African or Afro-Caribbean witch's personal religion 
would consist of. \/Vhat was sought by witchcraft seemed to be, inter afia, the securing of one's 
personal ends in a pragmatic fashion, in ll'Jays not deemed normal by society at large (Gonzalez 
Vi.lippier 1973: 9; Assimeng 1988: 180-188) and/or the disruption of the community by means of 
bad medicine (Chavunduka 1994: 99-100), or the aienation of an invisible part of a person's self 
(De Rosny 1985: 59 cf. Some 1994: 223), or possession by an evil power. The common factor in 
the practices of witchcraft described in the data seemed to be the disruption or chaHenge of the 
surrounding expressions of order, oten in 'evir ways but sometimes in a benign but innovative 
fashion, as Assimeng (1988: 180ff) indicated. Not al 'witches' deHberately intended to propagate 
evil in the 11.iorld. 
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5.2 AFRICAN WAYS OF KNOWLEDGE 
The question of the credibility of witchcraft raised above (5.1.2) touched on an important issue, 
that of knowledge. Many of the sources devoted some attention to the related themes of 
philosophical epistemology, education and intellectual advancement, scientific activity, and 
mystical or religious knowledge. All of these were undeniably relevant to strategies for developing 
the thought of African tradition beyond its beginnings. 
5.2.1 SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE 
El'vlPIRICISMAND PRAGt,;IATISM 
Most of the authors of the study accepted experience, or empirical evidence, as a vafid basis for 
knOll'Jledge. Many indeed stressed the need for grounding even religious claims on empirical 
grounds, a stance which often led to the replacement of transcendental god-concepts by more 
immanent pantheistic or panentheistic ideas of divinity (Osabutey-Aguedze 1990: 77; Kruger 
1995: 185) and to pragmatism or down-to-earthness in religion and morality rather than a purely 
spiritual concept of religious and moral Hfe (Kamalu 1990: 141; James 1954: 153, 162). Wiredu 
(1996: 43), an atheist, argued that such a material orientation was, at least in the case of the 
Akan, part of a spatial or quasi-material concept of being, built into the very structure of their 
language. 
THE QUALIFICATION OF Elv1PIRICISM 
The empiricism of the post-traditional African thinker, however, did not apparently in au cases 
exclude such things as extrasensory experience (De Rosny 1985: 35) or reHgious experience 
(Barashango 1991: 204). An openness to such things often went hand in hand with a rejection of 
Western science (cf. Some 1994: 206-209) and rationafism (Senghor 1964: 38), and claims about 
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the paranormal could not be easily integrated with a rigid and critical demand for empirical 
evidence such as that expressed by Bodunrin (1995: 376, 380-331). Thus, there could be found 
in the data references to viett11points that possessed an interest in the empirical but did not 
practice rigid empirical induction or critical analysis of empirical data - for example, a belief in the 
pragmatic efficacy of medicine, witchcraft, or the spiritual world which did not however rigidly 
distinguish bet~'lleen virtual and objective reality, carry out rigid scientific analyses of traditional 
medicine, etc. (cf. Some 1994: 230, 253: Jahn 1961: 128). None of this, however, 
contraindicated the presence of some down-to-earth wisdom in the African wor!dview (4.3.2). 
Such wisdom has been examined in detail byWanjohi (1997: 14, 49ff) in his t·'llOrk on the concept 
of kihooto (reason) in GikUy'U proverbs. 
THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EMPIRICAL 
There were some viewpoints in the data which did not restrict knolt'\Jledge to the directly 
apprehended empirical, or the rational implications thereof. Apart of course from the appeal to the 
authority of the experience of the ancestors (cf. 4.3.2), there could be found sources that 
appealed to a priori intuition as a source of knowledge. 
Kamalu (1990: 37-38, 50-52, 105) regarded the phenomenal world as knowable only in relation to 
its opposite, the noumenal world, whose negative qualities of infinity, continuity and the lack of 
phenomenal being were as knowable as empirical reality, and constituted its inalienable ground, 
and the source of philosophical ideas of transcendence. The pairing of the noumenal and 
phenomenal in various contexts gave rise to ideas trJhose conception arose simultaneously with 
perception and therefore were quasi-innate. Osabutey-Aguedze (1990: 112-113) and Oguah 
(1984: 219) also professed to a befief in what amounted to 'a priori' intuitive knowledge. 
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KROGER'S COSMOLOGY AND TRANSCENDENT MEANING 
THE PROPERTIES OF THE GESTALT-PERCEPTION 
An interesting tendency analogous to the mixture or empirical orientation and transcendental 
meaning in the above African authors could be found in the cosmology of Krager. Krager ( 1995: 
30) professed to reject the necessity of transcendental discourse in the name of radical 
empiricism; yet his concept of the universe as a meaningful Gestalt had the interesting quattty of 
being neither a directly apprehended empirical reality - for, as he said, the Totality could not be 
overseen on account of human Hmitation (Kruger 1995: 23) - nor something induced or deduced 
from the apprehension of oneself or another, since he indicated that the idea of the world as a 
meaningful Gestalt •Nas given to us by virtue of our being in the world, and therefore not inferred a 
posteriori (Kruger 1995: 151 ). Thus, it was not apparently an empirical idea at all, if by 'empirical' 
we meant that which was either directly apprehended in experience or induced or deduced from 
such apprehension. It had grounds in experience, in so far as we could experience ours~lves as 
unable to reject the idea of the meaningful Gestalt or 'vvhole' (cf. Kruger 1995: 151), and in that 
sense the idea seemed justifiable: for what could not be rejected had to be accepted. Buf in so 
accepting the idea of the universe as a meaningful Gestalt Kruger appeared to have, like Kamalu 
and Osabutey-Aguedze, taken a leap out of the initia!ty empirical 1.>1JOrld into the transcendental: by 
widening the range of discourse to include, explicitly and implicitly, not only 'experience of but 
'experience about' the truth of an idea (e.g. the experience that such-and-such a postulate, such 
as the idea of the world as a meaningful Gestalt, could not be rejected [Kruger 1995: 1511), 
Kruger's thought in effect hypothetically allotNed some transcendental intuition of meaning to 
become part of discourse based on experience, in so far as a speculative idea could be 
'experienced' as irrejectible. (By 'speculative' here is meant 'not directly apprehended in concrete 
experience or inferred from such apprehension': the term as used here does not necessarity 
imply, in a pejorative sense, the irrelevance or concrete unreality of what is postulated, especially 
11.lhen what is postulated is the actual Universe itself}. 
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THE ATTEMPT AT TRANSCENDENTAL SILENCING 
Kruger (1995: 129) did try to preserve the ideals of radical empiricism by insisting that the 
transcendental integration of the Totalty so constructed had to be simultaneously deconstructed 
. 
or unsaid: thus the impact of such transcendental meaning 1111as offset by a simultaneous attempt 
to unsay this meaning, ~·Jith a result that the speculation was, at least in theory, ultimately 
silenced. Nevertheless since the integrating process, by his own admission, could not be t111holly 
made to cease in the course of ordinary human life, the unsaying of the ultimate integration of the 
Totali1y could never in practice become absolutely final in the lifetime of the human. The 
integration. having been unsaid, could not be abandoned indefinitely, so nothing seemed left for 
the empiricalty problematic Ges1alt-idea, save to simply and involuntarily re-establish itself in our 
consciousness, defying all subsequent efforts to finally abolish it. A.nd thus the opening for 
transcendental meaning in the Gestalt-idea, despite Kruger's efforts to firmly establish an 
empiricism opposed to transcendental description, still remained, owing to the practical 
impossibility of finally and definitively unsaying the given or non-inferential introsp_ectively 
experienced and generated idea of an empiricalty unapprehended Ges1alt!TotaHty. 
One could reject certain modes of the TotaHty, certainly, by, for example, replacing a s1atic/fixed 
wnh a dynamic cosmology: but it appeared that the basic and, in a sense, transcenden1al 
construction of 'cosmology' as such, the postulation that some all-embracing whole existed, 
regardless of whether we perceived it as unchanging essence or as interrelated process or 
whatever, could not be finally made to cease, owing to the way the human mind necessarily 
needed lo work. 
INCLUSIVENESS IN EPISTEMOLOGY 
By means of the cosmological articulation outfined in the previous paragraphs, Kruger in effect 
ended up developing a 1norldview similar in certain respects to those of the Atican authors 
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Osabutey-Aguedze and Kamalu, which ~'\las empirically oriented yet had some room left for 
transcendental meaning: intuition as 'experience about' a belief could be seen as somehow 
related to the more empirical 'experience of something. This seemed to indicate that an inclusive 
dimension of sorts formed in effect part of certain forms of post-traditionai African episiemoiogy, 
as of cosmology; and the thought of Kruger and post-traditional Africanised religion could be 
compared or related in terms of a shared inclusive tendency in epistemology as ii'liell as 
Christclogy or cosmology (cf. 2.2.4., 3.5.2). 
5.2.2 INTELLECTUAL AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT 
A particularly distinctive feature of post-traditional Africanised thought as manifested in the 
sources was the concern with inteffectuai advancement and development, and the roles io be 
piayed by education and science in the expioration of the traditional African religious heritage. 
Although this sort of intellectual development did not akNays presuppose Western models of 
science or philosophy, it had the effect in many authors of introducing an element of intellectual 
sophistication into the aims and methods of Africanised religion. Yet the Western goals of 
objectivity and scepticism were not fully accepted by all authors, particularly Kamalu (1990: 27, 
75) who disagreed with the ideas that science was culturally neutral and that African magic could 
be shown by the same to be unttrorthy of serious consideration. 
THE CULTURE OF LEARNING 
Several authors were concerned to stress the Importance of learning and knowledge for the 
African. Barashango (1991: 5-6) vigorously opposed the misconception that learning and 
knowledge were Whitey's thing [sic]' and Diop ( 1990: 1) stressed the need to study history, 
especially from an Afrocentric point of view, in order for Africans to gain the historical self-
perception necessary for the consoffdation of a multinational state. Some (1994: 5) claimed that 
his traditional initiation made it easy for him to assimilate his lessons, and Frye (1988: 36) 
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suggested that left-brained expertise t•Jas present in African thought as well as right-brained 
expertise, citing Diop as a left-brained expert. It seemed to be implied by these authors that 
Africanised ways of thought were not necessarily an obstacle to the assimilation of Western 
thought - although De Montellano disputed this (3.5.3} and Barashango (1991: 203) argued that 
the \Nest (at least in the sphere of mystical symbolism) could never understand Africa. however 
much Africa was able to understand the \/Vest. Jahn's anticipation of an African Renaissance 
(Jahn 1961: 12, 16-17) seemed reminiscent of a general post-traditional tendency to greater 
sophistication in thought about Africa, manifested in the !t'Jorks of many of the authors studied. 
EDUCATION 
Many authors combined lf'Jith their esteem for black involvement in intellectual activity a new 
program for black education. k111uagwu (1991: 257-263) outlined a system for the education of 
African youth based on traditional precedents, which shared with other models in the data a 
desire to include paranormal phenomena and religion with science as objects of education (cf. 
Some 1994: 226), a preference for Africanised history over an exclusively Western history 
syllabus (cf. Diop 1990: 1), and a holistic and multidimensional goal of educational development 
(Kamalu 1990: 156). Certain authors referred to the Trivium and Quadrivium of Greco-Roman 
and medieval education, comprising grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy 
and music, as an authentic Egyptian product (cf. James 1954: 131-133) and seemed to interpret 
these disciplines in a similar holistic-mystical fashion to the authors cited above, but this time in 
the context of purported ancient Egyptian precedents for education and priestly training, based on 
the 1.'\lorks of Hermes Trismegistus. 
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SCIENCE 
HUMANISTIC REDEFINITION 
As has already been mentioned (5.1.1) many authors sought to redefine science in 
interdisciplinary terms, in such a way as to Africanise it and/or integrate it with Africanised thought 
about magic and religion. The resultant African definitions of science, especially when viewed as 
the content of education, tended to have a definite bias in favour of psychology and humanistic 
discipHnes, the opposite of the apparent bias in V\/estern high-school curricula in favour of physics 
and the natural sciences. This was reminiscent of Mutwa's view that Westerners were more 
familiar than Africans with physics and technology, but less acquainted with psychology, 
especially in the paranormal sphere (Mutwa s.a.: 173, 1i7ff). Both Mut1t-Ja (1960: 496) and Some 
(1994: 9) were confident that the African tradition, if fuily used, could lead to superior human 
accomplishment that rivalled the achievements to date of Western science. Some v11ent so far as 
to suggest that African occult traditions, if put to use, could help make the science fiction of the 
West into a concrete reality. 
USE OF WESTERN SCIENCE 
A lot of this was very difficult for the casual observer to harmonise with \t\/estern science at least 
as popularly understood. Yet many African authors were quite happy to assimilate and discuss 
various aspects of the Western scientific heritage. Barashango (1991: xii} did not see religious 
creation and evolution as contradictory, and Kamalu (1990: 59-61) was happy to discuss 
philosophical issues involved in Western mathematics (though not going as far as explicitly 
accepting numerology, fike some authors [Mutwa 1960: 549ff; cf. Gonzalez-V\fippler 1973: 40ff]). 
Frye (1988: 56-59, 61, 67-69) devoted some attention to the mystical impUcations of quantum 
physics. Western psychology and psychotherapy were aDuded to in the use of the Jungian 
concept of archetypes (cf. 2.3.3), and in the use, in the discussion of Airican medicine, of the 
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concept of the placebo (cf. Kamalu 1990: 82). If 'ps~hology' tt·rere interpreted in a broad sense to 
include the popular psychology of self-help literature .. one could also point to the themes of 
positive thinking and visuaUsation in Barashango (1991: 168, 190). Post-traditional Africanised 
science did not apparently have to exclude from itself absolutely everything that the West had to 
offer. 
DISCOVERY VS. CREATION 
Geschiere ( 1997: 229) related African t~tchcraft-be!ief to the practice of social science, indicating 
that both involved a special model of discourse whose Knks to reanty were debatable. A related 
problem to the one raised by Geschiere tNas the degree to which scientific research tended to 
virtually create Its own objects rather than discovering them; the quality of 'creating one's 01t.1n 
reality' t<'Jas a feature present in much of the Afticanised science and thought explored in this 
study. The reality discovered by science was in cosmological terms conceived by Barashango 
( 1991: 136ff) as a reality generated by the Logos, via a process into which our otr-m thought and 
visualisation could enter. Among other authors, the worlds created by art or the imagination were 
' 
not always rigidly separated from the realm of objective reality where science could be prefumed 
to operate (cf. Some 1994: 8, 230, 253, Senghor 1984: 280). An African form of science v.ihich 
included magic, offered lheoreticalty the means of re~reating the universe rather than simptyr 
describing it; and the prioritisation of Ufe-transformation over the achievement of objectivity -
although the latter goal of science was not absolutely ignored (cf. Barashango 1991: xiii) - was 
possibly a major area of difference between the post-traditional Africanised science explored in 
this study and the objectively oriented science of the West Whether 1Nhat was offered in theory 
could be achieved in practice was of course a totally different question altogether, which Jay 
outside the scope of the present research (1.4.2). 
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5.3 THE GAINING OF MYSTICAL KNOWLEDGE 
The Africanised ideas of science and knowledge found in the data, linked as they frequently t.-'llere 
lt'Jith religion, magic and mysticism, were not necessarily restricted to the ordinary five senses of 
Western thought; authors frequently made some room for extraordinary or extrasensory states of 
consciousness. De Rosny (1985: 224ff, 248) described his own attempts to make sense of the 
concept of nd1/nsi by, inter alia. undergoing a special traditional ceremony which would 'open' his 
'eyes'. Keita (1984: 60) stressed the value which Egyptians placed on the intuitive faculty of the 
'Nous'. The Rastafarians (Legesse 1994: 331 ·332) appealed to an intuitive experience of the God 
within. The melanin scholars (De Montellano 1992: 163) appealed to the superior forms of 
consciousness made available by melanin. In various ~'\Jays, befief in a form of knowledge 
transcending ordinary consciousness was articulated by the post-traditional African authors 
studied in the present research. 
5.3.1 ALTERNATIVE STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
METHODS FOR ACHIEVING EXTRAORDINARY MODES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Various modes of accessing this extraordinary mode of consciousness were proposed. 
Concerning the physiological basis of this consciousness there was no single answer. One author 
appealed to the melanin of the pineal gland (Barashango 1991 : 6, 170 cf. De Montellano 1992: 
163), another author to the po11~rs of the brain, particularly the right brain and the 'reptile brain' 
(Frye 1988: 7, 37 ·39, 42), another to the rhythmic activity of the body which could be expected to 
hofistically affect one's state of consciousness (Krllger 1995: 317ff, 321-322). As to the means of 
activating this consciousness, commonly proposed methods included: the strategy of looking for 
this awareness in one's inner self, through meditation (Some 1994: 256, 287, Barashango 1991: 
166, 170); the induction of trance.states or aftered states of consciousness through dances 
(Krager 1995: 321), music (Some 1994: 229), possession-ceremonies (Ortiz 1989: 95), and 
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herbal medicine (Rosny 1985: 244); the strengthening of one's unity with nature (Gonzalez-
Wippler 1973: 146: Kaboha 1992: 70): the loosening of the body's attachments to the ordinary 
1 •..,orld (Some 1994: 226); and the choosing of a ne~.., tNay of seeing the world, generalfy' one more 
non-rational or surrealistic (Senghor 1964: 24, 70-71, 280; Jahn 1961: 140) and less 'scientific' 
(Some 1994: 208-209) than the form of consciousness preferred by the \/Vest. De Rosny (1985: 
248) seemed to regard ndim.si as a new way of seeing the world, tNhich sensitised one to the 
conflicts in nature that raged on under the superficial appearance of placidity or peace. These 
means of consciousness raising were not necessarily mutually exclusive and often more than one 
of them was recommended by the same author. They seemed to have in common the 
characteristk: of trying to alter or tamper v.rith the ordinary relation of consciousness to nature, 
whether by mental exercises, or by the ingestion of natural substances (De Rosny 1985: 244 cf. 
Gonzalez-\/Vippler 1973: 88), or by ceremonially generated experiences. 
EXTRAORDINARY EXPERIENCE VS. SCIENCE 
Did such experiences place the occu~. or the practice of Africanised magic, on a scientific footing 
that could be assured of 1.'IJorldwide recognition? The arguments of Bodunrin (5.1.2) suggested 
that they did not: the experiences were perhaps virtually real to those who had them, but their 
transformative impact and pubHcfy' repeatable verifiability as yet fell short of what the average 
\Nestern person had learnt to expect tom science. \JVhere such experiences could contribute to 
the development of thought, was basically in challenging the monopoly over knowledge claimed 
by certain types of science, since, v.shi!e conventional science seemingly could not make sense 
of, or derive tangible and verifiable benefits from, claims of paranormal experience, for the same 
reasons it could not explain it fully as a feature of human Hfe. There were things outside the 
alleged omnicompetence of science, and the idea of Tibetan Buddhism that 'a philosophy 
comprehensive enough to embrace the whole of knowledge is indispensable' (Schumacher 1977: 
8), while possib~/ leading to a philosophical reductionism that not aH religions would agree tNith, 
nevertheless pointed out the dangers of a quantitative-scientific reductionism, and to that extent 
190 
supported the anti-quantitativist and anti-natural-scientific tendencies of the new '.African science' 
proposed by certain post-traditional Africanised authors. 
5.3.2 ESOTERIC TRAiNiNG 
Where could one learn to achieve altered states of consciousness? tvlany authors mentioned that 
ceremonial participation (especially in traditional initiation ceremonies) t'llas an important source 
of knotNledge about such things (Some 1994: 226 etc.): the traditional initiation was treated by 
Senghor ( 1964 :271) as a means of facilitating adjustment to society, following lhe precedent of 
Western anthropology, but most authors, especially exponents of post-traditional Africanised 
mysticism, treated initiation as primarily a means of transmitting secret knowledge. More 
Egyptologicaily inclined authors referred to the mystical initiations of ancient Egypt - V'Jhich even 
Jesus undenAJent. according to Barashango ( 1991: 168) - and to the esotericism of the Hermetic 
tradition. Another source of occult knowledge was mythology: according to Neimark (1993: 98) 
African my1hs had to be taken literally whenever they described the existence of an occult power: 
and Nobles (Kama!u 1990: 49) seemed to imply that mythology, by bypassing the state of 
ordinary knowledge, expressed the content of a supernormal state of consciousness and 
provided a guide for effecting the realities which it referred to. The common element in au these 
sources was tradition: it was in the African (or Egyptian) tradition, hOti'rever conceived or 
demarcated, that one had to look for answers to mysticai questions. 
5.3.3 THE POSSESSORS OF MYSTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
THE SH.l*AAN AND THE ~#\GUS 
Two of the authors (Frye 1988: xiii, 44; Gonzalez-Wippler 1973: 4} referred to the work of Carlos 
Castaneda, who was known for his quasi-anthropological accounts - of debated authenticity 
(Chandler 1988: 116) - concerning his own instruction by a Ya qui sorcerer, Don Juan Matus, who 
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taught him how to achieve paranormal consciousness through hallucinogens and other methods. 
Don Juan Matus represented the motif. widespread in primal religion, of the Shaman, a specialty 
appointed practitioner of r~uals or other processes involving extraordinary consciousness - the 
custodian, so to speak, of a tradttion involving such consciousness such as was mentioned in 
5.3.2. According to Steyn (1994: 67-58) the motif of Shaman was related to that of the Magus, 
tNho was in effect the Shaman's civilised counterpart. The data contained instances both of a 
theme related to the Shaman motif, in the form of the Traditional Healer (5.1.1 cf. Thorpe 1993: 
ix), and a theme related to the Magus motif, in the form of the African Priest who has received 
special training. Such a priesthood could be found mentioned in connection t.'Jith both Yoruba 
religion and Egyptian religion (cf. James 1954: 13Hf; Neimark 1993: 21-22 etc.). 
OTHER FORMS OF REUG!OUS PERSONAGE 
Other motifs which seemed to occupy an intermediary position between the shaman and the 
mysticalty initiated priest were the ordinary or traditional African priest, performing the fun_ction of 
intermediary between the spirit wortd and the physical world (Senghor 1964: 73), the Rastafarian 
'"· 
prophet who spoke by means of an internal demo-charismatic intuition (Legesse 1994: 338ff) and 
the role of Master of Spiritualism' assigned to Jesus by the Umbandista religion (~Gregor 1966: 
177). The role of Jesus in Umbanda could be alterna1ivety conceived as a Messianic theme totally 
different from the concepts of shaman, magus, or anything between them, although in a 
pantheistic or panentheistic ~·JOrldview magical personages and divinely indwelt persons could not 
be sharply separated. The common factor Unking quasi-shamans and quasi-magi with the other 
categories of religious personage mentioned in this paragraph appeared to be that of personal 
contact tAJith a tNorld beyond ordinary experience, and association with a tradition of such contact. 
Supernormal consciousness or contact seemed to impty in the post-traditional African thought of 
the sources of this study, as elsewhere, the presence or possibility of individuals who were 
experts in the use of such consciousness. This underlined the fact that occult knowledge, in an 
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African context and elsewhere, tended to rely on tradition and authority rather than critical 
investigation or experimentation. 
5.3.4 DIVINATION 
Theie v'liere references in the data to the possibility of knowledge through divination, particularly 
the lfa system of Yoruba religion (Neimark 1993: 15}. This form of knwJledge did not appear at 
first sight to involve the induction of an unusual state of consciousness but had more the 
character of a quasi-science: Nelmark ( 1993: 21) called it a spiritual representation of Einstein's 
theory of relativity. Nevertheless the binary structure underlying the lfa system of divination 
(2.5.3) - similar to the binary patterns in the Shona hakata system (Thorpe 1993: 95) - was 
related to the theme of ati'Jareness of conflict which 1J1Jas influentiai in the iniiiatory experiences of 
De Rosny (1985: 248) and Mutwa (s.a.: 134). Thus it could be suspected that !fa divination was 
linked 1t'\Jith the paranormal experiences described in 5.3.1 in some way, seeking a contact with 
the same sort of reality, even though It did not invotJe an extraordinary obserJable state of 
consciousness. 
5.4 MAGIC 
As well as extraordinary states of consciousness, several authors dealt tr\lith the themes of magic 
and the paranormal, especially in the context of traditional African beliefs and rituals. Some 
authors rejected the term 'magic' as a description of African beliefs, Chavunduka ( 1994: 9) 
defining it as 'the art of attaining mysterious results by tricks' as when a rabbit was taken out of a 
hat. A source cited by De Monteilano (i991: 47) rejected the term 'magic' in favour of 
'psychoenergetics' as a description of African utilisation of occult power. Rastafarianism forbade 
'magic' altogether (Turner 1930: 54). But apart from these sources, most authors accepted that 
the term 'magic' could be applied in a positive sense to the befiefs of sub-Saharan Africa and 
Egypt. 'Magic' was accepted by many post-traditional authors as being neither unscientific nor 
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inherently evil, and some sources readily accepted as vaUd the content of both V\/estern and 
Africanised esotericism or occultism. Given that innovative or traditionally unbound thought was 
associated t·'llith the practice of what ~'\Jas called magic or l·'llitchcraft. it ~·Jas perhaps 
understandable that many of the sources consulted in this study ttJOuld deai with these themes 
(5.1.1, 5.1.2). 
5.4.1 THE SCIENCE OF THE OCCULT 
The origin of magic was, according to some vitalist (and French-speaking) authors, traceable to a 
fife-force or the equivalent which was the source of magical efficacy (cf. Maquet 1972: 64 etc.). 
Related to this explanation 1.'\Jas the Hermetic and esoteric idea that magic was an exploitation of 
the interconnectedness of nature itseif (james 1954: 76; Gonza!ez-'vVippler 1973: 146). Severai 
authors gave Usts of 'lati\ls' or principles underlying their mystical worldview: often these were 
more llke confessional statements than explanations of the way magic worked (cf. De Montellano 
1991 : 4 7) but occasionally one found lists of actual la~·Js purporting to systematise the ~·Jorking of 
magic. Kamalu (1990: 81-82) seemed fairly confident that magical hypotheses could in the right 
sort of thought-system acquire a scientific character: 
"\t\/hether one sees these principles of magic as vaHd or not: or as being identical, in 
some aspects, with Newton's laws or not, one can see from the comparisons made that 
they are scientific principles in as much as they leave themselves open to proof or 
disproof as 1tiJell as being logically feasible. One could 1tiJell imagine such laws being 
scientifical~/ estabUshed in some afternative J'.\ristotelian' system: 
Certain problems, hot111ever, in the concession of a 'scientific' status to magic have already been 
touched on {5.1.1 ). 
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF tvtAGIC 
According to Eliphaz Levi, as cited by Senghor (1964: 262~. there 1.\tas only one basic law of 
magic, namely that the visible manifested the invisib te, the perfect word manifested the unseen 
vital force. This statement included a theme relating to correspondence in the reflection of the 
seen by the unseen, and another theme relating to contact, in the connection of the magic word 
with the force behind it. These t1No themes were echoed in the magical la111,1s of f razer, as cited 
and interpreted by Kamalu (1990: 81), namely the Law of Sympathy, according to which a given 
action !Nould produce a similar (or equal and opposite) reaction, and the Law of Contagion, 
according to which objects once in contact retained their relatedness and interdependence. By 
means of these laws a human act could be, according to a magical 11\1orldvie1 . ..,, empowered to 
have the same effect on the world as a natural cause, as in Levi-Strauss' definition of 'magic' 
(Senghor 1964: 267). 
LISTS 0 F MAG !CAL LAWS 
-""' 
More detailed lists of latl\IS than those mentioned above were given by Frye (1988: 56ff) and 
Barashango (1991: 167ff). Barashango mentioned, in his description of the workings of the Ptah 
principle, that the spiritual power of the African \Nas facilitated by contact with the earth, and by 
the fact of his/her belonging to the 'Sun people' (whose togetherness was related to Ptah's 
attribute as source of Order), and required the integration of male and female powers. He also 
stressed that visualisation and the law of karma were influential !n the use of magical power. Frye 
was more expffcitly Hermetic in listing the laws of magic, and included in these la111,1s the principles 
of mentafist vitalism, rhythm and the 'panta rhei' - as well as the well known Hermetic principle 
('as above, so below'), and the laws of polarity, gender, and monistic quantum-occasionalist 
cause and effect. In each of these cases the laws cited could be grouped into tttJo categories: 
those describing the sources of pcw..ier and vitality and the forms of interrelatedness underfying 
magic, thereby constituting virtual explications of the Law of Contagion, and those describing 
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processes of emergent repRcation and 'equal and opposite reaction' which constituted virtual 
explications of the Law of Similarity. It was in fact found that most of the facts and beliefs about 
magic in the data could be related to this t~·Jofold scheme, and that this scheme provoked various 
insights concerning the idea and attempted practice of 'magic' itself in post-traditional Africa and 
elsetAJhere. 
5.4.2 THE LAW OF CONTAGION: POWER SOURCES 
Many sources 1rJere in agreement that magical power depended on.some sort of union or contact. 
Union with Nature was an important source of power indicated by vitalist philosophy and implied 
by Hermetism in its relation of magical efficacy to the interconnectedness of the world's parts (cf. 
Huiin 1962: 60-61). As james (1954: 76) put it: 
"The quaiities or attiibutes of entities, human or divine, are distributed throughout their 
various parts, and contact with such entities releases these qualities." 
The theme of union with nature was Afrocentrised by Banfshango ( 1991 : 6, 166, 167, 171) in his 
stress on the powers inherent in melanin, the land of Africa, and the spirit of the black people. 
Related to union tAJith nature (and indeed non-different from it, if one accepted the vitalist premise) 
was the use of the inner self as a power source, to be accessed through silent meditation (Some 
1994: 256). Some sources related the power of the orisha to the inner self as a source of power 
(Gonzalez-V\Jippler 1973: 85; Neimark 1993: 7). Geschiere (1997: 7ff) and Barashango (1991: 
171 :) alluded to connections between occutt power and the social order, but this was only a minor 
theme. Since remoteness from nature and the hiddenness of the self, such as existed in the 
'profane' or public world, entailed remoteness from the power source, one could offer this as an 
explanation both for Some's belief that talking about power sources diminished their power 
(Some 1994: 258), and of the fact that social interdependence did not figure largely in the data as 
a power source. The possibility of conserved sexuai power (or asceticism) as a power source was 
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obviated in certain post-traditional African authors by the influence of the fertility ethic (2.5.2) 
although ascetic themes in Hermetism allowed for the concept (Hutin 1962: 62). 
5.4.3 THE LAW OF SIMILARITY: UTILISING POWER 
A frequent way of utmsing po1t>1er, found in the data, vi1as the Word, or Logos. This could be found 
in more traditional Africanised ritual in the form of magical chanting and other verbal expressions 
(Gonzalez-Wippler 1973: 147ff; Jahn 1961: 151) and in more post-traditional thought in the form 
of Thought as a source of magical power, through creative visualisation and positive thinking 
(Barashango 1991: 177ff. 190) and meditation or experience related to meditation (Some 1994: 
256: Kruger 1995: 321-322). Both verbal and mental or imaginative expression were forms of 
replication, and appHed the law of simiiarity found in Eliphaz Levi's one dogma of High Magic. 
OCCULT POVVER AND SECRECY 
Despite the power inherent in words (since their similarity, by the !aw of Contagion, united them to 
what they represented), the fact of expression in the public world, for Some {1994: 256), 
separated the words from the heart of reality whence they drew their power, and hence arose a 
paradox, that verbal expression not only actualised power but at the same time depleted it. 
Hence, silence was essential for maintaining power. Thus for Some (1994: 28i), as for several 
other authors, some sort of secrecy 1."Jas essential to the use and communication of occult power: 
although some authors seem to doubt that an 'esotericism' as such existed in traditional African 
mysticism (3.3.1), and Geschiere (1997: 204) pointed out that an occult power nobody knew 
about would not come across as very efficacious, other authors took it for granted that where 
there 1111as occult power there had to be secrecy. 
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KNO\/\/LEDGE AS REDEMPTION 
The motifs of \1'\/ord or Thought as a source of power, and the need for secrecy, combined in the 
phenomenon of Gnosis or a secret redemptive knowledge. Many of the authors studied, 
especially the Egyptological ones, accepted the Gnostic concept of salvation or empowerment as 
part of the African heritage. The means of African achievement of Gnosis indicated in the data 
varied from the mysterious experience of initiation (Some 1994: 22 Hf, etc.} or sacrifice (Neimark 
1993: 37) to the use of divine archetypes (cf. Barnes 1989: 3, 20) and other forms of knoll'-Jledge-
based meditation (Barashango 1991: 117ff etc.). Gonzalez-Wipp!er (1973: 65) emphasised faith 
and wiU-power as a source of empowerment, but related this to magical contact 1•-.Jith the orishas 
tl\lithin us, and thus ~·Jas not an exception to the Gnostic trend in post-traditional thought about 
Africa. The quasi-Gnostic understanding oi African religion was not restricted to occuitic authors 
but could also be found in a vitalist interpretation of African reffgion, according to which vital 
forces such as lay behind magic were the principal object of philosophical knowledge (~vlasolo 
1994: 54.ff). 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The religious life of the post-traditional Africanised person, as explored in this study, involved 
various attempted strategies of innovation adopted against the background of pre-conceptions 
about the universe (2), about history (3), and about the African cultural heritage itself (4). A 
preoccupation lfllith knowledge, both ordinary and mystical, formed a significant part of these 
s1rategies of development. 
Common or widely-shared areas of agreement in the data included: a desire to get rid of the 
image of traditional Africa as technologically backv>Jard; interest in traditional healing ( 5 .1 .1) and 
witchcraft (5.1.2) as features of African religion requiring discussion; an acceptance of empirical 
knowledge or experience as an important part of religion (5.2.1}; a belief that Africa had the 
198 
potential to equal, if not surpass, the intellectual achievements of the West (5.2.2}; the desire for 
a humanistic or Africanised reinterpretation or re-thinking of Western science. and a holistic and 
humanistic form of African education: belief in a 'science of magic' (5.4.1) l·\lith laws of contact and 
utilisation explicable in terms of the Frazerian la1t.1s of magic (5.4.2-3); acceptance of extrasensory 
experience (5.3.1) and transcendent meaning (5.2.1) as 1111ell as ordinary experience: belief in the 
\/I.lord or Thought as important expressions of power (5.4.3); and belief in the existence of 
religious personages ti\!ho possessed expertise in the realm of extrasensory experience or magic 
(5.3.3). 
Areas of disagreement or difference of emphasis in the data could be indicated as follows. 
Firstly, the actual methods of achieving mystical consciousness or magical results varied 
from author to author, although certain underlying principles were similar and the various 
methods were also integrable or mutually non-exclusive (5.4). Related to this was a 
difference of emphasis as to the role of race, sexuality and society in the generation o.f occult 
power (cf. 5.4.2). 
Secondly, the desirability of secrecy in occult knowledge and its impartation was an area of 
difference of viewpoint (5.4.3), as was the significance of the initia1ion ceremony (5.3.2). 
Thirdly, not ail authors believed that the occult povrer attributed to traditional Africa li'Jas a 
reality (5.1.2). To some extent, this difference seemed to be an effect of the inclusion of 
outsider perspectives in the study (1.4.2). Yet even among believers there was no consensus 
on the integrabifrty of traditional heafing with Western science, some appearing to deny it, 
others to affirm it (5.1.1 ). Not an authors agreed on the meaning of the word 'magic' (5.4 }, and 
ideas of the 'magically expert' person tended to vary, especiaUy under the influence of 
Egyptological concepts (5.3.3), and likewise the idea of the witch' had no universally agreed-
on definition (5 .1.2). 
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.As in the case of post-traditional theology and cosmology, this !.\laS an area of thought where 
inclusive tendencies tended to be more prominent than exclusive ones - in. contrast to the post-
traditional discussion of history and the African cultural heritage, 1Nhich sometimes gave rise to 
important polarisations. !vlost of the differences in emphasis in the realm of strategies took the 
form of definitional standpoints: What was 'magic'? \Nhat l.'Jas science? \Nhat were \•Jitches'? 
\/Vho were the experts in science and magic, and what was their relative status? 
Most vietNpoints were agreed on the significance of lmo1Nledge and mysticism as important areas 
of discussion, 111Jhelher posifr.;e or negative, in the contemporary ideological development of the 
African tradition, however this 11.ias conceived: and in thought about mysticism and magic the 
influence of the 'perennial philosophy' concept associated with Hermetism and the Ne~'IJ Age was 
discernible in Egyptological authors. The development of an interdiscipUnarf paradigm of thought 
(cf. 5.2.1) in contrast to the present model of\Nestern science was a similarly visible concern: and 
the relationship of this tendency to similar trends among non-African New Age groups ll'.lin be 
brieily explored in the next chapter, which deals inter alia with the ultimate goals of happiness and 
transformation sought by post-traditional African religion. 
The problem of how to achieve public recognition of African 'magical science' by the sceptical 
West was as yet unsolved by the sources studied: various indications in the data existed that the 
paradigm of esoteric or magical knov~ledge in African and post-traditional African religion was 
based more on tradition, consensus and internal coherence of pattern-systems than on 
verification and tangible or replicable proof ( 5 .1.1-2, 5 .3 .1). The sources studied indicated that 
Africanised psychotechnology had yet to achieve a track record of tNorldtNide achievement 
comparable with that of more well-kno1rm Western technology, although Western quantitative 
science might not be able to claim an assured predominance in the sphere of scientific 
knowledge. 
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5 THE DESTINY OF AFRICAN LIFE 
The post-traditional African religious life, as manifested in the data, involved several reHgious and 
moral aims. Many of these aims have already been dealt with in Chapter 3, which explored the 
problem of African-\Nestem relations and racial conflict. and Chapter 4, which dealt with morai 
and poiitical ideas in relation to the indigenous or Egyptological cultural heritage claimed by the 
authois. But still to be expioied weie the questions of destiny in general, life after death, earthly 
happiness. and the goals of mystical development. Each of these concepts related to the 
perceived goal to tNhich the strategies of innovation and/or cultural preservation of various post-
traditional A.fricanised authors !.'Jere directed. 
6.1 THE SURVIVAL OF THE HUMAN 
The vast majority of the authors studied accepted some form of immortanty or survival of death as 
part of Africanised belief (cf. De Montellano 1991: 4 7; Barashango 1991: 187, 206; Kamalu 1990: 
70; 0 sabutey-A.guedze 1990: 56, 64; etc.). Nevertheless there were some differences in the 
concepts of how exactly the human being survived death. and both Egyptian and traditional sub-
Saharan ideas of survival contributed to the explanations of immortality which were advanced in 
the data. 
6.1.1 BODY AND SP!R!T 
AJI authors, obviously, betieved that humans were endowed with physical bodies, by reason of 
which they formed part of the physical universe. Yet when it came to ideas of the spirit, things 
were less clear. Certain Egyptological authors appeared to accept the conventional belief in a 
mortal body and immortal soul as an authentic African concept (cf. Keita 1984: 63); but according 
to Wiredu (1996: 43, 45, 47) the traditional concept of survival of death in Africa involved the 
continuation of the personafity in an invisible but quasi-material form: while Gyekye (1987: 99ff) 
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argued that the individual spirit, even in sub-Saharan African thought, was distinguishable from 
the body. Certain authors viewed matter and spirit as mutually convertible in African belief, so that 
material reality could, at the approach of death or in the course of human development, be 
converted into a spiritual form (cf. Barashango 1991 : 206; B'Nasseem 1992: 21). 
THE PARTS OF THE SELF 
SUB-SAi-i.ARAN TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS 
Many viewpoints, related to traditional African belief, viewed the human self as a complex of 
many invisible parts in addition to his/her physical frame. A distinction ~·Jas frequently drcwJn 
bettl'Jeen the body and two other human components, nameiy a 'divine spark' which survived 
death, and a '!01111er component' of a more earthly nature, v11hich couid function as a sort of spirit 
double during earthly life (cf. Gyekye 1987: 38ff; De Rosny 1985: 59), and often faded atrJay or 
perished tf'Jith the death of the body (cf. \IViredu 1996: 50). Additional components to these could 
be found in various Africanised religious orientations claiming a sub-Saharan affiliation, and 
Mutwa (1960: 549) isolated no less than six parts of the human self, viz. body, mind, soul, ena 
(an impersonal spirit double capable of persisting after death for finite periods), living force and 
adverse force. 
In the sources explored in the present study, the relationship of the 'parts of the self in African 
traditional belief to the spirits of the ancestors tended to be obscure. Mutwa (s.a.: 135) identified 
the ancestral spirit lf'Jith the ena. ll'Jhich faded at.'\Jay after death unless sustained by means of 
ancestral veneration rituals. Jahn (1961: 106, 107, 108), on the other hand, seemed to identify 
the ancestor with the immortal self. 
202 
EGYPTOLOGICAL CONCEPTS 
The picture tt.Jas further complicated by the Egyptian subdivision of the human into the ka. the ba. 
and other components, which some authors accepted, particularly James (1954: 122-125) who 
treated he Egyptian scheme as the source of Aristotelian faculty-ps~hofogy. Kamatu identified 
the ba with the divine spark, which for him had no individuality after death apart tom God, and 
treated the ka as an aspect of the physical self. Most of the authors regarded the ka as part of the 
human, thus differing from the view of the Egyptologist Breasted (1959: 52, 56, 81) who regarded 
the ka as a guardian spirit. not part of the human at all. Breasted's vie1/\Js basically reduced the 
Egyptian human to a composite of the body and the ba, the latter being quasi-material and 
surviving death. This interpretation had an interesting resemblance to the quasi-material concept 
of survival in African religion alluded to by v\iiredu and tv1biti (1989: 79). 
NEW AGE ANTHROPOLOGY 
Barashango (1991: 180, 183, 187, 206) further complicated matters by integrating traditional 
African ideas vvith New Age concepts. He argued that since atoms h'llere immortal physicafy and 
spiritually, human death was an illusion, and the ancestors were continued in the atoms of their 
children.· From this he dretN the conclusion, reminiscent of traditional communal and 
ancestrio!ogical A.frican religion, that procreation was a means of perpetuation of the species, 
whereby the African people as a whole achieved immortality. /ls far as New A.ge ideas were 
concerned, Barashango adJpted the concept of the aura, or psychically visible envelope of 
colours around the physical body, which he represented as an Egyptian belief. He also 
subdivided the human self into an ego and a higher or divine self, indicating that the individual 
could achieve immortality by merging his/her ego 1.'.Jith the higher self, and becoming one with the 
One. In this way the individual vJou!d ultimately achieve freedom from materiality, supersede the 
death of the material self. and be absorbed into the pure spiritual reality of the divine mind. 
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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF KM1ALU 
!NDIVI DUAUi'l AFTER DEA iH 
A destiny of divine absorption of the self. resembling the one proposed by Barashango in some 
points ~'IJas envisaged by Kamalu (1990: 70, 71, 143, 144) who went so far as to deny all 
individual existence apart from the body. He accepted that personal immortality could be 
achieved in the form of remembrance by one's descendants, and discussed the concept of 
reincarnation, of which he distinguished an Egy'})tian concept which involved a liberation of the 
individual from the wheel of rebirth (as in Eastern thought) and a traditionaHy derived African 
concept of reincarnation in one's descendants, in which 1he child inherits traits of a foreparent 
rather than the entire personality'. Both ideas had in common the theme of the ultimate 
absorption or loss of one's individuality in a wider sphere (the divine sphere and the collective 
sphere respectively). 
THE PLUF?AUT'i" OF !NDIV/DUALS AFiER DEATH 
Kamalu's anthropology distinguished between the noumenal self, tNhich v.ias non-different from 
God, and the phenomenal individuality of the person, tt<Jhich tNas tNholly dependent on the 
physical body (cf. Kamalu 1990: 35, 36, 68, 69-70, 105); for him there was no possibiUty of 
individual consciousness apart from the physical body, the idea of a noumenal plurality based on 
the relationship of spirits to physical individuals being foreign to his thought. In this way Kamalu 
differed from Barashango { 1991: 206) who stated that an individual ~~ho realised his/her nature, 
as a soul or intellect capable of surviving death, and the product of an evolution Intended to 
produce mind from matter, could achieve immortality 'in and through a proper relationship 
betv.ieen the ego and the Universal lvlind', which wording seemed to imply that the individual 
united with God after death did not have to tNholly lose his/her individuality, but could exist with 
God in a collaborative and divinising unity (cf. Steyn 1994: 178-179; Barashango 1991: 160). 
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THfi POSSIBILITY OF SYNCRETISM 
The predominance of an inclusive or syncretist view of divinity in the post-traditional Africanised 
God-concepts of the data led lo the question of ~·Jhether there was a similar syncretism of se!f-
concepts derived from various religious viewpoints. In Barashango, certainly, there seemed to be 
some palpable New Age borrowings, despite his disparaging remarks about Western occultism 
(Barashango 1991: 203): concepts like the aura, er the higher self and lower self. were linked i•:ith 
more traditional..,A.frican-sounding ideas like perpetuation of the race through one's descendants. 
Nevertheless there was some reluctance in some authors to emphasise separation of spirit and 
body, the views of Neimark (1993: 2) and Kamalu (1990: 69-70, 105) being cases in point. The 
ideal of holistic integration of dimensions of the self ~·\Jas accepted by many authors. as will be 
seen (6.3.1 ). What then was the significance of poiychoiomist schemes ihat subdivided the 
human into many components? 
THE THEME OF PARTICIPATION 
A possible clue to this lay in the relationships of the self to reality that 1.'IJere presupposed by the 
distinctions bet11'1Jeen the parts. An important theme shared by various sub-Saharan African and 
Egyptological ideas of body and spirit 1Nas the 1heme of participation. Existing descriptions of 
traditional African religion shov-Jed manifest signs of the subdivision of invisible principles in the 
human according to participative relationships: for example, the Akan ntoro and mogya linked the 
individual to his/her father and mother ( lkenga-Nletuh 1931 : 36, 33), and the lgbo obi, chi and eke 
were related to participative relationships with the physical environment. God and the ancestors 
( lkenga-lvtetuh 1991 : 57). In Hermetic cosmology the human being 111Jas viewed as participating in 
the world of animals through his/her body, and in the world of the gods through his/her spirit 
(Keita 1984: 63). And at the same time, aH reality was one, so that the human being finked in 
his/her ot'llll person visible nature and the unseen. To some extent this was also true of certain 
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aspects of Mutwa's anthropology: his 'Ufe force' united the human with God, and the 'adverse 
principle' linked him/her with the evil in the Universe. 
THE QUESTiON OF HUivtA.N iNTER!viEDlARY STATUS 
African authors in this study who dealt with Hermetism or Egyptology, however, did not all accept 
!he theme of the human as intermediar/ between matter and spirit in lhe strict sense. The 
comments ventured by Barashango (1991: 140, 188, 206) on what he deemed to be 
contradictions in Genesis 1 and 2 revealed that he did not possess the idea of 'stewardship', 
111Jhereby the human being was a servant of God in this world and a ruler of the earth 
simultaneously. He seemed, in general, not to give humanity a constant intermediary position as 
the personification of the iink between maiter and spirit. Rather, V'Jhile accepting that the black 
human participated in God through the Ptah principie, he stressed that his/her materiality li\ias the 
vestige of an animal past which he/she was destined eventually to discard. This effectively made 
the idea of an ongoing 'intermediary' role of the human somewhat retrogressive and an obstacle 
to further evolution towards the state of pure spirituality. 
6.1.2 REINCARNATION 
ln descriptions of VJhat happened after death, authors tended to be very vague concerning the 
nature of purely spiritual forms of existence, but clearer on the forms of incarnate existence 
possible after death. The idea of reincarnation was ~'Jidely accepted in the data as an African 
concept, and ll'Jas predictab~f retained in some form by authors shotrJing signs of NetrJ Age 
influence, such as Neimark (1993: 7). Several forms of reincarnationism could be indicated. 
206 
ANCESTRAL REINCARNATION 
A common form of reincarnationism, with roots in traditional sub-Saharan African religion, was 
belief in reincarnation within one's biood!ine, or rebirth through one's biood relatives. According to 
Kamalu (1990: 143) this could not be straightfoni11ardly described as ihe transfer of personality 
from one's 01tm body to the body of a descendant - and indeed, accoiding to his philosophy 
individuality ceased after death, making the reconstitution of numerically the same person 
problematic. But not all authors seemed to experience the same problem: the Rastafarian idea of 
ancestral reincarnation seemed to treat transmigrating souls as straightfon.'\lardly passing from 
body to body, as when the modern black race was viell'Jed as the reincarnation of the ancient 
Israelite people of the Old Testament (Turner 1930: 53), punished for the sins of past lives by 
temporar:r subjugation to white rule. The identity of persons was biurred oniy in the sense that 
past-life identifications made one person out of what normally v11ould have been thought of as 
separate individuals: for example, all the prophets were deemed in Rastafarianism to be one 
person repeated~/ manifested (Hood 1990: 99-100), a theme which ~·Jas to be found elsewhere in 
the data (cf. 8.3.2). 
ETERNAL CYCLIC REINCARNATION 
A somewhat unusual idea of reincarnation was put forward byMutwa (s.a.: 137ff): he argued that 
there were seven stages of reincarnatior1 (grass, iree, beast, human, reptile, bird and star} and 
that this sequence v'\Jas simpiy repeated over and over in an eternal cyclical process. There was 
no possibility of liberation from the cycle, but rather, in conformity with certain trends in 
indigenous African religion (cf. Kaboha 1992: 70), the cycle of nature, 111Jith which reincarnation 
was connected, was represented as a normal and natural rhythm. Fr:re (1988: 45) was the only 
other author to explicitly refer to Mutwa's reincarnation theor:r, but he interpreted the stages 
symbolically as referring to ievels of consciousness. The stages leading up to the human level 
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s1ood for ordinary human consciousness, the later stages represented a higher level of 
consciousness. and the reptile stage was a 'bridge' or transition point betvJeen the two. 
STANDARD PYTHAGOREAN RElNCARNA.TlO N 
Many authors seemed to accept what Kamalu ( 1990: 70) identified as a more ancient 'African· 
idea of reincarnation, name~J the concept of an individual persisting spirit transmigrating !Tom 
body to body, associated with Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Hermetism and in modern times 
Theosophy and the Ne1111 .Age. Ole la ( 1984: 37) identified Egypt as the source of Orphism and 
Pythagorean phikJsophy, and thus. by implication, of their reincarnationism, and Barashango 
(1991: 89, 167, 187) indicated his acceptance of the la.'11 of Karma and of belief in the repeated 
incarnation of the divine in the form of Hindu avatars and Messianic figures, although he 
integrated this ~·Jith belief in the perpetuation of the ancestors in the atoms of their African 
descendants. Osabutey-A.guedze (1990: 58) attributed this 'African' reincarnationism even to 
Aristotle, thus tracing his ps)-t:hology as t.\letl as Plato's to an Egyptian precedent. A similar-idea to 
this reincamationism was found in the Umbanda reHgion, but this was deemed not so much an 
.African as an adopted V\/estern spiritualist belief: and the explanation of reincarnation involv~ the 
use of Western spiritualist concepts such as, for example, that of special missions or Hfe-lessons 
app~;ing to particular incarnations (cf. Ortiz 1990: 93). Such a concept nevertheless were not 
wholly without an Africanised precedent in the Yoruba-derived idea of personal destiny (cf. 
Neimark 199:3: 7). 
WHY REINCARNATION? 
The preference for reincarnationist ideas rather than ideas of disembodied existence seemed to 
be related to a taste for immanentist rather than transcendent God-ideas: indeed, it was common 
to see pantheism and reincarnation accepted simultaneously by many perspectives. In both 
cases there seemed to be the concern to have the spiritual realities of religion close at hand: the 
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afterlife, like the God, had to be somehow related to Hfe in this world. Further evidence of 
immanentlst concern lay in the vagueness of ideas in the data concerning the nature of 
disembodied spiritual existence, as opposed to the relative clarity of concepts of reincarnation. 
6.1.3 THE INTERMEDIATE STATE 
Concerning the nature of existence bett•Jeen incarnations, the data t,.Jere vague: Kamalu (5.1.1), 
as has been mentioned, did not accept the idea of an individual incorporeal existence, atthough 
he mentioned that ancient Egyptian ideas on judgement seem~d to presuppose this sort of 
individuality, and not by means of habitation of a nell'J body either. Diop (Moore 1986: 233) saw 
Egyptian befiefs on the intermediate state as being more of an asset than a problem, being yet 
another exampie of the African anticipation of V\iesiern religious ideas. Barashango (1991: 187) 
believed in the possibiUty of an afterlife beyond the earth-plane at the ievel of everlasting cosmic 
energy, and in the suivival of death by the ancestors, although their degree of individuality apart 
from God ~·ras debatable ot~ing to the destiny of fusion between ego and !l'Jider self (cf. 5.1.1 ). 
Mutt/\Ja (1960: 243ff) and Neimark (1993: 21ff, 24) both believed in the individual surnivai of the 
ancestors. AJthough Mutwa did not accept the idea of a personal divine judgement, he did accept 
that, as the result of an impersonal retribution, a soul could become 'damned' through exclusion 
from the reincarnation cycle (cf. Mutwa s.a.: 132-133; 1960: 243), or alternatively admitted into 
the happy netherworld of the ancestors (Mutwa 1960: 243ff). 
In general, however, there were few attempts to elaborate in detail on what life was like apart 
from the body. More attention lt'Jas given to the phenomenon of reincarnation, and also to that of 
the theme or symbol of the Messianic figure, whose repeated incarnation seemed to furnish a 
clearer goal of personal development and fulfilment in a post-traditional Africanised pattern typical 
of the thought found in the data than any picture of incorporeal bliss (6.3.2). 
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6.1.4 MUTWA ON THE ENO OF THE WORLD AND THE RESURRECTION 
The Christian idea of bodily resurrection did not appear to fit into Africanised thought as far as 
could be gaihered from the sources studied. Mutwa (s.a.: 243ff) believed that in the future the 
world beloti\J' would rise to the surface of the earth, and so the world as we mortals knetill it il\Jould 
cease - but this circumstance, it appeared, v11ould involve the generation of a new and better 
human race to dwell on the physical earth, rather than the cessation of the cycle of reincarnation 
itself. There was certainly no question of the inauguration of a quasi-eschatological resurrection, 
1Nhich idea Mutwa (s.a.: 244-245) stigmatised as a \Nestern belief, foreign to African thought. 
6.1.5 THE AFTERLIFE !N RELATION TO RELIGION AS A WHOLE 
The connection bet!J'Jeen ancestors and the afterlife suggested that in much of the post-traditional 
African thought of this study the question was not so much "\/\/hat happens to me after death?" as 
"\AJhat shall I become after death?" or "What shall I change into?" Certain post-traditional African 
ideas about the afterlife could be viewed as an aspect of the personal goals of those who 
believed in them, a dimension of religion integrable with the happiness and serenity they sought 
in this fife as weU as the next. As Barashango (1991: 206) said: 
"When one makes up their mind that intellect is superior to and supersedes matter, [this] 
is to take the most important step of au in the living of a serene and effective life. The soul 
grows within even as the body decays without, and one ll'Jho is able in the end to merge 
his/her sense of being with that of the Secret Self has perpetuated himself/herself, has 
achieved immortality.• 
The hope thus sought was apparently meant to provide consolation in this life, not merely bliss in 
the next. Indeed, views on the destiny of the human in the data were often linked not so much 
with the afterlife as on what lay in store for one during the present iife. 
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6.2 THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GOALS 
Although certain of the authors in this study accepted bellef in fate or destiny of some sort, this 
idea did not aki'Jays rule out a beHef in personal freedom. Neimark (1993: 7), though adhering to 
an African tradition that made much of the idea of destiny, stated as one of the principles of !fa 
that •except for the day you 1111ere born and the day you are supposed to die, there is no single 
event in your life that cannot be forecast and, where necessary, changed." Destiny l/IJaS 1hus 
more of a goal or ideal than an irresistible fate. ln line with this concept many of the authors, 
inciuding some who li'rere inspired by the Yoruba religion, stressed that personal effort and 
achievement v11ere, in African belief and religious life, necessary for the reaiisation of happiness. 
6.2.1 PERSONAL ACHIEVEMENT AND REDEMPTION 
HUrv~ EFFORT 
Many of the authors followed what might, using Christian terminology, be called a Pelagian 
concept of the way to happiness. 0 sabutey-Aguedze ( 1990: 92, 216) rejected the trends in 
V\lestern theology based on the concept of total depravity, and thus insisted on natural effort 
;ather than reUance on God's grace, independent of any natural activity or transformation, as a 
ll'Jay to achieve one's ultimate goals. Kamalu (1990: 71~72) similarly regarded religious faith as 
useless unless it was actualised in deeds, and even then it was not an essential part of the 
religious life as in Christianity, since Kamalu viewed atheism and theism as equally defensible. 
Neimark (1993: 7, 16, 18ff) argued that sacrifice and the observance of taboos were necessary, 
not as absolute rules, but on pragmatic grounds, since Yoruba rituals would not work for you 
unless you followed the principles on which they were based. Neimark (1993: 36, 30) viewed the 
Universe as, in a certain sense, unforgiving and harsh, ll\lith a dark or violent side that had to be 
faced. The theme of retributive 'unforgiveness' also cropped up in the form of the Lat.'\l of Karma, 
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accepted by Barashango (1991: 168), according to ~'>lhich the consequences of one's deeds were 
unavoidable and all-determining. 
DIVINE HELP 
Post-traditional African religion was far from lacking in certain of tts trends the idea of divine 
influence on one's life, and the invocation of divine help. But since many of the authors accepted 
a worldview in which God and the self were one, divine help usually could not be obtained 
independently of personal effort of some sort. This effort did not have to be purely external, since 
meditation. visualisation and so forth could also be used to actuaHse the power of divinity ll'Jithin 
(cf. Some 1994: 256). Nevertheless, as Mutwa (1960: 497) pointed out, a pantheistic or 
panentheistic ~·.iorldview accepting the concept of creative visualisation implied that in the end it 
was not an external God, or an ex1ernal spirit, but rather one's oitm mind, .exercising the po1.•Jer 
within itself, that really answered one's prayers. 
SALVATION 
As a consequence of the above mindset, the idea of salvation by external divine aid, as in 
Christianity, was not accepted by any of the authors of the study, except for those who had a 
Christian background (cf. lvlbiti 1989: 96-97): and even among authors with a Christian 
background the idea of salvation or redemption ~·Jas reconceived in a more horizontal fashion. 
f{N0'0/LEDGE AND SOCIAL ACTION 
The t~'\JO most common ideas of redemption in the data, ~ere indeed the idea of redemption 
arose at aH, were the gnostic idea of liberation through knowledge (5.4.3) - which could take the 
form of an experiential inner transformation (Barashango 1991: 206), an initiation (Some 1994: :?i), 
a growth in knowledge of the arts and sciences v.sith a mystical goal in mind (James 1954: 1) or a 
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changed understanding of his1ory and destiny (Barashango 1991: 4-9) - and the idea of 
redemption through ideological and social transformation by the efforts of .the black people (cf. 
Kamalu 1990: 8). These two ideas were not mutually exclusive: James (1954: 1, 158, 162) 
accepted both, and both shared the common element of an Afrocentric transformationalfy-
oriented kno~'\lledge-base, in the sense that the wisdom of Africa and Afrocentrism played a 
central and foundational role in both forms of redemption. Nor did belief in social virtue 
necessarily rule out the ascetic or so»tary dimension of religion: the idea of self-disciplined effort 
formed part of gnostic 'redemption' in vietAJS which borrowed their ideas of virtue and moral 
improvement from ancient Egypt (cOllaybee 1999: 155; James 1954: 30ff). 
THE PRIORITY OF.MENTAL E11AA/1!C!PAT!ON 
There was a tendency among authors lo ascribe a redemptive role to Africa primarily in the 
context of the propagation of the message of Afrocentrism, and only secondarily in the context of 
social activism. James (1954: 158, 162), for example, understood by 'philosophy of redemption' 
primarily the mental emancipation of the black people, although he did regard the social 'Gospel 
.. 
of Happiness' as a consequence of this. Similarly Barashango (1991: xii, 4-9, 167, 206}, alttfough 
accepting personal and social transformation as the result of the African's enlightened self-
perception, claimed 1ha1 the message of Afrocentrism in spirituality, rather than religious 
conversion, was the aim of his writing on religious issues. The aims of Afrocentric emancipation 
were sometimes far-reaching in scope, as in the 'mission statement' of Kaboha (1992: 76): 
•it is the job of Africa now to lift this veil of blindness before it is too late for the !l'Jhole 
tNOrld. It is the turn of Africa to play missionary to Europe, America and even .Asia." 
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6.2.2 SOCIAL AND NATURAL TRANSFORMATION 
The ideals of social achievement envisaged by the authors studied. in addition to the mental 
emancipation described above, were frequently coloured by the struggles for independence in 
their respective countries, and tended to endorse these ideals as a matter of course. Thus. 
original post-traditional African thought in this sphere tended to belong, in this study, to thinkers 
t•Jho were also political leaders. such as Nkrumah and Senghor. On the other hand. more vague 
but still innovative expectations of social transformation were found in authors who had been 
influenced by the New A.ge movement. 
THE IDEAL SOCIETY 
The only detailed plan for an ideal society in the data, along lines mostly compatible t'liith \Ne stern 
democracy, yet formulated in a post-traditional mould. was that of Senghor ( 1984: 269ff, 282). 
Senghor argued that the moralising influences of traditional African society - to wit, respect for 
ir-Jomen, democratic chieftainship, all-embracing reHgion, initiatory age-grade societies as aids to 
social integration, personaHsm, communal ownership of property- embodied African values which 
modern African leaders ignored at their peril. With the possible exception of his treatment of 
private property as something profane, most of these values seemed to be integrable v.Jith 
Western democracy. A similar plan to Senghor's, to preserve African values in a modern society, 
was drawn up by Ezeanya (1991: 239ff), whose thought, however, seemed to be cast in a 
conservative Cathofic mould, and thus did not, strictly speaking, belong to the non-Christianised 
post-traditional type of religion envisaged by this study; nor were his ideas, like Senghor's, 
significantly related to the mysticism of other less Christianised post-traditional authors. It 
appeared possible that plans for a detailed and, by V\/estern standards, democratic specification 
of the social order in a post-colonial society, was somehow related to a Christian background: a 
less Christianised vie~'llpoint, like Nkrumah's consciencism, would take less account of Western 
values, or of human rights as the West understood them. 
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THE NEWWORLD 
CATASTROPHE AND RECOVERY' 
A few authors referred to a coming catastrophe, after ~\thich a new age could be expected to 
datNn: whether these ideas were truly of African origin was debatable. Reference has already 
been made to Mutwa's expectations of the rising of the ancestral nethenNorld (6.1.4.). Another 
author that could be mentioned was Barash an go ( 1991: 34), who adopted in an Africanised form 
the Hindu scheme of avatars, including the last avatar Kalki t.\lho tNaS expected to usher in a ne~'.l 
world after a future catastrophe. Apart tom these eX1reme examples, other authors tended to 
view future social transformation more in terms of an Afrocentric reconstruction of society in the 
ruture, along the lines envisaged by the mental and social idea of redemption outlined in 6.2.1. 
THE RESTORAT!OiV OF ANClBl/T AFRICAN REUGiON 
Ideas of a future social redemption of or by Africa by various authors were sometimes related to 
the idea of a 'fall' in the African past, leading to the decUne of ancient Egyptian civilisation (2°'.5.3). 
This concept of an Egyptian 'fall' was related to the Hermetic pessimism concerning Egyptian 
religion, and the Hermetic prophecy that the Egyptian gods were destined to fall into disuse (cf. 
Bernal 1987: 129ff). Nevertheless Hermetic views on ultimate divine union demanded, and the 
vie~'.Js of several authors in this study confirmed, that the 'fall' of ancient '.African' religion and 
wisdom would not necessarily be accepted as permanent by Hermetic esotericists. Barashango 
(1991) and James (1954) could be viewed as authors t.\lho were making attempts to reverse what 
the Hermetic corpus had prophesied, by atl\lakening new interest in the ancient mysticism of 
Africa. 
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THENEWAGE 
New Age authors commenting on the African tradition varied. in their· interpretation of fts 
significance. Bailey ( 1964: 1O7) viewed the potential of Africa in terms of a ·rundamental and pure 
mysticism, ranging all the way from nature lrJorship and a primitive animism to a deep occult 
knovJledge and an esoteric understanding which may some day make Africa the seat of the 
purest form of occult teaching and Jiving. This, ho1tJever, Hes centuries ahead.• In these 1111ords 
Bailey seemed to be hypothesising that the African people might some day evolve a very 
sophisticated form of mysticism: but, in line t·'llith the colonial mindset of her time, she indicated 
that this would happen only after many centuries. Needless to say, other post-traditional 
Africanised mystical authors in this study, particularly James and Barashango, did not share her 
reservations to the slightest degree. but were already proposing African forms of mysticism 
adapted to the concerns of the present era. 
The Umbanda religion {Ortiz 1989: 90ff) had already come to terms with the fact that Alricanised 
religion and mysticism had to move beyond their elementary beginnings. And in discussing 
Santeria, Gonzalez-Wippler (1973: 123ff} stated that "the elements contained in sanjeria will play 
~ 
a major role in the development of the new religious movement 1Nhich is coming into world 
consciousness in order to fulfil the spiritual needs of mankind.• Indeed, in her view, the 'diaspora' 
from \iVestern Africa to the Americas had been providentially arranged to allow Africa to make her 
contribution to the imminent transformation of \IVestern society (Gonzalez-Wippler 1973: 122-
123). The NewA.ge influence on Egyptological mystical movements, such as the one Barashango 
belonged to {cf. Barashango 1991: 206), was unmistakable; and the Egyptological trend was not 
restricted to America but of interest to certain authors on the African continent ttself (cf. Kamalu 
1990: Hf, 28 etc,). 
Neimark (1993: 178ff), being less enthusiastic about Western alternative refigion. criticised certain 
New Age trends as mere trivialities, including the habit of hopping from fad to fad instead of 
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committing oneself to a single spiritual discipline and thereby obtaining the fu!fi!ment and 'genuine 
self-rethinking' which was the reward of such commitment; nevertheless his views already 
contained significant parallels with central issues in New Age thought - e.g. cosmic 
consciousness, morai reiativism, ecoiogical concern, quasi-karmic retribution, reincarnation and 
the idea of success and seif-iuitilment as a goal of religion (Neimark 1993: 7, 13, 30). Similarly 
other post-traditional authors in this study, aithough they ~"Jere not expiicitiy Ne~·J Age persons, 
adopted a mystical 1.nJor!dview significantly related - often via Hermetism - to the basic philosophy 
and outlook underMng the modern Net~LA.ge movement. 
6.3 THE !DEAL STATE OF HUMANiiY 
It has already been indicated that post~traditional Africanised authors in this study tended to view 
the ultimate destiny of the human in terms of 'What shall i become?" rather than 'What will 
happen to me')• (8, 1 $),This did not mean, however, that circumstances of future happiness and 
social improvement were irrelevant; but in explicitly post-traditional perspectives in this study 
involving a mystical wor!dview, the element of personal transformation tended to hold a more 
prominent position than was apparent in indigenous African traditionai religion itself. it was 
nevertheless natural that. in worldviews laying emphasis on the close union of matter and spirit 
(cf. 2.2.4} such things as spiritual transformation would not necessarily be vietNed in isolation frnm 
the acquisition of more material benefits for oneself and society. 
6.3, 1 HAPPINESS 
The view of happiness as something temporal rather than purely spiritual was a commonly 
expressed idea in the data: Nkrumah (Axelsen 1934: 233) and other authors expressed 
opposition to a religious pietism that sought happiness beyond this world and not on earth; 
Neimark ( 1993: 2) argued that religion did not have to imply self-denial in the material sphere. 
Sur.dermeier ( 1998: 9~ 10) confirms a concern with the material lf'Jorld or material life as a whole 
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as central to traditional African ideas of happiness. In his words: "Anyone encountering Africans 
will find they are passionate lovers of life .. Africans turn to this 11"11orld in order to experience their 
wholeness• (Sundermeier 1998: 9L Uka ( 1991 c: ·j 63) quoted Ayi;llard Shorter to the effect that 
African spirituaiity was horizoniaiiy oriented rather than 'inward-looking', a feature continued in 
post-traditional ideas on the concept of 'redemption', in so far as it involved social concern. but 
not whoily tiUe of post-traditional ideas in so far as an element of gnosis or intellectual concern 
formed part of the salllation-concept. In general the Egyptological authors of this study tended to 
attempt the integration of inwardness/intellectuality and outwardness/sociality rather than opt for 
one or the other. 
MATERIALITY \ .. ~./ITHOUT IV1ATER!AUSM 
The t111Jo-tNay tendency mentioned above surfaced in the tAJay that some authors acknotAlleclged 
the validity of social or temporal goals, yet in other contexts seemed to speak unfavourably of 
matarialism or attachment to material things (cf. Barashango 1991: 32, 167: Kama!u 1990: 141): 
These statements \/\Jere not necessarily in opposition to the basic norm of temporal happiness, 
but rather represented attempts to quaHfy the desirable form of temporal happiness as being, for 
example, more humanistic than materiaUstically anti-human (cf. Barashango 1991: 32), or based 
more on love of life as a whole than on certain material aspects thereof, as in the vie~'\J of Kamalu 
(1990: 129-130): 
"Happiness is a state of well-being not derived from any particular object in the world, but 
is experienced as a resuft of a total overJiew of one's Hfe and its possibilities. Whereas 
pleasure is related to the love of worldly things, happiness can only stem from love of Hfe 
as a whole.* 
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HOLISM 
hOUSM A/\i'D THE CONCEPT OF HUMAl1ifTY 
The integration of intellectual and social goals was related to an important theme in the post-
traditional Africanised anthropology of many of the authors studied, namely the goal of holism. or 
the harmonious collaboration and integration of all parts of the human. A basis for ho!ism existed 
in the fact that traditional African concepts of humanity tended to be non-Cartesian, and therefore 
was already disposed to consider humanity as an 'indivisible psychophysical unit of mind and 
matter' (cf. Kruger 1991: 95) whose material and spiritual components could not be viewed in 
mutual isolation. Moreover, some vietr~points accepted the consubstantiality of the material and 
spiritual self on a monistic basis (2.2.4); and even where the separability of body and soul (or 
other parts of the self) appeared lo be accepted, their unity and harmonious collaboration was 
deemed to be a desirable ideal (cf. Keita 1984: 63, 64-65) - and the union of (separable) body 
and soul in the Africanised thought of the present study could be contrasted with the \Nestern 
opposition of the tv~o (cf. Neimark 1993: 2, 21ff), for in such thought the flesh and spirit, even 
where distinguished, tended to be two partners rather than two antagonists. 
THE APPUCATION OF HOUSM 
The idea of a harmonious development of au leveis of the human person formed part of post-
traditional educational ideas (5.2.2), and Mutwa (1960: 497) indicated that: 
• .. .if properly linked to the soul with the mind, the brain could exploit all the powers of the 
soul. The ideal is in fact to weld the body, brain, mind, Ena, and soul into one co-
ordinated lfllhole instead of so many scattered entities. Where a person can achieve this, 
he wiU reach ultimate perfection." 
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The ideal of a general integration of an elements of life was important for some authors (Kaboha 
1992: 71; Frye 1983: 91 ). Such an integration was, for them. typical of traditional African religion, 
as opposed to the fragmented and secularised \Nestern perspective on life. It ailo~·Jed for a point 
of contact between physical weifare and spiritual transformation, which in a holistic anthropology, 
particularly one based on Hermetic esotericism, could be viewed as connected. it seemed 
possible that the ideal of integrating the material and spiritual from an Egyptological perspective 
was r.ot unrelated to concern with the reconcrnation of various opposites in the humar. person. as 
in the Egypto!ogical 'ideal man' of Barashango (1991: 155). Barashango said: 
"The universe was created in an equilibrium and it is the subtle and complex interplay 
betltreen the light and the dark that gives the universe its form and its reality. In the 
Deified Man, the paragon of Egyptian [Kemetan] soul science, the opposites are united 
and transcended.• 
6.3.2 FULL HUMANITY 
As far as the types of personal transformation were concerned, post-traditional African authors 
tl'Jith a mystical background admitted several types of ultimate transformation. One could simply 
develop one's human capacities, or one could become one of the ancestors, or one could 
become a hero or shamanistic figure, or one could be absorbed into the divinity itseif. 
THE DIGNITY OF THE HUiUAN 
The status of the human in the post-traditional sources explored in this study tended to be 
ambivalent. Certain sources claiming a connection with indigenous sub-Saharan religion viewed 
the animal as equal to or superior to the human, and these viewpoints have been discussed in 
2.4.2. Other sources, however, notably ones claiming a connection with Egyptian thought, treated 
the human as superior to the animal. Barashango ( 1991 : 206) and Wade Nobles (De Montellano 
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1992: 164) treated the human as a superior life-form evolved from the animal, and the latter 
claimed that the essential melanic system elevated the black person even above the whites on 
the evolutionary scale. James (1954: 7. 83) and Keita (1934: 63) alluded to the Hermetic teaching 
that the human had a divine spark whereby heishe could be allowed to participate in the super-
animal world. From another philosophical point of viet1\J, Jahn (1961: 101-102) mentioned the 
distinction in Kagame's philosophy between MUNTU and KINTU, the linguistic class-distinction 
bettrJeen 'persons' and ihings' in Bantu grammar seeming to imply a sort of qualitative difference 
bettAreen the human and the rest of creation. This conclusion seemed unaffected b~/ the fact !hat 
most Bantu languages placed animals in a class which was etymologically related neither to the 
·1v1uNTU' or the 'KINTU' class in Kinya11111anda: for even in this case, the fact that animals were 
excluded from the noun class denoting people still remained. There seemed to be a general 
tendency in the data to make the human superior to the animal, a tendency which was possibiy 
related to the concern with human intellectual development and innovation in these viet<'Jpoints 
(cf. 5.2.2). 
ANCESTRAL AND HEROIC STATUS 
A very prominent theme in traditional African conceptions of survival of death, was that of the 
ancestors, befief in trolhich could be pointed to as a sign that traditional African culture beUeved in 
immortality (Chavunduka 1994: 58). Whether reverence for the dead was part and parcei of 
Egyptian culture, as Keita (1984: 59) claimed, or a Nordic invention, as Diop (1990: 156) claimed. 
the fact remained that traditional sub-Saharan African religion made much of this motif (cf. 
Griaule 1965: 26, 27, 123, etc.}. The ancestors were a source ofll'Jisdom (cf. Kaboha 1992: 70, 
75; Barashango 1991: 206) and even of terror (Some 1994: 34-35); their place in African refigion 
could not be denied them, despite the fact that it t111as often embarrassing (cf. \Niredu 1995: 164-
165). If they were not gods - and indeed the Hermetic authors of the study could not, in terms of 
their monism, deny this outright, though less Egyptofogised authors fike Uka (1991a: 47) could be 
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found to represent them as non-divine intermediaries - the ancestors were nevertheless 
ubiquitous. 
RETENTION OF THE ANCESTRAL CULT 
Many authors accepted that the ancestral cult in African religion was something that should not 
be suppressed: in fact Neimark (1993: 21-27) claimed that even 111Jhites (/\Jere obliged to venerate 
their wm ancestors if they wanted to derive maximum benefits from the religion of lfa. He 
recommended that a glass of t."Jater be left to evaporate as a sort of sacrifice to be symboHcally 
'drunk' in this way by the ancestor: and he even urged a fellow convert to Yoruba ways - a white 
girl, who had become a priestess - to forgive and venerate the spirit of her dead father, despite 
the fact that that this ancestral veneration was foreign to Jt.Jhite culture and rettgion, and that, 
according to her claims, her father, while he had lived, had been very unpleasant to her. Neimark 
was the only white author in the. study to claim that whites should venerate their ancestors: but 
black authors were more ready to recommend and defend ancestral veneration and i:elated 
practices. In fact, Some (1994: 9-10) claimed that the white race needed some form of ancestral 
heaHng. 
ANCESTORS, SURVIVAL AND HEROIC COMtv1Elv10RATION 
The theme of the ancestors was often brought up in connection with debates on immortatity and 
survival: reference has alr~ady been made to ancestral reincarnation (6.1.2) and the relationship 
of the ancestors to the parts of the self (6 .1.1). There was a tendency in post-traditional thought to 
think of ancestors in the context of survival of death and the transmission of culture, rather than in 
the context of ancestral ritual: for Barashango (1991: 187, 206) the ancestors seemed to be not 
so much personages to be placated as repositories of ancient wisdom and a manifestation of 
racial survival in the spirit world. This made ancestral veneration something closely related to 
herolatry or heroic veneration, the practice of venerating the memory of persons who had made 
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significant cuftural contributions to one's race in the past. Barashango (1991: vii) endorsed heroic 
veneration, even to the point of claiming that the gods and goddesses of ancient Western 
religions were derived from African heroes; and sentiments of heroic veneration could be found in 
Zulu thought, as expounded by rvtutwa (s.a.: 185), and in the heroic ethic associated with the cult 
of Ogun (2.5.2). 
MESS!ANJC STATUS 
A. recurring feature in several post-traditional African authors tr~as that of the Messianic figure. 
Tne iespect for Messianic figures uncovered in this study seemed to be related to heroic 
veneration and to personify various forms of human excellence, including in some cases even 
wisdom or inteiiigence. Some of the messianic concepts were related to the Christian tradition 
(3.5.2) while others had a non-Christian source. 
MYTHOLOGICAL FIGURES 
In traditional African reffgion some quasi-Messianic motifs surfaced in the form of culture-heroes, 
such as the smith of Dogon mythology, and, from the same tradition, the mythical figure Lebe 
who unde!V'Jent death in order to gain the secret of the Third Word from the Seventh Ancestor (cf. 
Griaule 1965: 56ff, 86ff). The narrative material related byMutwa (1966: 148), on the basis of a 
hitherto secret Zulu tradition to which he claimed access, referred to a heroic figure Lumukanda 
who personified the continuity of fife. 
REGAL FIGURES 
In more post-traditional thought, the Messianic symbolism seemed to feature more prominently, 
and to be connected ~'llith socio-political aspiration. Africanised Christian and Islamic movements 
had their divinised Messianic figures and prophets, but owing to the non-Christian siani of this 
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study these did not figure widely in the data actualty' explored. Nevertheless signs of this trend 
tr.Jere not absent from movements which were in fact included in this study, on the grounds of 
being apparently based on pantheistic reincarnationism rather than a standard Semitic worldview. 
Rastafarianism had its Emperor Ras Tafari, identified with the divinity within (cf. Legesse 1994: 
331), and Barashango (1991: 83ff, 166) recognised Jesus and the avatars of the East as Black 
Messiahs, personifying stages in human evolution. The tendency in post-colonial politics to rely 
on visionary leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah seemed to have features in common tivith political 
IV1essianism, in so far as the leader tNas vie!t'Jed as beyond criticism and in that sense quasi-divine 
(cf. Assimeng 1999: 229). Such divinisation of leaders was also visible in the way that Rawlings, 
one of Nkrumah's successors as leader of Ghana, was described as 'Junior Jesus' by the Rev. 
Damuah, who later left the Catholic Church to initiate a reformed variety of African traditional 
religion (Assimeng 1988: 242). 
FIGURES OF WISDOM 
An interesting form of l'v1essianic 'veneration' was the tribute which the thinker Cheikh Ant a Diop 
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received, as incarnation of the •pharaonic Principle-, a divine principle within every individual, 
said to be personified by the Egyptian Pharaoh (Finch 1986: 227ff). This showed two things about 
the post-traditional African Messianic motif uncovered in the data: firsti'f .. it could (especially in 
Egyptologised thought} be appffed to exemplars of wisdom as well as political heroes, and, 
secondly, the Messianic state could be viewed, by some schools of thought, as a goal attainable 
in some sense by any individual, through sufficient development towards full humanity and 
realisation of the divineness within. The Egyptian veneration of Thoth, who according to Bernal 
(1987: 144) was an ordinary sage subsequently thought of by posterity as a god, seemed to be 
reminiscent of the aforementioned veneration of Cheikh Anta Diop. According to James (1954: 
134) the 1Nisdom of the Egyptians allov.1ed every sufftcient~ trained Egyptian priest to gain pOll'.Jer 
over the forces of nature, exercised in the name of the divinity itself. This suggested that the motif 
of shaman or magus mentioned in the last chapter (5.3.3) could be viewed as connected with the 
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Egyptologised Messianic motif; for both sorts of symbolism effectively personified the attainment 
of a god-like or divinely related state of accomplishment while in human form, a vivid example of 
the ideal union of humanity ~'\11th the pm.'llers behind nature. 
GOD-REALISATION 
Many of the authors of the study did not assign any definite terminus to the development of the 
human beyond death, apart from reincarnation or ancestral existence. In ~ilutwa's religion a soul 
could attain a state of damnation, in the sense of being unable to reincarnate (MuttrJa 1960: 243), 
but otheMise the cycle seemed to just go on indefinitely. Those authors who did hold a concept 
of humankind's ultimate destiny tended to view it as God-realisation or the absorption of 
individuality into an immanentist divinity, in line with NetrJ Age or Hermetic concepts (cf. 
Barashango 1991: 206). Such absorption did not necessarily rule out subsequent reincarnation 
as a divinised or Messianic person. In fact, it was to be expected that in a s-yTichrnnic creative 
cosmology cf the sort described in 2.4.1 the process of creation, and the eternal cycles it implied, 
could never wholly end or be superseded: an absorption into God meant simp~/ an identification 
with the ongoing synchronic creative process, and so the end in effect became once more the 
beginning. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The goals of post-traditional Africanised religious life, as could be gathered from the previous 
paragraph, were difficult to articulate when the concepts involved transcended the linear temporal 
frame of reference: but within the framework of earthly hfe (or rives) it was more easy to specify 
what religious goals were the object of one's spiritual and developmental strategies. 
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Common or recurrent themes in the data were as foUows: 
First~/, some idea of immortaUty or survival was generally accepted (6.1 ), and this concept often 
involved the possibility of return to the physical world through reincarnation (6.1.2) although 
Christian-style resurrection tl\las not widely accepted (6.1.4). The concept of an abrupt termination 
of the ongoing cycles of nature, as in Semitic eschatology, did not play a major role in concepts of 
ultimate destiny (6.3.2). 
Secondly, the nature of the human tended to be conceived holistically, though usually not 
materialistically (6.3.1), as involving participation in various levels or aspects of life, which were 
occasionally expressed by means of an anthropology assigning many invisible parts to the self 
(6.1.1). 
Thirdly, confidence 1<-\Sas shown by many authors in the ability of the African individual to fashion 
hiSJher Otl'Jn destiny (6.2), and, by knowledge and social action, to effect his/her own happiness 
(6.2.1) especially in the temporal sphere (6.3.1). Expectations for the future of Africa were 
optimistic (6.2.2) and veneration for the past of Africa, in the form of ancestors and heroes, ~'\las 
taken for granted. Messianic motifs tended to emerge in various forms, more noticeably in an 
Egyptological context (6.3.2). 
Areas of disagreement or differing emphasis involved the definition of humanity (6.3.2), individual 
spirituality (6.1.1, 6.1.3) and reincarnation (6.1.2), and it was difficult to obtain clear ideas about 
individuality apart from the body, much less a consensus on the same. Concepts about 
Messianism (6.3.2) and the future of Africa (6.2.2) also tended to have varying emphases, and 
this was perhaps in keeping with post-traditional ideas about the free self-determination of one's 
own spiritual destiny and the future of one's country. 
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Preference was shown in the data for ideas of the afterfife or the future of the human that made 
human destiny immanent in this world and/or open to participation by people in this world. 
Bet\.-,,een concepts of the afterlife and God-concepts there were several significant connections, 
and the idea of Messianic figures - such as ordinary people, like Cheikh Anta Diop, could become 
- offered a personification both of divinity, of survival, of African values, and of development in 
knowledge or political power. Even among certain vie1npoints tNhere the Western Jesus ~'\las 
decentralised or even denied, the ideal of the Messiah or venerable superior human incarnation 
seemed to remain a powerful symbol. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
The emergent religiosity of post-traditional Africa and Africanised thought, as uncovered in this 
study, may be characterised by 11 ... 110 facets: elements of agreement and elements of debate. The 
former facet arguably expresses the inclusive, social and community-oriented side of the type of 
religion discussed in this report, trJhile the elements of debate signify where individuality and 
creative thought have their contribution to make to emergent Africanised religion. The future of 
the reiigious orientations described in the previous chapters is uncertain: but the areas of 
agreement and disagreement in the data are possible indications of what ideas, respectively, 
shall remain as recurrent or popular trends post-traditionai Africanised thought on the one hand, 
and what shaii offer opportunities for innovative or creative thought about reiigion and Africa on 
the other, against the background of these popular trends. 
These areas of agreement and disagreement, owing to U1e way in which the data of this study 
have been arranged, are aU understandable in terms of an overarching perceived contextual 
matrix (consisting of perceived intervening conditions, perceived historical conditions, and 
perceived aspects of the immediate context) in terms of which strategies are taken with various 
goals in mind. Since post-traditional Africanised religion is a pluralised and non-monolithic 
phenomenon, this framett.Jork should be understood not as a monofithic ideology of praxis 
undertaken within a monolithic tradition, but as an inteBectual climate of shared and debated 
ideas in relation to which various plans are made and proposed to various audiences, ~nd various 
goals are visualised, some in a widespread fashion, others less so. 
7.1 AREAS OF AGREEMENT IN POST-TRADITIONAL AFRICAN RELIGIOUS 
AUTHORS IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLORATION 
Viet111ed from its inclusive, consensual and community-oriented aspect, the post-traditional African 
inteUectual climate appears. on the basis of summarised areas of agreement in the data studied, 
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to be moving in the direction of a non-secular interdisciplinary and optimistic Africanised model of 
thought. The background, strategies and goals of the non-mononthic interdiscipHnarism found in 
the sources studied, which are indicative of certain features of post-traditional African religiosity 
that may require further study, may be outlined as follows. 
Intervening, historical and contextual conditions of ideology: The post-traditional African 
thought of the sources consulted in this study tended to prefer inclusive and immanentist God-
concepts, and to articulate interdiscipBnary cosmologies where religious and scientific ideas are 
not opposed to one another. These attempts 1.~re not unrelated to efforts to decolonise the 
African mind from its domination by Western science and religion. \/\Jithin this framev.iork of 
inclusiveness there were attempts to recognise the importance of Africa and its heritage, and to 
redefine its relationship with Western and other cultures, sometimes globally and inclusively, 
sometimes in a more critical fashion, especially in the light of colonial experience. The values and 
cultural potential of indigenous African tradition were explored in various ways, particularly in the 
realm of the sacredness of land and the family, and the integration of religion with Hfe was tfpheld 
as a praiseworthy traditional achievement. Logocentric motifs (i.e. those centered on the theme of 
" 
_.a 
the ffving Word) related to African and Western befiefs tended to be valued by many of the 
sources of the present research, partk:ularly those of West African derivation, as the principles of 
an ordered cosmology. 
Strategies: There was a widespread tendency in the authors of this study to resist the idea that 
African culture must be bacJ:ward or retrogressive. To this end beffefs in traditional medicine and 
witchcralt 1r.tere discussed, and often evaluated positively. Frequently adopted strategies in the 
post-traditional Africanised thought indicated by this study were the humanistic and Afrlcanised 
reinterpretation of science and education, and the adoption of a rationalisation of the mystical and 
magical, often according to New Age or Egyptological precedents. The themes of the Word, and 
of a concern for experientially based beief and refigion, were important features in the post-
traditional Africanised consciousness of many thinkers. 
2..?9 
Goals: The goal of the strategies mentioned in the previous paragraph, as ideologies often found 
in association with social action, seemed to be in most cases a holistic ideal of satisfaction for 
Africans and others in the material world; and in certain post-traditional Africanised authors there 
were signs of increasing confidence in the abifity of Africans, and of individuais in general, to fuifii 
goals in the material t111orld by means of personal effort and struggle. Many thinkers were of the 
opinion that the goal of happiness did not have to be cut short by death, but might be looked 
fontJard to in the form of immortality and sur.1ival, particularly by means cf reincarnation. 
Veneration of the African past (especially as represented by the ancestors), and optimism for the 
African future, ~-.iere influential in many post-traditional visions. 
7.2 DEBATED iSSUES iN POST·TRADiTiONAL AFRICAN RELIGIOUS 
AUTHORS IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLORAT!ON 
Viewed from its creative; controversial, polarised and individuafised aspect, on the basis of areas 
of disagreement in the data studied, the inteUectual climate of post-traditionalAfricanised thought 
appears to invo!Ve various definitional questions, notably that of the self-definition of African 
people in relation to the West. \/\/ithout any implication that aU post-traditional Africanised 
viewpoints are preoccupied with the debates in question, the forms of background, strategies and 
goals vmich were found in the present study to be associated with the controversial side of post-
traditional Africanised religiosity, and could probably be identified as important areas of more 
detailed future research in post-traditional African t'.lought, can be outfined as follows. 
Intervening, historical and contextual conditions of ideology: The themes of violence and 
conflict in theology, cosmology and values gave rise to differing opinions in the sources consulted 
in this study: for example, not au authors were agreed on whether to positively or negatively 
evaluate the idea of a personal God who judges the creation, and moreover the significance of 
patriarchal symboffsm in the African tradition and the role of evil in the cosmos was found to be a 
debated issue. The idea of history, and its relation to the timeless and mythical cosmology of 
230 
traditional sub-Saharan Africa, was also a controverted matter. The problem, in particular, of ~.mat 
to make of \/'Jestem history, culture and philosophy, and of the hist~ry of an ~frican' Egypt, could 
give rise to conciUatoiy or critical approaches to the West. and the area of racial confrontation 
could involve definite polarisations of opinions ranging from support for racial equaUty to overt 
anti-ttJhite hostiUty. The conflict of individualism and communalism, and the problem of reconcifing 
individual and intellectual progress v.iith social order, could be expected to generate varying moral 
and political theories. The inclusiveness of Africanised worldviews was sometimes brought into a 
situation of confrontation with the particular demands of African historical situations, especially 
those of conflict and violence, and there was no one agreed-on way to articulate the ideological 
background of simultaneous inclusiveness and harsh struggle. 
Strategies: Definitional issues 1nere important points of controversy in the adoption of religious 
and intellectual responses to the ideological situation: What was 'science'?· What ll'JaS 'magic'? 
What was 'mysticism'? vVhat was 'knowledge'? Generally most variation in ideas of strategy found 
among the authors of this study 1111ere of the definitional variety, authors being found to agr~ that 
irJhat we needed was inteHectual progress, gro~\lth in knowledge, or social action: or mystical 
insight, yet to differ in the understanding of the same. Methods of mystical achievement varied 
from source to source, and this disagreement could be readily separated from definitional issues 
about mysticism itself: how mysticism was done. and what it was, were not wholly separable 
issues. The post-traditional African variation of opinion in the sources studied on strategies of 
contextual response was not unrelated to differences in the constitution and evaluation of the 
context itself, by means of traditional and post-traditional ideas and moral systems. Once an 
idiosyncratic way of 'seeing' and 1udging' ~'.las chosen, the recommended strategy of 'acting' 
could be expected to follow precedents set by perceived and evaluated conditions. 
Goals: Definitional issues, judging by the picture presented by the data of this report, tended to 
be the main focus of variation of opinion about goals as well as s1ra1egies in post-traditional 
A.fricanised thought: \/I/hat was humanity, or the individual, or reincarnation? How did one 
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understand the ideal human or Messianic figure? And most important, what was the 'happiness' 
we expected for the future of Africa? 
The creative or individual thrust of contemporary post-traditionalAfricanised thought, as far as the 
data of this study were representative of it, seemed to follow a common thread of self-definition 
and definition of strategies and goals: African self-understanding in relation to history, and the 
knowledge of where Africa is headed, and the significance of the individual in relation to his/her 
people, and the decision tAJhether or not to take sides in a conflict, racial or othemise, were all 
basically definitional questions. A search for identity of some sort, communal or personal, seemed 
to be a principal motivation behind ideas proposed for debate, or behind the adoption of 
differences of emphasis in the exposition of the African heritage. 
7.3 SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS FACED BY POST-TRADITIONAL AFRICAN 
RELIGIOSITY 
in the course of researching areas of agreement and disagreement among the sources used in 
this study, several possible problem areas in contemporary Africanised thought suggested 
themselves. Possible problems exist for post-traditional Africanised thought in the follottving areas: 
Problems in Constitution of the Ideological Context: The problem of absolutising the relative 
is a problem surfacing both in the paradoxes/contradictions of immanentist post-traditional 
Africanised God-concepts, and also in value systems ~"Jhich can adhere rigidly in a quasi-absolute 
fashion to norms originally devised from a pragmatic or relativist point of view. The danger of 
dictatorial manipulation of negotiable God-concepts and values, and the role of objectivised 
democratic values and refigion as a defence against the same, is not taken seriously in a post-
colonial context by many authors, and Afrocentric prejudice seems to find its way into many forms 
of interreligious study and politics. The interaction of cultural exposition and critical reason in a 
post-traditional African viewpoint can on occasion take the form of a defence of African culture as 
an end in itself, and the deflection of critical reason outtNards, towards whites and the West, thus 
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reinforcing anti-white prejudice. The \/\/estern individualist conceptions of intellectual development 
and freedom/democracy seem significantly threatened by such a process. 
Problems in Strategies and Goals: The concern with rehabifrtating 'African science' and 
decolonising the mind of the African can give rise to Nell'J-Age~like systems open to the stock 
criticisms generally raised against paranormal belief by V\festem sceptics. Significant and g!oba!!y 
noticeable effects of 'African Science' on the West have yet to be noticed, although the ideas do 
have some subjective impact in the challenging of quantitative-research biases. The social and 
other goais of post-traditional Africanised thought, as manifested in the data, are often this-
worldly to the extent of being short-term. Optimism is shown, broad strategies for transformation 
are articulated, and expectations are high, but detailed or specific plans of social reconstruction. 
apart from those originated or proposed by post-colonial leaders themsetves, seem not to be pi..1 
fon1'Jard or implemented on a large scale by non-politicians. 
The problems of post-traditional Africanised refigiosity, as far as the sources of this study are 
representative, seem to aggregate around the themes of post-colonial dictatorial manipulation of 
ideology, Afrocentric bias. the uncertainty of the efficacy of proposed transformative strategies, 
the problem of simultaneous rigidity and lack of firm ground in values, and the fundamental 
philosophical problem of the abso!utisation of the relative. 
An important future priority for the siudy of post-traditional Africanised thought is therefore the 
degree to which rationaliiy and freedom may be safeguarded against the influence of pro-African 
cultural or political attachments, and the problems which such attempts must face. 
7.4 OTHER DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Certain other aspects of post-traditional African and Africanised thought also seem likely to 
require further study. As was already mentioned in the introductory chapter, this present study 
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has concentrated on the ideology and beliefs found in literaiy sources bearing on post-traditional 
African thought. Yet there is still a need to investigate further how these beliets relate to real life 
and history, to 1°'.lhat extent they are verifiable, and hottJ they are lived in practice by their 
adherents in daily life. A comprehensive history of post-traditional African thought, inciuding ail of 
the trends consulted in this study, including the 'melanin scholars, the Osaist reHgion of 
Osabutey-A..guedze, the philosophy of Kamalu, and the crnss-fertilisation of indigenous Afiican 
and Afro-American philosophies and religious viet•Jpoints, has yet to be t•.iritten at all. much less 
commented on. P.nd the history of this religiosity continues as we speak. 
The principal issues dealt with in the literary sources consulted have been summarised, in the 
above classlflcations of the inclusive and controversial sides of post-traditional Africanised 
!hough!. in lerms of background, strategies and goais. issues deserving of further investigation in 
the iight of these themes inciude the various attempts to formulate interdisciplinaiY worldvie!/IJS in 
which science, magic, mysticism and reiigion are all combined, and the various attempts to 
redetine Africa as an equal or superior, and not an inferior partner L'Jith the \/Vest. The 
comparative study of African and Eastern l/\JOridviews is at present a neglected one, but one 
lf\lhich may become important in the context of the nEW.J mystical and Hermetic tendencies present 
in post-traditional African viewpoints, which tend to present a 1Norldview reminiscent of certain 
trends in Eastern thought. The approach of such issues without undue Afrocentric distortion is 
imperative. 
But, in a morn distincthiely Afiican conteA1, a noticeable feature of many of the post-tiaditlonal 
vitwJpoints investigated in the present research is the way in tNhich they are attempting to 
combine African thought with a culture of learning and the inteDect, alphabetising and 
modernising traditional religious orientations, yet striVing not to make too many concessions to 
Western secularism. Whether or not one sympathises with post-traditional Africanised religion 
and mysticism. it is undeniable that a culture of learning and progressive development, adapted 
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to indigenous African ways of life, is something which the people of Africa certainly require for the 
attainment of their goals of individual, national and social fulfilment in the contemporary world. 
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